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Abstract 
 
‘A mother first, last, and always’: A theological study, through life stories, of mothering a child 
on the autism spectrum. 
 
This research seeks to offer a practical theological reflection on the experience of mothering a 
child on the autism spectrum.  
 
I begin by exploring contemporary literature on disability and autism to critically assess the 
tensions between the everyday challenges of daily mothering, and the wider impact of social 
attitudes and policies which occlude this experience. Adopting a feminist phenomenological 
approach, I then undertake an analysis of mothers’ life stories. These include my own 
autoethnographic writing, published memoirs and life story interviews. I draw on these to 
construct a theological reflection on the challenges experienced by mothers of children with a 
diagnosis of autism and use this as a basis to critique the existing theological literature in this 
field. Finally, I propose that the lived experience of the mothers necessitates a theological 
response which attends to the complexity and unsettled nature of lived experiences which 
resist incorporation into normative epistemic frameworks. It requires a theology of 
‘unresolvement’.  
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Prologue:  The beginning. 
 
After a long and arduous pregnancy, I remember his first months seeming effortless. We 
existed in a blissful bubble. Placid but inquisitive, he fed well, slept well, laughed and 
cuddled. He was affectionate, but not needy. I was naively smug in my ability to mother this 
tiny human. We knew each other intuitively, him and I. Two halves of a whole. But as his first 
birthday neared… our symbiosis began to fragment; dissolving slowly, but insidiously.  
By 8 months old, my once peaceful baby had become habitually disconsolate. His cries were 
impossible to predict and even more impossible to soothe. Something had shifted with him 
and I. Imperceptible, yet pivotal. A gnawing unease had begun to form in my belly. The 
intuitive ease with which I had always been able to anticipate his needs had evaporated, 
seemingly overnight, and I was paralysed by my inability to understand him. Something was 
wrong. 
It felt like weeks since he had slept. Those days had turned into nights, nights in which day 
light was simply replaced by the glow of the alarm clock, the minutes and hours ticking by 
almost mockingly. Those nights his cries, seemingly without purpose or interruption, would 
seem to last an eternity. I nursed. I held. I sang. I paced. One particular night marked the end 
of a week so long I could no longer do anything but sit on the bed and rock, trying futilely to 
guide my screaming child to a breast he did not want. By the time morning came, the soft 
light flickering through the curtains, I too was weeping. ‘Please stop’, I murmured, over and 
over, a record scratched and jumping, constantly repeating; a desperate nursery rhyme 
which calmed neither he nor I.  
My mother joyfully threw open the bedroom door, brandishing a huge balloon and a bouquet 
of flowers. ‘It’s Mother’s Day!’ she exclaimed. I had forgotten. Of course I had, the night had 
lasted weeks. The realisation that I had welcomed my first Mother’s Day broken and 
weeping, and that I had not been the one to first waken the wonderful creature before me with 
the flowers and excitement which she greeted me, wrought fresh sobs from my chest. My 
mother’s smile faltered as she took in the scene before her. Wordlessly, she took the baby 
from my arms. ‘It’s…he’s…and I…I can’t,’ I wheezed between sobs, staring down at the now 
empty space in my arms. With my baby deftly tucked under one arm, my mother turned her 
attention to her baby, now grown. Gently, she eased me back into bed. 
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‘Oh, my darling,’ she said. ‘But you can. There will be many more mother’s days, and many 
more nights like this before them. This baby will take every last ounce of energy and love you 
have, and you will still find more to give him. That’s what it means to be a mother. And that’s 
why we get the flowers.’ As always, my wonderful mother was right. There would be many 
more Mother’s Days. There would be many more flowers. But there would also be many 
more tears.  
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Introduction  
Nature of the Thesis  
 
This thesis critically examines the distinct maternal experience of parenting a child on the 
autism spectrum. Illuminating the complex and often conflicting emotions of this experience 
through my own and other’s shared life stories, it will seek to reflect on how practical 
theology may attend to the occluded theological challenges these narratives present. Swinton 
and Mowat suggest that ‘the questions that emerge in the light of the human experience of 
God are often different from those which emerge from the solitude of the academic’s office’ 
(2006, 7). This particular research topic has emerged in the light of what has been a deeply 
challenging lived experience. My son was diagnosed with autism aged 6. The years prior to 
this were filled with confusion, frustration, fear and guilt. My beautiful, sweet natured child 
would disappear without warning, leaving behind a furious, terrifying stranger, whose actions 
and motives were inexplicable even to him. While we have always travelled hand in hand, 
just him and I, the road has been far from smooth. 
It has now been 5 years since his diagnosis. While we have journeyed a long way from the 
dark and bewildering days of pre-diagnosis; that road has been paved with tumultuous, 
twisting and circuitous emotions. As a theologian, who became a mother of a child with 
autism, I attempted to locate my maternal experience within the theologies available to me. 
Surely, I considered, I would find myself somewhere on these pages? Surely, I would 
stumble across our pain, our joy, our fury or our triumph on a shelf somewhere, and be able 
to apply some meaning or understanding to our experience? This was not the case. Despite 
increasing interdisciplinary research confirming that autism, peculiarly and significantly, has 
been found to impact maternal well-being and mental health more profoundly than other 
developmental conditions (Estes et al 2009, 376; Giallo et al 2011, 466; Zhang et al 2015, 
29), very little attention has been given as to how autism affects mothers; what challenges 
autism presents in everyday life, how these challenges meaningfully and substantially change 
the lived experience of motherhood, and how this really feels for the women who are living it.  
In the course of this research, I was approached by a friend and educator who inquired 
whether I would be willing to facilitate what she, quite aptly, called ‘A Meet and Greet1’ for 
other mothers of children with additional support needs. In supporting these families, this 
 
1 For the clarity of non-Scottish readers, ‘greet’ in this context refers to the practice of ‘greetin’’, a very Scottish 
way of describing sobbing one’s heart out.  
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wonderful woman saw that the network of support available to them was insufficient in 
attending to what they really needed. These women did not need to be taught more about 
autism, or how to parent their autistic child. Parents of children on the spectrum learn very 
quickly to be experts not only in autism but in their own spectrum children, becoming their 
advocates and champions (Nicholas et al 2016, 926). 
Rather, what she identified, and what I myself had been becoming aware of, was that they 
had no space to speak of their struggles. They were silenced, often ashamed, in their struggle; 
caught between love for their children and utter exhaustion. In reflecting upon this silenced 
struggle, theirs and mine, I considered that perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of the 
parental experience of autism is that it is often hidden; it is marginalised socially, 
academically, and theologically. In order to demonstrate the particularity of this occluded 
issue, I will go on to contextualise the complex, interrelating and conflicting socio-political 
conditions that shape the experience of autism, and which coalesce to create a distinct 
maternal challenge. 
Situating the Context- Autism in Scotland 
 
Autism is a life-long, developmental condition currently impacting 1.035% (103.5 per 
10,000) percent of the Scottish population2. It is characterised by delayed development in 
early childhood, and abnormalities in three specific areas of cognitive function: social 
interaction, communication, and behaviour3. However, whilst autism can be seen to exist as a 
distinct diagnostic category 4 , its symptomology is so diverse and multivariant in both 
severity and complexity that it remains a much misunderstood condition.  
In 2001, The Scottish Government issued ‘The Scottish Strategy for Autism,’detailing 26 
short, median, and long-term goals in achieving its aim:  
 
2 https://www.gov.scot/publications/microsegmentation-autism-spectrum/pages/9/  
Accessed 12/02/20 11.49am  
3 International Classification of diseases 
https://icd.who.int/browse10/2016/en#/F84.5  
4 There are a multitude of terms used to describe both autism and those with an autism diagnosis. Whilst 
‘Autism’ and ‘Aspergers’ were initially thought to be separate diagnosis, increasingly these terms are being used 
interchangeably to describe what is now commonly referred to as ASD (Autism Spectrum Disorder). It is 
important to note that are contestations around appropriate terminology for describing persons with autism (see 
Kenny et al (2016) ‘Which terms should be used to describe Autism? Perspectives from the UK Autism 
community.’). However, this remains largely personal preference. Given that I am representing a multitude of 
voices in this thesis, I do not adopt any one term but rather use a full ‘spectrum’ of terms interchangeably to 
reflect the diversity of opinions and research relating to the definition of autism.  
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…that individuals on the autism spectrum are respected, accepted and valued by their 
communities and have confidence in services to treat them fairly so that they are able 
to have meaningful and satisfying lives (2011, 9).  
With the estimated national cost for individuals with ASD (Autism Spectrum Disorders) 
estimated at £2.292 billion per annum, and financial costs to families estimated to be between 
£3,813 and £4,479 per annum, 5 the importance of providing timely and appropriate support 
to individuals and families affected by autism has very real material implications for public 
policy in Scotland. Given the breadth and pervasiveness of autism symptomology, successful 
strategies for autism support are expected to traverse health, education, and social welfare 
policy. Despite Scotland’s commitment to the just treatment of people with autism, there is 
currently no cohesive autism strategy implemented nationally; rather, regional health boards 
are expected to put forward their own strategies for meeting the aims of the Scottish Strategy 
for Autism’s 2011 report. As of 2015, Glasgow City Council’s autism strategy was still 
presented as a ‘draft’ report6. With strategies varying dependent on region, access to 
diagnosis and support for families within Scotland can arguably be seen to be inconsistent 
and insufficient in meeting national aims.  
Indeed, despite approaching almost a decade since the release of the 2011 Scottish Strategy 
report, many of the central short-term goals have still yet to be achieved. In 2014, a study 
published by Autism ACHIEVE Alliance7 found that in children, the average wait from 
referral to diagnosis was 331 days. A more recent article from the National Autistic Society 
(2016)8 continued to petition for the government to bring autism diagnosis time in line with 
the current NHS guidelines for 18 weeks from referral to treatment.  Research has shown that 
delays in receiving a timely diagnosis can significantly impact outcomes for children and 
contribute to significant mental health affects for parents and care givers (Zelzazo et al 2001, 
40; Sansoti et al 2002, 81).  
 
5 https://www.gov.scot/publications/microsegmentation-autism-spectrum/pages/10/ Accessed 12/02/20 11.49am  
6 
http://www.glasgow.gov.uk/Councillorsandcommittees/viewSelectedDocument.asp?c=P62AFQDNT10GT1UT
2U Accessed 12/02/20 14.11pm  
7 Waiting for Assessment Executive Summary (2014) ACHIEVE Alliance 
https://www.autismnetworkscotland.org.uk/files/2014/11/AAA-ASD-Waiting-for-Assessment-Executive-
Summary.pdf Accessed 12/02/20 
8 https://www.autism.org.uk/get-involved/media-centre/news/2016-07-06-scottishguidelines.aspx Accessed 
12/02/20 15.20pm 
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Within my specific local authority (whose autism strategy also remains in draft format), there 
are currently no guidelines for follow-up support from health care professionals following a 
single diagnosis for ASD9. Parents who receive a stand-alone diagnosis of autism are often 
left with more questions than answers after receiving a diagnosis, and few places to go to ask. 
Often, parents are directed to non-profit organisations and local carer groups for information 
and support following a diagnosis, however utilisation of these services depends on the 
proactive and independent engagement of the parent in seeking social support and advice. 
This is particularly concerning, as for many parents the days and months following diagnosis 
can be an extremely confusing and distressing time. Furthermore, the everyday demands of 
caregiving can often inhibit individuals from having the time and financial resources 
available to them to access support (Tomeney 2017, 907). For parents living in Scotland, the 
experience of autism can thus arguably be seen to be profoundly shaped by inconsistent and 
inadequate social policies which prolong and complicate the process of attaining support. In 
this respect, I have considered the lived experience of Scottish mothers particularly revealing 
in illuminating the complexity of challenges associated with raising a child on the autism 
spectrum as deeply social, political and relational.  
A Distinct Maternal Experience 
 
While current research pertaining to autism care giving predominantly utilises the relatively 
gender-neutral term of ‘parenting,’ the literature itself paradoxically reflects that the 
experience of parenting even typically developing children remains strongly gendered. Karen 
Christopher, in her analysis of dominant motherhood ideologies amongst working mothers 
notes that even women who consider themselves to be independent and economically stable 
in their own right, often continue to adopt traditional patterns of gendered division of labour 
within the home, performing almost double the amount of housework as their male partners 
(2010, 74). This ‘sexual and familial division of labour’ (Pollock 1999, 71) is extensively 
reflected in the literature examining parenting of children with additional support needs, 
particularly in relation to autism spectrum disorders. Research conducted by Marshall and 
Bonita indicates that the care giving demands of parenting a child on the spectrum are 
consistently more occupied by the mother in comparison to the father (2005, 105). Tomeney 
 
9 This differs in the cases where Autism presents with other co-morbidities which typically require medication, 
such as ADHD and Tourettes (Tic Disorder).  
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et al also support this assertion, observing that ‘mothers, who often serve as primary 
caregivers, appear to be particularly affected by these unique challenges’ (2017, 907).  
Although fathers are certainly impacted by this parental journey, they are not the subject of 
this thesis. An insight into the lives of fathers would doubtless offer a significant contribution 
to this discussion, however I propose that their experiences differ to those of mothers 
significantly enough that they would be beyond the scope of this thesis to attend to. As I will 
demonstrate in subsequent chapters, mothers have been particularly and peculiarly implicated 
in the history of autism (see chapter two, section 2.2b); consequently, this thesis looks to the 
lives of mothers as affected by the experience of autism in ways which are distinctive to 
mothers. 
The emotional responses which can be seen to accompany the myriad of challenges faced in 
mothering a child with a lifelong developmental condition such as autism are often 
complicated and conflicting. The struggles of parents whose children are on the autism 
spectrum are thus often carefully and skilfully hidden. To express grief or disappointment in 
our mothering situation can feel like a denial of our child.  We fear that perhaps we do not 
love him or her enough if we admit to such emotions. The stigma associated with confessing 
such complicated feelings is also prohibitive, and so the world of an autism mother can be a 
lonely, silent place. This experience is also theologically silent, as we have yet to develop a 
theology which adequately reflects the complexity of this particular maternal experience. 
Current theologies of disability are limited, and often still rely on essentialist notions of 
disability as something which is fully embodied or medicalised (Swinton 2012, 444). 
Conversely, theologies of motherhood often depict a normative experience of mothering, 
which does not attend to the added complexity of caring for additional support needs.  
Motherhood is hard. What is harder still is that we are often left unable to speak of how hard 
it can be without fear of shame or judgement. As a consequence the real, lived experience of 
motherhood can become hidden, stigmatised and silenced. The feelings, experiences and 
stories we hold inside can become lost as we are unable to find a meaningful space in the 
narrative of motherhood which allows for them to be told. Joan Laird describes this as the 
‘unstory;’ the stories that are too shameful or painful for us to share (Laird 1991, 437). It is 
this aspect of motherhood, the ‘unstories’ which we feel compelled to keep hidden, that is too 
often neglected in our reading of maternal experience. In situations such as these Heather 
Walton observes that ‘there may be times when we take brave decisions to share experiences 
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that are -painful to us, because their telling may be of benefit to others’ (2014, pxxix). And 
so, brave or otherwise, in revealing and reflecting on our ‘unstories’, this thesis intends to 
highlight aspects of maternal experience which have hitherto been hidden from theological 
discourse and explore how such narratives may prove generative in provoking new ways of 
thinking theologically about occluded lived experiences. 
Revealing the Unstories- The Theological Turn to Lived Experience  
 
The significance and revelatory power of lived experience is increasingly being considered a 
valuable and legitimate form of knowledge making within practical theology (Walton 2014, 
100; Miller-McLemore 1994, 30). While there remains continued apprehension from within 
the discipline as to the reliability of lived experience as a credible theological source 
(Swinton and Mowat 2006, 67; Graham 1996, 174) feminist practical theologians in 
particular have illuminated the transformative potential of women’s experience in providing 
vital sources of theological knowledge and in generating fresh insight and meaning into taken 
for granted social, theological and public practices (Bons-Storm 1996, 135 ; Walton 2014, 
170).  
Michael De Certeau proposes that while accounts of lived encounters are significant, these 
cannot be extracted from the complex and interweaving material and social realities of 
everyday living (1980, xi). In developing theologies which attend to the lived experience of 
women, theologians such as Bonnie Miller-McLemore (1994, 2016) and Ada Maria Isasi-
Díaz (1996, 2002) have similarly advocated for an interrogation into the seemingly banal, yet 
complex practices of everyday living which shape women’s reality and, subsequently, their 
meaning making.  
Despite these disciplinary strides, as stated, I had found that my own lived experience was 
absent from the texts I so urgently explored. The harder I sought, the more ‘missing’ I 
seemed to be. And yet, I was aware that key aspects of my experience of mothering were not 
confined to myself alone. There were other women around me who shared the complicated 
and fluctuating spectrum of emotions that come hand in hand with parenting a child on the 
autism spectrum. This thesis will seek to reflect on my own lived experience, alongside the 
shared experiences of other local women who have children on the autism spectrum, in order 
to discern what is distinct about the practice of mothering a child with autism. By exploring 
our shared yet different lived experiences, I intend to demonstrate an occluded form of 
motherhood which may provoke new theological reflection. 
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Structure of the thesis  
 
This thesis has been constructed through an interdisciplinary approach. Autism, central to the 
experience of mothering I seek to explore, is situated within competing contexts of medical, 
social and public policies. A theological reflection on the maternal experience of autism 
therefore must attend to these complexities in order to provide a holistic examination of the 
complicated and conflicting forces which shape this distinct lived experience. While this 
research looks to contribute to a theological tradition which thoughtfully engages with the 
revelatory potential of lived experience, it does so with an awareness that experience is 
situated in and therefore inextricable from its social and historical contexts (De Certeau 1980, 
xi; Veling 2005, 6; Walton 2014, 7). In locating the issue of ‘mothering with autism’ in 
relation to the social, historical and political contexts of disability generally, and autism 
specifically, I intend to firstly highlight how the complex and interrelating constructs of 
autism significantly, and often negatively, impact the experience of mothering. Secondly, I 
hope that in providing insight into the issues relating to autism, I will generate a greater 
theological understanding of autism itself, and of the often overlooked experience of 
mothering an autistic child.  
Consequently, I adopt a pluralistic approach to my research topic, which I address in this 
thesis in three parts. The first part looks to critically engage with contemporary literature in 
disability, autism and parenting to provide an interdisciplinary context of the theo-political 
dimensions of the experience I am seeking to illuminate. The second part contextualises my 
own experiences in relation to the literature explored and introduces the lived experiences of 
other myself and other mothers who share their experiences and insights into the everyday 
struggles of motherhood in the context of autism. The third part will look to explore how 
theology has traditionally responded to these issues. It then asks whether, in the light of the 
insight generated from the sharing of our lived experiences, such theologies can be seen to 
adequately attend to the challenge of mothering a child on the autism spectrum. The specific 
concerns of each chapter are set out below. 
 
Part One 
In Chapter One, I begin by critically examining contemporary literature on disability, 
examining how the competing discourses of the medical and social model have constructed 
dichotomous and polarised understandings of disability. I will explore how disability is 
constructed as ‘other’ within society, reflecting on how schemas of ‘normalcy’ have had an 
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enduringly destructive impact on the lives of disabled individuals. Engaging with feminist 
disability literature, I will highlight the disciplinary turn towards attending to embodied lived 
experiences which are counter normative. Finally, I will problematise the invisibility of 
certain groups within the disability agenda, particularly that of children and those with 
cognitive development conditions, in representing a limited portrayal of disabled experience.  
 
In Chapters Two and Three I trace the history of autism in its emergence as a recognisable, 
distinct condition. Given that lack of understanding and knowledge of autism is often cited as 
a considerable barrier to acceptance and inclusion, this chapter contextualises the impact of 
socio-political forces on medical discourse, looking specifically at how in the case of autism, 
these forces functioned to delay, misrepresent, and impede the development of research for 
several decades. Detailing what are now commonly accepted as the defining characteristics of 
autism, I will highlight that such symptomologies are often significantly stigmatised both for 
individuals with autism themselves and for their care givers. I will propose that this 
stigmatisation, in addition to the way mothers are peculiarly and damagingly implicated in 
the presentation of autism, coalesce to form a distinctly challenging maternal experience. I 
will argue that the complex social milieu in which autism emerged has shaped popular 
perceptions (or misperceptions) of autism, functioning to marginalise autistic individuals and 
their families and prevent the understanding necessary to provide appropriate social and 
theological support.   
 
Part Two 
In Chapter Four I address the methodological choices utilised in approaching the research 
question. I will begin with a brief discussion of practical theology’s significance in attending 
to the complexity of lived experience in theological reflection and locate the challenge of 
reflexivity within research.  From here, I situate my methodology as being informed by a 
phenomenological feminist perspective which pays attention to experience as lived and 
embodied, gender as constructed, and experience as shaped by dualistic and hierarchical 
social forces which function to legitimate dominant paradigms of knowledge. I then move to 
a discussion of methods, outlining my use of life stories (memoir, life story interview and my 
own autoethnographic life writing) as the means through which I will illuminate the 
particularity of autism mothering as an occluded lived experience, articulating my conviction 
that life narrative based research can provoke a generative and illuminative theological 
response to complex issues arising from everyday experiences of struggle.  
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In Chapters Five and Six I employ these life stories to reflect on and critically engage with 
my own and other mothers shared experiences of living with autism, analysing how the 
dominant themes which emerge from our narratives relate to contemporary literature on 
maternal experience, and revealing significant aspects of our experiences which are currently 
occluded in research. In these chapters, I develop a new account of maternal experience 
which is complex, conflicting, and enduring and argue this necessitates a distinct theological 
response.  
 
Part Three 
In Chapter Seven I will critically engage with traditional theologies of disability, examining 
the relationship between such theologies and the models of disability examined in chapter 
one. I will examine the impact of liberation disability theologies in situating disability as a 
theo-political issue in which accessibility and inclusion emerge as key theological concerns.  
I will then consider the utility of communitarian theologies of disability in attending to the 
relationality of disability as a social issue, evaluating how this model could inform the kind of 
social support which may be beneficial for mothers of children with autism. From here I will 
look to the emergence of ‘autism theologies’, which I propose can be shown to draw 
respectively from the preceding theological models to explore the theological particularity of 
autistic experience. Lastly, I will discuss the paradigmatic turn towards theologies of ‘limits’ 
in respect to disability. The theologies of limits I will examine acknowledge the embodied 
nature of human limits, moving beyond paradigms of lived experience as rooted in bodily 
impairment towards a more inclusive theological model of difference which may resonate 
more deeply with the multiplicity of challenges represented by autism.  
 
In Chapter Eight I re-articulate my position that our lived stories have revealed a distinct 
form of maternal experience, critically engaging with theologies which attend to the 
importance of motherhood as a theologically generative (and currently neglected) site of 
knowledge. I will consider the themes which have emerged within chapters five and six in the 
context of theologies which look to the complexity of the everyday as a potential site of 
struggle and resistance.  
In Chapter Nine I conclude this thesis by attending to the gaps and silences I have 
encountered in theologically reflecting on our lived experiences. Considering the limitations 
of current theologies in responding to experiences which are resistant to categorisation, I 
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propose a theological response attentive to lived experiences which are ambiguous, uncertain, 
and unresolved.  
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Chapter 1) Disability  
 
In this chapter I will present disability as a contested concept, examining dominant paradigms 
of disability which have emerged in response to the marginalisation of disabled experience. I 
will explore how competing discourses situate disability as variously; medical, social and 
embodied; highlighting that even within disability studies, there can be seen to be epistemic 
incongruity as to exactly whose lived experiences might fall under the designation ‘disabled.’ 
In examining these conflicts, I explore key concerns in disability theory in respect to 
embodiment, adaptation, and accessibility, situating the central paradigms which will later be 
shown to inform dominant theologies of disability (see chapter seven). I will examine how 
the ‘othering’ of disability has been shaped by social, cultural and historical forces; 
identifying how these forces have operated to influence our understanding and attitudes 
towards disability, and, by extension, autism. 
1.1) Dys-functional Definitions 
 
‘Disability’ is a commonplace term. Its meaning, at one level, is beguilingly obvious – 
not being able to do something. In lay terms, referring to people with impairments -as 
disabled signals that they belong to that group of people who cannot engage in 
‘normal’ activities because of their ‘abnormal’ bodily or intellectual ‘deficit’ or 
‘incapacity’.  (Thomas 2002, 38) 
Historically, the term ‘disability’ was used to refer to those who fall outside the parameters of 
what we consider ‘normal’. This categorisation, while seemingly straightforward, however, 
has come to raise more questions than it answered. What do we consider as ‘normal’?  Where 
did those parameters come from? Who gets to decide who is normal, and who is not?  
The term ‘disability’, much like autism, is thus a simple designation for what is anything but 
a simple concept. If we are to consider the multiplicity of individuals who identify as 
‘disabled’ and the myriad of conditions and impairments which fall under this over-arching 
term, the possibilities of variation within this one classification appear infinite. A double 
amputee, for example, would be considered as an individual with a disability. Such an 
impairment would be visible, obvious, and would likely be accompanied by physical 
symptoms of pain or discomfort which would impact an individual’s daily life and ability to 
perform everyday tasks to a considerable degree. However, we might also be likely to 
 
 
21 
 
consider someone with autism (who is able bodied) to have a disability. While the person 
with autism may not be physically impaired, their experience of the social world is often 
described as extremely disabling. Their disability, on the other hand, would to a large extent 
be ‘invisible’; it would not be defined by their physicality or rooted in their body to the same 
degree, and would arguably go unnoticed by the casual observer. Thus, these such individuals 
experiences of the world would be wildly different, and yet they would be bracketed under 
the same ‘catch all’ designation for a group of people whose only commonality is arguably 
their ‘otherness’ to our ‘normalness.’  
In recent decades, the notion of disability has been increasingly challenged as homogenising 
a collective condition which does not, in fact, exist. There is no unitary group of the 
‘disabled’ which can be seen to share the same characteristics. The framing of ‘disability’ as 
a collective noun for what are arguably un-collectable impairments has gradually begun to be 
problematised as overly simplistic, static, and discriminatory (Swinton 2012, 175). In what 
follows, I will discuss how these attitudinal shifts have been informed by and contributed to 
evolving social theories of disability, evaluating the impact of dominant discourses of 
disability on the lives of individuals with impairments, and their limitations in providing a 
meaningful account of disabled experience.  
1.2) Disability and the ‘Other’: The social construction of normalcy.   
 
…disability is not a transhistorical, ubiquitous, social phenomenon, but is bound up 
with social relationships at specific historical junctures. This enables us to move 
beyond simplistic ideas about disability being a type of always occurring ‘restricted 
activity’; disability is located spatially, temporally and economically (Thomas 2002, 
46).  
Disability has occupied a problematic space in our social history. Despite the fact that we all, 
at some point in our lives, will likely (at least temporally) incur some form of disablement, 
the role of the disabled individual has been that of the outsider, as peripheral to the successful 
functioning of society. Author Lennard Davis contends that ‘the ‘problem’ with disability is 
not the person with an impairment; the problem is the way that normalcy is constructed in our 
society to create the ‘problem’ of the disabled person’ (2002, 3). He suggests that ‘when we 
think of bodies, in a society where the concept of the norm is operative, then people with 
disabilities will be thought of as deviants’ (2013, 8). Being subject to the dichotomy of the 
‘other’ is one of the most enduring aspects of ‘disability’. Disabled individuals, in the 
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absence of commonality in condition, are thus defined by what they are not; not able bodied, 
non-seeing, non-hearing, not normal. This distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ then, 
naturally functions to exclude, ignore, or devalue the experience of disabled individuals 
within society. As a consequence, the disabled story throughout history has been one of 
marginalisation, vilification and institutionalisation.  
The reduction of disability to merely the dysfunctional body, and a body which, as Davis 
contends, is considered a site of deviance, also functioned to rationalise any stigma or 
discrimination faced by the impaired as being created, in effect, by their own body. Erving 
Goffman reminds us that ‘stigma’ has in its roots a deeply entrenched association with the 
body; its original use by the Greeks referred to physical symbols on the body to demarcate 
the bad or the amoral in society (1990, 11). Thus, bodily difference, such as disability, has 
been inherently associated with deviance, immorality, and shame (Goffman 1990, 24). The 
mind-body dualism developed by Plato enhanced the position that the mind was associated 
with culture, intelligence, progress; whilst the body was primitive, crude and tainted. In a 
society which favours bodily perfection, and yet which also considers bodily integrity as 
naturally predetermined and fixed, one’s biological position dictates one’s social. As a 
consequence, individuals with disabilities have historically found themselves in an 
impossible paradox in which merely occupying the body they were born with functioned to 
preclude them from being socially valued (Eisland 1990, 70). With the social position of the 
impaired so intrinsically linked to the body, disabled identities thus became inextricable from 
their impairment; by occupying an impaired body, an individual was, statically and 
unchangeably, disabled. 
Paul Abberley, a founding member of UPIAS (Union of Physically Impaired against 
Segregation) and author of ‘Disability and Oppression’ reminds us that in attempting to chart 
the development of ‘exclusion’ in the history of disablement, we must also recognise that 
who we consider to be ‘included’ is also a contested notion bound by the same conflicting 
forces (2002, 121). Whilst the marginalisation of disabled lives was by no means a modern 
phenomena, Abberley points to the changing division of labour in the Industrial Revolution in 
constructing a society in which social roles, and therefore social value, became inextricably 
bound with production (2002, 125). With large scale industry demanding consistent and 
predictable levels of production, the notion of the ‘perfect worker’ became one in which 
‘average’ was the ideal (Oliver 1990, 46; Thomas 2002, 61). This had significant implications 
for disabled individuals. In a society in which social value was intrinsically linked to 
 
 
23 
 
production value, being excluded from the labour market meant being excluded from active 
participation in society.  
The economic changes wrought by the industrial revolution also significantly altered social 
relationships; with labour migration influencing the emergence of the nuclear family unit and 
the dissolution of wider familial ties. Advancements in medicine and the introduction of 
vaccinations brought increased life expectancy and the potential for individuals with 
disabilities to live beyond infancy. However, this was not an unproblematic development. 
While individuals with disabilities were now afforded a stronger chance at survival, they 
were also now dependent on a much smaller family unit, and much more visible to a society 
which increasingly considered them as superfluous (Thomas 2010, 37). This increased 
visibility of the disabled body within society made disabilities or any deviation from the 
‘norm’ even more pronounced.  
1.3) The Medical Model 
 
With the additional economic pressures associated with increased life expectancy, and the 
stigmatisation of ‘deviance’ associated with individuals with impairments, the late 19th 
Century also gave the rise to the introduction of institutionalisation. Families of individuals 
with disabilities were encouraged to relinquish their ‘financial burdens’ to the state, who had 
begun the process of spatially isolating individuals with impairments from society. At the 
same time, biomedicine began to develop a model of care in which the primary concern for 
illness and impairment was ‘detection, avoidance, elimination, treatment and classification’ 
(Thomas 2002, 40). It is interesting to note that amongst these five options, only one concerns 
the practical management of symptoms; the remaining four are chiefly concerned with the 
cataloguing and eradication of ‘abnormalities.’ 
Davis highlights that the same statisticians (Queletet, Sir Franics Dalton, Darwin) who 
promoted the concept of ‘normalcy’ in their social categorisations were also eugenicists. 
With this in mind, the statistical classification of humans takes on a sinisterly different 
function; one which is designed to mark, and subsequently remove, the flawed and imperfect 
(2008, 9). The disturbing growth in popularity of the eugenicist movement, coupled with the 
introduction of institutionalisation, meant that individuals with impairments were not only 
sequestered from visibility, but that this invisibility also functioned to conceal the practices 
which occurred within institutions. With elimination rather than amelioration the aim in 
respect to impairment, institutional life brought with it practices such as enforced sterilisation 
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of impaired individuals to prevent the continuation of hereditary conditions (Hauerwas 2005, 
151).  
Michael Foucault defines this phenomenon as ‘biopower’, one that is enacted by authoritative 
(medical) forces who exert physical and social control over ‘deviant bodies’. Bodies, he 
argued, rather than naturally pre-determined organic entities, were sites upon which external 
social forces such as discipline could be enacted (1978, 144). Indeed, it is only within the last 
few decades that such institutionalised models of care have being abandoned within the UK. I 
have personally supported individuals with impairments who had been institutionalised at an 
early age on the recommendation of medical professionals; individuals who have, 
respectively, been both over and under medicated to the long-term detriment of their 
conditions,  and had even had their teeth removed for ‘convenience of care.’ In this context it 
is not surprising that some disability and human rights activists argue that despite de-
institutionalisation, we remain subject to the legacy of an ‘elimination model’ of medicine, 
with elective abortions associated with neonatal screening for disabilities still commonplace 
in contemporary society. As recently as 2017, actor and special Olympian Frank Stephens 
spoke powerfully at the United States Congress on the issue, asserting, 
People pushing their particular ‘final solution’ are saying that people like me should 
not exist…. I am a man with Down’s syndrome, and my life is worth living10.  
The moral and social implications of such practices, particularly in neonatal contexts in 
which the health and well-being of the mother is balanced against that of the foetus, remain 
highly emotionally charged and controversial subjects. Such controversies are clearly beyond 
the scope of this thesis. They are useful, however, in highlighting that the distribution of 
power in the relationship between impaired individuals and medical professionals, can in 
some cases, be literally one of life or death. In the following chapter, I will examine how such 
issues of power would go on to have a pivotal, and disastrous, role in the development of 
autism research.  
The unequal power relationship between the individual and the practitioner remains a 
complex and controversial issue. Whilst we are moving away (albeit only in the last few 
decades) from institutional models of care, individuals remain hugely dependent on the 
diagnosis of a medical professional for access to resources, treatment and support. The 
 
10 https://www.lejeunefoundation.org/powerful-speech-down-syndrome-goes-viral/ accessed 28/08/19 12.41pm.  
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eugenicist legacy of ‘amelioration or elimination’ is arguably still strongly resonant in 
restorative models of medical care. These rehabilitative models of medicine were strongly 
influenced by the work of medical sociologist Talcott Parsons, who considered the ill or 
impaired to occupy a position of deviance within society which he termed ‘the sick role’ 
(1951, 439). Parsons suggested that the creation of the ‘sick role’ functioned to create a 
(temporary) space in which individuals were exempt from their social duties under medical 
advice; which, after being dutifully followed, would re-instate them to their full participation 
in society. Central to this model was the importance of the role of the medical professional, in 
both legitimising a person as ‘sick’, and in providing the tools with which one could ‘become 
better.’ 
However, for individuals with impairments, this was particularly problematic. Once 
diagnosed with an impairment, one thus occupied the position of the ‘sick role.’ However, if 
such an impairment was permanent, the secondary obligation to rehabilitate could not be 
fulfilled, and therefore the reciprocal social exchange is broken. Without the hope of 
rehabilitation, the impaired individual remains stuck in a position of deviance, dependent on 
medical professionals for legitimisation. Carole Thomas suggests, however, that it was in part 
Parson’s re-invigoration of ‘deviance’ which shone a post-structuralist spotlight on the social 
inequalities which emerged from such a label, with the 1960’s marking a shift in sociological 
inquiry towards a critical analysis of the ‘social processes involved in the discursive 
construction and regulation of deviance’ (2010, 40). This marked a significant turning point 
in the history of disability studies, with disability being considered for the first time as 
something potentially dis-embodied and socially constructed. 
1.4) The Social Model  
 
Despite the fact that, as we have seen, impairment had (and arguably continues to have) 
profound and far reaching social consequences for the disabled individual, the relationship 
between the social body and the impaired one was not considered until the late 1960’s and 
early 70’s. Influenced by the critical lens of theorists such as Foucault11, 1970’s Britain 
witnessed an emerging movement which challenged how we consider disability, and what 
this meant for disabled lives. The Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation 
 
11 As touched upon in the preceding section, Foucault’s discursive analysis of ‘bio-power’ explored the 
constructive and coercive influence socio-political institutions exerted on individual bodies. Identifying that our 
bodily experiences were also fundamentally shaped by external social forces, Foucault arguably contextualised 
the social construction of disabled bodies later developed by social modellists (Hughes 2002, 60).  
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(UPIAS), comprised of individuals who were themselves disabled, proposed that in contrast 
to the medical model which considers disability to be causally linked to impairment, 
disability is in fact the consequence of a disabling environment; one which creates social, 
spatial and financial barriers to impaired individuals leading full and inclusive social lives 
(Oliver 2002, 12). Proponents of the social model, most notably disability theorists such Mike 
Oliver and Paul Abberley, contended that the most debilitating effects of disablement were 
not symptoms of impairment, but rather social attitudes.  
The infantilisation of physically disabled individuals (sometimes referred to as the ‘personal 
tragedy model’), they argued, consigned the impaired individual to the role of victim, 
preserving disability as something unfortunate, pitiable, and reliant. The assumption that 
physical impairment naturally implied mental impairment strongly influenced public policy, 
with political, civil, and sexual rights paternalised by the state (Campbell and Oliver 1996, 
28). Further to the social barriers they perceived were constructed to exclude individuals to 
impairments, disability theorists also challenged the perspective that bodily impairments 
limited mobility. Rather, they argued, participation in work and leisure activities were 
inhibited by inaccessible buildings, poor public transport links, and public spaces which were 
designed purely for the able-bodied.  
This shift in consciousness away from disablement being something inherently flawed and 
inescapable in the individual, to being something external and socially constructed, was 
transformative for many impaired individuals. Carol Thomas observes that ‘when disabled 
individuals encounter the social model, the effect is often revelatory and liberatory; enabling 
them, perhaps for the first time, to recognize most of their difficulty as socially caused’ 
(2002, 38-40). Whilst some adopted the ethos of the social model at solely the individual 
level, utilising it as a tool to alter their self-perception and outlook from a ‘disabled person’ to 
an ‘individual with impairments’; the social model also operated at the socio-political level, 
applying pressure for legislative changes. This was not a simple undertaking. If we are to 
assume, as the social model proposes, that society, rather than the individual, is the problem 
for disabilities, one is left with the huge problem of changing society.  
Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic shift from the paternalistic model of welfare 
towards policies which centre around inclusivity and equal access to all areas of public life. 
Though arguably hard won, the social model can be seen to have had some success in 
contributing towards these shifting attitudes towards disability. The World Health 
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Organisation’s ICIDH schema (International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and 
Handicaps) has altered their definition of disability, reflecting the importance of changing the 
language we use to describe disability:  
The term ‘disability’ has been replaced with ‘disablement’, with a focus on limits to 
activities, and ‘handicap’ is superseded by considerations of participation; impairment 
remains as before – loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological or anatomical 
structure or function (Thomas 2002, 42).  
In 2013, the Scottish Government introduced the ‘Keys to Life’, a policy strategy influenced 
by the UN Convention of rights and adopted by both public and private social care 
organisations. This strategy is designed to promote a commitment to ensuring individuals 
with physical or learning disabilities have equal access to health care, education and housing; 
and are supported to have choice, control, and independence in their lives as active, fully 
recognised citizens.12 The divide between ‘mainstream’ and ‘special’ education is becoming 
increasingly permeable, with local authorities encouraged to make learning adaptations rather 
than separations. Such changes mark a dramatic turn in history from the situation for 
individuals with disabilities a century ago. The social and structural barriers designed to 
conceal, marginalise and victimise individuals with impairments have begun to gradually be 
dismantled.  
Proponents of the social model and organisations such as UPIAS have reframed disability as 
a form of social oppression, speaking of ‘disablism’ in the same context as ‘racism’ and 
‘sexism’. In considering themselves as an oppressed group, rather than victims of personal 
circumstance, disabled individuals are arguably able to assert some agency over how they 
consider their impairment. This, however, is not unproblematic. Whilst, as I have discussed, 
the social effects of disability are profound and often far reaching, some argue that the social 
model has gone too far in attributing the challenges faced by impaired individuals to social 
forces alone, neglecting the physical and bodily experiences which too are disabling (Bury 
2000, 75; Hughes 2002, 59-60).  
1.5) Lived Experience: Embodiment and Impairment Effects  
 
In many ways, the social model can be seen to be the antithesis of the medical model in 
which disability is considered consequential to impairment. The social model introduced a 
 
12 https://www.scld.org.uk/the-keys-to-life/ accessed 03/09/19 12.59pm  
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radical way of considering disability, bringing into focus the social inequalities which 
constrained the lives of the disabled individual.  This focus, however, has been criticised for 
overshadowing what is arguably the starting point for the question of disability rights; that of 
the disabled body (Hughes 2002, 59). Whilst liberatory on the one hand, the social model’s 
rallying call against disabling social forces relegated the impact of bodily impairment to the 
side lines, considering that disability could be largely ‘overcome’ with equal access to public 
spaces, education and employment. Adaptation, in contrast to the Parsonion paradigm of 
rehabilitation, was the watchword of the social model.  
Chair of Disability Studies at the University of Glasgow Nick Watson, and sociologist Tom 
Shakespeare suggest that as admirable as the goal of adaptation may be, the early social 
model advocates’ claims can arguably be seen to be somewhat blurred by their own 
ontological position. UPIAS in particular has been criticised as comprising a very narrow 
representation of disabled experience; composed largely of white, heterosexual men with 
predominantly physical impairments (often the result of accident or injury). Watson and 
Shakespeare propose that such organisations lacked the diversity and breadth of experience to 
elucidate a more nuanced and representative understanding of disabled lives (2010, 58). 
Furthermore, the social model’s premise of adaptation can be seen to be more concerned  
with adjustments to accommodate physical disabilities or sensory impairments such as 
blindness; whilst the experience of individuals with learning disabilities, which are arguably 
more social in both presentation and in effect, is largely absent. Shakespeare and Watson 
issue this challenge,  
What would it mean to create a barrier-free Utopia for people with learning 
difficulties? … What about people on the autistic spectrum, who may find social 
contact difficult to cope with: a barrier-free Utopia might be a place where they did 
not have to meet, communicate with, or have to interpret other people…Barrier-free 
enclaves are possible, but not a barrier-free world (2010, 63).  
As Shakespeare and Watson articulate above, the experience of disability for individuals with 
learning difficulties is often profoundly social, and arguably also profoundly different in 
many respects to individuals with solely physical impairments. With such different ranges of 
lived experience, can we assume that by mere juxtaposition to the ‘normal’ social body, that 
their experiences of disability are the same? It is precisely this question which underpins 
much of the criticism levelled at the social model. To what extent does it acknowledge lived 
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experience, and can there really seen to be a universal lived experience of disability which 
can be reduced into a unitary group of the socially oppressed? 
If disability is social, then impairment is bodily, and as such remains within the remit of 
medicine. Thus, in attempting to move past disability being defined by the body, towards a 
paradigm in which disability is the shared experience of inequality, critics suggest that the 
social model preserves the biomedical discourse it seeks to supersede. Mike Bury proposes 
that the social model treats the disabled body as a taken for granted assumption, when in fact 
it is the body which is the site on which our reality becomes perceptible, particularly in 
relation to chronic conditions (2000, 75). That disabled experience is shaped by bodily 
experience seems too obvious to ignore, and yet a narrative of impairment is often 
conspicuously absent from the social model.  
1.6) Feminist Approaches to Disability: Deconstructing Body Dualisms.  
 
Feminist approaches in disability studies have highlighted the need for multi-sectional 
approaches that account for race and gender and attend to how structural hierarchies create 
positions of subordination (Hall 2001, 6; Morris 1992, 166). In her volume ‘Feminist 
Disability Studies’, Kim Hall suggests that many of the issues raised in disability studies are 
in fact issues which feminism has been attempting to unravel for decades; such as the issues 
of bodily difference and the regulation of ‘different’ bodies (2001, 6). Writing on the 
integration of feminist theory within disability studies, Rosemarie Garland-Thompson 
proposes that a feminist analysis offers a particularly strong critique of the material practices, 
such as medicine, which function to control and ‘discipline’ bodies of difference (2001, 17).  
However, despite being strongly placed to attend to issues of bodily difference, it has been 
suggested that within feminist theory the experience of disabled women is often 
conspicuously absent from the debate (Samuels 2002, 55). Whilst non-disabled feminists 
such as Judith Butler might contend that the gendered body is itself a social construct and 
propose a feminist perspective which moves away from the body as the site of difference 
(1990, 47); many feminist disability theorists continue to advocate for a disability theory 
which attends to issues of gender and embodiment (Thomas 2002, 45).  
Consequently, there is now an increasing shift towards a phenomenological reading of 
disability which posits that disability is defined by neither the social nor the medical, but that 
both conditions are in fact mutually reinforcing (Bury 2010, 1074, Merleu-Ponty 1962, xvi–
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xvii). Heidegger has asserted that the normative body is a taken for granted reality, and as 
such is unquestioned. It is only when the interruption of this reality, or of our body, by 
disease, injury or disablement calls into question what we thought we knew, that the 
‘phenomenon’ of our embodied selves in the social world becomes visible (1996, 49). These 
insights become fundamental to my own research (see chapter four, section 4.3b) in which I 
pursue a phenomenological methodology. 
1.7) Missing Children: The invisibility of children’s experience in the disability 
movement.  
 
In their volume ‘Approaching Disability,’ Rebecca Mallett and Katherine Runswick-Cole 
suggest that the myth of a unitary collective of experience is particularly evident in the 
treatment of disabled children in disability studies (2014, 39). If we are to consider that 
disability theory attends, as we have discussed in the preceding section, firstly to male 
experience, with the female experience existing on the margins; then the experience of 
children is largely missing from the page altogether. While normative assumptions of the 
(adult) body have been critically challenged in sociology inquiry (Goffman 1990, 11; Butler 
1999, 47; Davis 2013, 8), children’s bodies remain measured against universalised and taken 
for granted assumptions of ‘normal’ development. Strongly influenced by developmental 
psychology, children are assumed to follow a linear, staged pattern of development (Burack 
et al 2001, 11; Zezalzo et al 2001, 49). This assumed process of ‘normal’ child development 
thus inevitably functions to situate anything out with this conventional paradigm as 
‘abnormal’; immediately pathologising such a child as ‘disabled’.  
Erving Goffman posits that for children with disabilities, the experience of childhood is 
complexly and precariously dependent on how their impairment is socially perceived. He 
suggests that, ‘a child with a stigma can pass in a special way. Parents, knowing of their 
child’s stigmatic condition, may encapsulate him with domestic acceptance and ignorance of 
what he is going to have to become’ (1990, 113). He argues that children already occupy a 
position of partial social invisibility; thus, it is easier for parents and caregivers to shield their 
child, for a short time at least, from realising their difference from their peers. This 
opportunity for ‘passing’, however, is usually temporary, and can arguably present more 
problems than it solves. The moment when the glass shatters, so to speak, and an individual 
suddenly becomes aware of their difference may be even more psychologically harmful for 
the child who has been sheltered from an understanding of such difference. 
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This potential danger was brought into sharp focus for me when utilising a childcare provider 
for additional support needs. With my son unable to attend ‘mainstream’ childcare, this 
service was a lifeline. Not only could the provider cope with the challenges he presented, 
allowing me to complete a working day without desperate phone calls to retrieve him; they 
picked him up and dropped him off. I remember standing on the doorstep, waving him onto 
the bus with children of varying abilities and impairments, and being viscerally assaulted by 
the memory of children at school mocking what they would call ‘the special bus.’ Silent tears 
streamed down my cheeks; I was at once relieved for the help and devastated that we needed 
it. That same day, Micah returned home, troubled. While he loved the activities and the staff, 
he could not reconcile his own identity with that of the other service users.  
‘Those other children aren’t like me, Mumma. Why am I there?’ He asked. He had until then, 
for all intents and purposes, ‘passed’ as ‘normal’. His discomfort at being confronted with the 
reality that he in fact might share something in common with these children (although their 
impairments were, admittedly, much more profound) was palpable. Balancing his need to feel 
‘normal’ against my own need for support, I consequently gave up the brief respite this 
service had afforded us both. This anecdote raises another particular difficulty of childhood 
disabilities; the question of disclosure. For children with impairments, disclosure is a 
significant challenge and one which is perhaps unique to the experience of children. There is 
rarely a question of how or if an adult will or should be informed of their impairment, and yet 
for children, their knowledge and understanding of their own condition is often largely 
dependent on adults to construct. Perhaps reflective of this interdependency, children in 
disability studies are rarely discussed in isolation of their relational ties to adults.  
With some considering this relationality as further functioning to oppress the lives of disabled 
children, there is an increasing call for disability studies, and indeed practitioners and 
educators, to consider the voice of the child themselves. Emerging bodies of literature 
suggest that children’s agency in articulating their own experience and contributing to their 
own support is crucial to their equal status as social beings (Mallett and Runswick Cole, 
2010). Research suggests that disabled children experience significantly unequal access to 
educational attainment and leisure activities, profoundly impacting their opportunities for 
social inclusion (Mallet et al 2014, 40). A 2017 study from the University of Cambridge 
found that children with additional support needs were considerably more likely to 
experience bullying and abuse, and 9 times more likely to be excluded from ‘mainstream’ 
schools. Undoubtedly, further study is required to explore the experience of children with 
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disabilities from their own perspective, particularly as this subject raises significant ethical 
challenges in respect to the capacity, susceptibility and reliability of children in making 
informed decisions on important subjects such as healthcare (Prout 2003, 1).   
However, extensive studies have shown that society’s disablement of children extends to the 
family, in respect to employment opportunities, access to resources and support, and the 
social lives of care givers (Dowling and Dolan 2001, 23). As such, the experience of disabled 
children is intricately, and arguably inextricably, bound with the experience of their care 
givers. This (inter)dependency impacts not only how the impaired child is socially valued, 
but also their parents. Increasing attention is being given to the complex emotions and 
pressures faced by parents of children with impairments, and how these can similarly be seen 
to be shaped by social constructions of disability. Despite studies suggesting that the well-
being of parents can profoundly impact the well-being and development of children with 
disabilities (Giallo et al 2011, 466; Zhang et al 2015, 29); the potential positive ‘trickle down’ 
effect on children by appropriately supporting parents has yet to be adequately explored.  
1.8) Summary 
 
In contrast to other areas of study, disability studies is still arguably in its infancy, emerging 
as an academic interest and area of social inquiry only within the last few decades. As such, 
the ways in which disability is considered and experienced both by and within society 
remains an area in which there is much exploration to be done. In considering current 
discourses in disability studies, I have explored the ways in which dominant models of 
disability can be seen to significantly impact the experience, lives and opportunities of 
individuals with impairments. Despite often being considered dichotomously within disability 
studies as being either medical or social, I would contend individuals with impairments 
experience their disability as being mutually formed by these seemingly opposing forces. In 
the subsequent chapter, I will explore how the complex and competing issues examined in 
this chapter can be shown to problematise the emergence, diagnosis, and attitude towards 
autism as a condition within society, in ways which can still be seen to be enduring.  
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Chapter 2) Autism: An Enduring Enigma.  
 
2.1) Difficulties in definitions and diagnosis.  
 
Perhaps one of the most defining characteristics of the condition commonly known as autism, 
is its difficulty to define. While there can be seen to be a series of shared characteristics, the 
ways in which these characteristics present in any given individual are unpredictable and 
varied (Burack et al 2001, 11). Why one set of symptoms may be present in one individual 
with autism, yet not with another is a mystery which we are no closer to solving. Dr Stephen 
Shore, a professor in special education and himself autistic, once famously declared, ‘If you 
have met one person with Autism…you have met one person with Autism13.’ Having had the 
privilege and opportunity through both my son and my work to meet other children, and 
adults, on the autism spectrum, I can say this to be true. I have never met another Micah, nor 
have I met any individual with autism who I could say was just like another. They are all 
brilliantly, curiously, inexplicably different. This is perhaps one of the most simultaneously 
wonderful and problematic features of autism; that one could spend years charting the 
behaviours and peculiarities of one autistic individual, only to discover their findings have 
little to no relevance to another.   
The inconsistency and unpredictability in symptomology could undoubtedly be seen to 
contribute to the decades of confusion, misrepresentation and conflicting theories 
surrounding the question of autism as a diagnostic category. Despite first being documented 
as a distinct category of observable symptoms in the early 1940’s, there continues to be 
debate as to whether autism can be seen to be a psychological, biomedical, or environmental 
condition (Wing 1997, 33; Loveland 2001, 17). Furthermore, increased visibility and 
understanding of autism notwithstanding, there remain some who continue to question 
whether autism, is in fact, even a ‘real’ condition at all14. The ambiguity in the causation, 
symptomology and presentation of autism has resulted in it being a condition which is 
notoriously difficult to diagnose, with no current uniformly agreed upon methods of 
management or support.  
 
13 ‘Interview with Dr Stephen Shore: Autism Advocate and on the 
spectrum’https://ibcces.org/blog/2018/03/23/12748/ Accessed 12/03/19 12.49  
14 ‘Ignorance, Autism, and the things People say.’ 25th February 2013, and article by John Elder Robinson for 
Psychology today. 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/my-life-aspergers/201302/ignorance-autism-and-the-things-people-
say.  Accessed 13/05/2019 13.34pm.   
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The apparent spike in autism diagnoses in the last century has given rise to a myriad of 
competing, conflicting and often controversial theories as to why such an acceleration has 
taken place, confounding much of the confusion that already existed regarding autism as a 
condition (Silberman 2015, 6).  In order to unravel some of this confusion, understanding 
how autism presents itself and how it came to emerge as a diagnostic category may shed 
considerable light as to why, decades into our collective awareness of autism, it continues to 
be such a misunderstood and misdiagnosed condition. In what follows, I will explore the 
development of autism as a contested condition, charting the historical turbulence and 
conflicting research agendas which have complicated autism research, and consequently, 
autistic experience.  
2.2) Emergence of Autism: A Legacy of Confusion.  
2.2a) Kanner’s Syndrome.  
 
These characteristics form a unique ‘syndrome,’ not heretofore reported, which seems 
rare enough, yet is probably more frequent than is indicated by the paucity of 
observed cases… 
…To satisfy the need for some terminological identification of the condition, I have 
come to refer to it as ‘early infantile autism.’ (Kanner 1943, 242) 
In 1943, Dr Leo Kanner released his seminal paper, ‘Autistic Disturbances of Affective 
Contact,’ which would later form the blueprint of clinical understandings of autism for 
generations to come. De-camped from Germany during the Second World War, Kanner had 
become a respected Child Psychologist working out of John Hopkins Memorial Hospital in 
Baltimore in the early 1940’s when he began to receive children who were, at such point in 
time, considered ‘lost causes.’ Many had exhausted other diagnostic avenues, most had been 
declared respectively: schizophrenic, mentally retarded, psychopathic, even deaf and mute. 
Some had confounded diagnosis, yet all shared a distinct commonality- their parents were 
desperate for answers to the enigmas that were their children. For such children, prognosis 
was often lifelong institutionalisation, and so the significance of Kanner’s diagnosis cannot 
be understated for these families. For some, he was quite literally their last chance of having 
some semblance of a ‘normal’ family life.  
The children brought to Kanner for assessment were afflicted by a myriad of unusual and 
distressing symptoms. After observing 11 such children, Kanner was able to identify common 
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characteristics amongst those referred to him which differed from the characteristics 
presently defined as childhood schizophrenia, with which many of his subjects had been 
previously diagnosed. At times, we can discern an almost poignancy to Kanner’s 
observations of the children in his study. He describes one boy, Richard, thusly:  
He did not communicate his wishes but went into a rage until his mother guessed and 
procured what he wanted. He had no contact with people, whom he definitely 
regarded as an interference when they talked to him or otherwise tried to gain his 
attention.  
The mother felt that she was no longer capable of handling him, and he was placed in 
a foster home near Annapolis with a foster woman who had shown a remarkable 
talent in dealing with difficult children. Recently, this woman heard him say clearly 
his first intelligible words. They were, ‘Good night.’ (Kanner 1943, 226). 
What was relatively unique about Kanner’s approach to Psychology in the United States at 
the time was his belief that family history, in particular family dynamics, were significant 
factors to the diagnostic process. He argued that the family history presented by his patients 
clearly indicated that this was as an innate, developmental condition, one which in many of 
his patients was described as being present from birth. Kanner, however, faced criticism from 
his peers as to the reliability of charting the development of children from birth retroactively, 
particularly when relying on a clinically accurate timeline of development from parents 
(Silberman 2015, 210). Furthermore, the uniqueness of his diagnosis was challenged, with 
others in the field suggesting it was almost indistinguishable from the popular diagnosis of 
early childhood schizophrenia. Kanner maintained, however, that these children did not 
appear to be afflicted or distressed by their reality, but rather it was ours which these children 
found perplexing.  
The children who were presented to Kanner all presented with the diagnostic criteria for 
atypical early development, in varying forms. The most prevalent atypicalities amongst the 
children were development of speech, response to external stimuli or affection and personal 
independence. As a consequence, some of the children had been diagnosed as deaf or mute, 
as it was perceived that their inability to vocalise, respond to commands or instruction or 
express their needs was a consequence of their inability to hear and therefore engage with the 
world around them. Kanner, however, believed that the children’s inability to respond was 
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not related to their inability to recognise speech, but rather their inability to infer any meaning 
or significance from it which was relevant to them (Kanner 1943, 225). Kanner observed that, 
The children’s relation to people is altogether different…people, so long as they left 
the child alone, figured in about the same manner as did the desk, the bookshelf, or 
the filing cabinet. (1943, 246). 
This, coupled with the lack of speech development, severely inhibited the children’s ability, 
or seeming desire, to communicate. He observed that in instances where speech had 
developed in his patients, their speech pattern was unusual. Some of his patients could recite 
complex poems, lists or historical facts; however, they could not initiate spontaneous 
discussion or respond appropriately to questions put to them. The children displayed a 
literalness in their understanding of language; they were unable to infer meaning from speech 
(1943, 244). In addition to repetitive patterns of speech, the children all shared repetitive 
behaviours or preoccupations with objects, often simply spinning their object of choice for 
hours rather than engaging in creative or imaginative play. Repetition could also be seen to 
reinforce the children’s concern with routine, with many unable to cope or function with any 
deviation from their perceived ‘norm.’ Although it would be years before Kanner’s paper 
would gain recognition amongst his peers, the detailed observations on his patient’s unusual 
idiosyncrasies would in fact, as we have seen, go on to inform the diagnostic model utilised 
today.  
2.2b) ‘The Refrigerator Mother’   
 
The complex interrelation of social impairments presented by their children was undoubtedly 
extremely difficult to navigate for the parents seeking Kanner’s assistance. Arguably, it was 
this desperation which led them to Kanner in the first instance. What they had likely not 
anticipated, however, was the extent to which they themselves would feature in their 
children’s diagnosis. Kanner’s reliance on comprehensive family histories in his diagnostic 
process distinguished his work from that of his peers and solidified his place in history as 
‘discovering autism’. However, it would be Kanner’s casual observations of the parents 
themselves which would arguably form the basis of one of the most enduring, and damaging 
claims, in the history of autism:   
I have dwelt at some length on the personalities, attitudes, and behaviour of the 
parents because they seem to throw considerable light on the dynamics of the 
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children’s psychopathologic condition…patients were exposed from the beginning to 
parental coldness, obsessiveness, and a mechanical type of attention to material needs 
only…They were kept neatly in refrigerators which did not defrost (Kanner 1949, 
425).  
Kanner’s nuanced observations of his patient’s complex behaviours were punctuated by very 
personal (and arguably clinically baseless) observations of the psychology of their parents. 
The association between high intellect in parents and these children were ones which were to 
be echoed by Hans Asperger as an unusual commonality, however Kanner’s perception of the 
link between parental intelligence and autistic traits were much less favourable. While such 
descriptions would arguably fail to pass as legitimately credible clinical observation today, 
Kanner’s depiction of these mothers was unquestionably accepted at the time. Bernard 
Rimland, author of ‘Early Infantile Autism’ and parent to an autistic boy himself wrote of 
Kanner’s assertion: 
To add a heavy burden of shame and guilt to the distress of people whose hopes, 
social life, finances, well-being and feelings of worth have been all but destroyed 
seems heartless and inconsiderate in the extreme (1965, 65).  
Whilst this arguably hampered any deeper investigation into the causality of autism, it also 
served to retain autism within the field of psychiatry, and consequently, Kanner himself. 
Thus, autism was regarded as a psychological condition, and therefore one which could be 
treated. Furthermore, in associating autism with mothering, Kanner tapped into a popular 
social anxiety at the time, that of women entering the workforce. Psychologist and leading 
researcher in autism Uta Frith observes that,   
This caricature of bad mothering overlaps with the caricature of the career woman, in 
particular the ‘intellectual’ type. An abnormally detached child- a child who is unable 
to relate lovingly- is a fitting punishment for the woman who neglected to be a full-
time devoted wife and mother! (2003, 30).  
Bruno Bettleheim, psychologist and contemporary of Kanner, popularised this perception of 
the refrigerator mother with publications such as ‘Why Mothers feel guilty’ and ‘The empty 
Fortress’. Capitalising on the fear that further education and economic independence of 
women during the war would destroy the traditional family, Bettleheim propelled Kanner’s 
theory in the mainstream media and created a damning culture of blame which cited women 
as the cause of their own family’s demise. This created an impossible situation for mothers; if 
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they sought help for their children, they were subjected to blame and stigma, if they did not, 
they were forced to ignore their concerns and forgo any possible assistance they might have 
accessed for their child.  
2.3) Asperger: Parallel Histories  
2.3a) A different kind of hospital.  
 
One of the enduring curiosities relating to autism is that it was first ‘discovered’ almost 
concurrently, by two separate individuals who had never met, at opposite sides of the world. 
Whilst Leo Kanner is widely credited to have first observed autism as a distinct condition; in 
a serendipitous turn of events Dr Hans Asperger, a leading paediatric psychiatrist in Vienna, 
also found himself immersed in a similar world of bewildering and beguiling children a year 
later in 1944. Although Kanner’s paper had already been published, it initially received little 
professional acclaim, and so it is generally accepted that it would have been highly unlikely 
to have crossed Asperger’s path prior to his own publication. It is interesting to note, however 
that one of Asperger’s primary diagnosticians, George Frankl, also worked under Leo Kanner 
as a psychiatric paediatrician after fleeing Vienna in 1937, and, despite failing to be credited 
by Kanner, arguably contributed much to his research (Silberman 2015, 180).  
Asperger’s patients similarly presented with delayed development, and an extreme 
detachment from the social world. The children, like Kanner’s, were preoccupied with 
objects or routines but seemed to have little or no interest in pleasing or bonding with their 
care givers, to the extent that they were also often peculiarly violent towards others and 
seemingly without remorse (Asperger 1944, translated in Frith 1991, 77). Both men, 
however, had distinctly different approaches to their practice. Rather than rely on 
retrospective accounts of their condition, or subject these children to standardised tests (many 
of which they had already failed to measure on); Asperger and his colleagues at the Vienna 
clinic instead attempted to observe the children in as natural and comfortable an environment 
as they could create for them within a hospital setting, and instead painstakingly documented 
the minutiae of idiosyncrasies which formed each individual child as they naturally presented 
themselves (Frith 1991, 7).  
Modelled after Erwin Lazaar’s compassionate therapeutic approach, the Vienna clinic was 
unparalleled at the time in its unique and innovative approach to therapy. Rather than 
adopting a purely medical model of intervention, the clinic combined biomedical treatment 
with education and play therapy in an ‘intuitive synthesis’ which accepted, rather than 
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condemned, the children’s differences (Frith 1991, 7). The children were allowed to indulge 
in their respective proclivities, with Asperger and his team seemingly intuiting that allowing 
such obsessions to be explored could potentially break down some of the barriers that adults 
typically had in engaging with these children. Perhaps one of the earliest examples of person 
centred and inclusive learning which we are only now, in very recent years, showing a shift 
towards in education; Asperger believed that it was the environment that the children were 
forced to learn that was flawed, and not the children themselves. 
2.3b) Asperger’s Little Professors. 
 
One of the most marked differences between Kanner’s and Asperger’s syndromes, which still 
distinguishes them today in the D-ISVM criteria, is Asperger’s association with autistic traits 
and intelligence. Asperger, like Kanner, had observed similar traits in both his patients and 
their parents, and had also documented that the children came from unusually intelligent 
families for the time. However, where Kanner saw the children as a product of an un-
nurturing environment, Asperger saw a potential biological link, raising the possibility that 
autistic ‘intelligence’ could be genetic in nature.  
Whilst the children on Asperger’s ward were unable, or unwilling, to produce such 
knowledge in clinical tests, the environmental observations of the Vienna clinic proved 
invaluable in identifying that the children did, in the right setting, show a nuanced 
understanding and acumen on specific subjects. Asperger noted that despite some children 
being able to engage in general communication or behaviour appropriately in social 
situations, their expressive language when speaking about a subject of their choosing was 
quite exceptional. Indeed, he commented with clear fondness that in such contexts the issue 
was rather bringing the conversation to a close, as their reserves of knowledge on their given 
subject was seemingly endless- this, I am personally and fondly familiar with (Asperger, 
1944; in Frith 1991, 53). In taking the time to speak to these children, whom Asperger 
affectionately dubbed ‘his little professors,’ Asperger was able to identify another unique 
facet to the autistic condition; the ‘Special Interest.’ The preoccupation with a particular topic 
remains arguably one of the most easily recognisable traits of Asperger syndrome, or what is 
now typically referred to as ‘high functioning autism.’  
For Asperger, however, these special interests were of greater significance than merely 
establishing commonality in behaviours. He believed that the children’s ability to understand 
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and articulate their passions and hobbies in such a way demonstrated beyond refute that they 
were, indeed, not only educable but socially valuable: 
This ability…can in favourable cases lead to exceptional achievements which others 
may never attain. Abstraction ability, for instance, is a prerequisite for scientific 
endeavour. Indeed, we find numerous autistic individuals amongst distinguished 
scientists (Asperger, 1944; in Frith 1991, 74).  
This perception of autistic intelligence has been both celebrated and criticised for 
‘romanticising’ the image of the genius savant (Frith 1991, 32). Asperger himself admitted 
the maladaptive behaviours associated with autism were indeed much more common 
(Asperger, 1944 in Frith 1991, 74). However, Asperger had reason to portray what was 
perhaps a rose-tinted view of the condition. For children who had, to all intents and purposes, 
been deemed lost causes, the significance of Asperger’s words could mean the difference 
between life and death.  
2.3c) The Lost Boys  
 
During the time of Asperger’s research, Europe was deeply in the throes of the Second World 
War. Vienna, whilst home to many notably prominent scientists and intellectuals of the time, 
was also home to significant Nazi entrenchment. This presented a very real danger to 
research being conducted at the time; financially, morally, and physically. The expectation 
was undeniable; any valuable contribution to science or the arts was to be made under the 
banner of Hitler’s regime, and be representative of their agenda. Building upon ideas 
espoused in earlier decades by catholic theologian Josef Mayer who believed that the 
mentally ill, poor and handicapped were ‘life unworthy of life’; Hitler’s position on genetic 
and racial superiority, which had hitherto been raised as purely theoretical debate, were fast 
in danger of becoming social policy. One of Hitler’s doctors, Theo Morel, produced a paper 
in 1939 detailing the financial burden on the state of individuals with disabilities and 
introducing a bill which required the registration of all births with diagnosed defects or 
disabilities. Within a few short years, this bill had been utilised to facilitate the ‘therapeutic 
euthanasia’ of 336 children in Am Spiegelgrund, the Austrian hospital to which Asperger’s 
Heilpadagogik clinic was attached (Silberman 2015, 143).  
By the time he presented his paper on autistic disturbances in children in 1944, Asperger was 
facing an audience of peers who had adopted this model of a ‘national socialist medicine.’ 
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Asperger was forced to walk a precarious tightrope between appearing to toe the line with his 
Nazi benefactors and fighting to save the lives of his ‘little professors’. His decision to 
present only his less severe cases, and stress their unusual capacity for intelligence, was 
arguably driven by his desire to portray his patients as socially valuable, protecting them 
from what would undoubtedly have been a grim fate. This decision to misrepresent the 
demographic of patients he had observed, whilst likely well intentioned, left a lasting impact 
on his research. While arguably promoting inaccurate expectations of the Asperger condition, 
Asperger also obscured many of the commonalities with Kanner’s children: who in fact, were 
far more representative of Asperger’s patients than those he chose to admit. In suppressing 
some of the more maladaptive symptoms in his patients, Asperger unwittingly distinguished 
his research from Kanner’s and deprived himself from being associated with the discovery of 
what was, in essence, the same condition.   
2.4 The Spectrum Model  
 
The dualistic discoveries by Kanner and Asperger of two separate, yet hair splittingly similar 
conditions highlighted potentialities of autism which could not be ignored. As the notoriety of 
both papers grew, and their similarities became apparent, research began to question whether 
these men were in fact documenting the same phenomena. Nonetheless, there were sufficient 
differences that one could, as Asperger did, draw a distinction between the symptomology of 
his patients and Kanner’s. How, then, does one account for the existence of two distinct 
conditions whose symptomology overlap so significantly?  
Some decades later, Navy Psychologist Bernard Rimland raised the question that perhaps 
Kanner may have been somewhat exclusionary in maintaining such rigid criteria for his 
diagnosis, potentially excluding children who portrayed enough, but not all, of Kanner’s 
autistic behaviours (Rimland 1963, 21). 15 For his part, Kanner criticised what he termed ‘the 
dilution of the concept of early infantile autism,’ believing that his condition was being 
diagnosed too readily by other practitioners (1958, 110). However, increasing attention was 
being given to the possibility that autism existed as a condition which varied considerably in 
 
15 It is worth noting however, that Rimland would go on to create his own exhaustive diagnostic checklist which 
would be adopted by practitioners for some decades, and which was arguably more specific and meticulous (and 
therefore potentially exclusionary) than Kanner’s.  
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severity and symptomology, often presenting in distinctly different ways depending on the 
individual. Rimland considered that such differentiation represented not different conditions, 
but in fact suggested the existence of ‘sub-groups’ of symptomology and ability within the 
same condition (Rimland, 1963, 60).  
This theory was later developed by British Psychiatrist Lorna Wing (again herself a parent of 
an autistic child) into what we now refer to as ‘the spectrum model.’ Wing concluded that the 
variation in the children she observed, and multiplicity of their symptoms could not feasibly 
be considered to be separate conditions, but rather pointed to a continuum within the autistic 
condition. Furthermore, she argued that autism was not a static, unchanging condition, but 
that the patients she observed could be seen to move along this continuum, in either direction. 
She described some patients who initially presented with ‘classic autism,’ who later 
following maturation presented as more firmly within the Asperger category (Wing 1996, 
29).   
Wing’s contribution not only impacted autism research in highlighting that autism could be a 
fluid and changeable condition, but also changed the way in which we speak of autism. 
Today, practitioners and parents typically favour the term ‘Autism Spectrum Disorder’, often 
abbreviated to ‘ASD’ rather than the traditional terms of ‘Autism’ or ‘Asperger’s’, which 
arguably perpetuated narrow diagnostic criteria. Indeed, in recent years I have personally 
witnessed a shift in the dialogue with my son’s doctors from ‘Asperger’s’ to the more 
inclusive category ‘ASD.’ This development highlights that the diagnostic process has now 
become much more flexible as a consequence of the spectrum model, opening doors to 
children who may previously had narrowly missed a diagnosis due to the rigidity of 
traditional autism criteria.  
2.5) Causes for conflict- Theories as to the origins of Autism  
Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of autism, for individuals and practitioners alike, 
is that 70 years later we are no closer to a definitive answer as to exactly how it comes to be. 
In contrast to the perceived ‘invisibility’ of children in disability studies raised in chapter one; 
autism has become inherently and inextricably linked with childhood development. Perhaps 
as a consequence of this, autism is still very much a condition which is significantly 
stigmatised for both the autistic individual themselves, and their families. With the shadow of 
‘toxic parenting’ still looming over autism, the absence of a cause often compels parents to 
search more fervently for answers. That we still cannot say with any degree of certainty that 
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autism is a neurological, psychological or biological condition leaves the condition 
vulnerable to misrepresentation and misunderstanding. Whilst there is currently no accepted 
causality of autism, several theories have been presented over the years, of varying merit.  
2.5a) Psychological 
 
Initially associated with childhood schizophrenia, autism was first documented within the 
field of psychiatry, where it remained for several decades. Both Kanner and Asperger 
considered autism to be a form of psychiatric disorder. Today, this theory is considered 
controversial, as it implies that autism is form of mental illness, which can be stigmatising for 
the autistic individual. Nonetheless, psychological explanations of autism have arguably 
retained their popularity, as many of the characteristic associated with autism are considered 
to be relational and behavioural, and therefore more strongly associated with personality.  
One of the most prevailing psychological theories of autism is the theory of mind approach, 
proposed by psychologists such as Michael Rutter (1983) Simon Baron-Cohen (1995) and 
Alan Leslie (1985).  In their 1985 paper ‘Does the Autistic child have a theory of mind?’ 
Baron-Cohen and Leslie found that autistic children consistently failed tests designed to 
gauge an individual’s awareness of the thoughts and motivations of others, in comparison to 
the neurotypical children and children with Down’s Syndrome used as controls. This, they 
reasoned, accounted for many of the social relational difficulties often found in autistic 
individuals (Baron-Cohen 1985, 40). 
Whilst this theory is useful in attempting to understand the social deficits experienced by the 
autistic individual, it has faced criticism in recent years for failing to account for the myriad 
of other symptoms associated with autism which are not social relational (Tager-Flusberg 
2001, 186).  Katherine Loveland furthers that such an approach confines autism as located 
within the person; ‘when viewed this way, autism tends to be reified as a thing (a static 
syndrome or deficit) that afflicts a person and remains throughout life; thus, the person is said 
to ‘have autism,’ rather than to have autistic characteristics or behaviours’ (2001, 19). 
2.5b) Environmental  
 
In Kanner’s seminal study in 1944, he positioned autism as a mental health condition, 
brought on by the absence of a warm and loving family environment. Kanner proposed that 
these parents busied themselves with instilling information, rather than love, in their children: 
which accounted not only for their unusual feats of intelligence, but also their social 
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relational difficulties. In echoing the parental fears ignited by Freud’s oedipal complex, 
autism was reduced to a ‘psychodynamic conflict’ which placed the blame, and consequently 
hopes for recovery, squarely on the parents (Frith 2003, 30). This hypothesis was 
enthusiastically adopted by contemporaries such as Bruno Bettleheim, Rudoph Ekstein and 
Lauretta Bender and became fundamental in shaping treatment and intervention strategies for 
decades to come (Evans 2013, 9). 
This theory has now thankfully been almost universally dismissed; however, the 
ramifications of this controversial hypothesis were considerable. In positioning autism within 
the realm of child psychology and family therapy, it arguably discredited autism as a lifelong, 
developmental condition, hampering any multidisciplinary research for several decades by 
implying that autism was a mental state from which one could recover.  Furthermore, the 
notion that autism was located within the family was an insidious one. Despite this theory 
being largely discredited, there is still a very real sense of culpability and shame felt by 
parents following a diagnosis (Frith 2003, 30). 
2.5c) Genetic  
 
Hans Asperger also noted peculiarities in the parents of his patients, particularly in relation to 
their unusual level of education. In contrast to Kanner, Asperger believed that rather the 
similar traits observed in families implied a genetic component to autism, observing ‘related 
incipient traits in parents or relatives in every single case where it was possible to make a 
closer acquaintance’  (1944 in Frith 1991, 84). He also suggested that the overwhelming 
prevalence in males reinforced the hypothesis that autism was a condition with a strong 
genetic component, and one which was potentially linked or inherited through gender. This 
theory has stood the test of time, as it is generally accepted today that autism is a 
developmental condition that is likely genetic in origin (Tsanis et al 2001, 81).  
However, exactly which genes contribute to autism remains an area of research which 
requires considerably further inquiry. Catherine Tstanis and Fred Volkmar in their 
examination of neurobiology and genetics in autism observe that, 
…latent class analysis methods have been used to estimate that probably 2 to 5 genes 
act in concert to produce an autistic phenotype. However, as many as 10 to 12 genes 
may be implicated, and it is not predicted that the same genes would consistently be 
involved (2001, 82).  
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Recent research from Edinburgh University has succeeded in linking specific genes 
associated with autism and increased cognitive ability in the general population, particularly 
in relation to problem solving tasks (Clarke et al, 2016). However, the multivalency of autism 
presentation is characteristically problematic when attempting to successfully chart a genetic 
map of autism. Silberman observes that even the most common markers associated with 
autism were found in less than 1% of a recent sample study of children, citing neurogeneticist 
Stanley Nelson, ‘If you had 100 kids with autism, you could have 100 different genetic 
causes’ (2015, 15).  
2.5d) Neurological  
 
With the psychological theories of autism failing to account for how such cognitive 
differences arise, research has in recent decades shifted towards a developmental 
psychological approach, combining the fields of psychology with neurobiology to attempt to 
find causality between biological neural difference and the cognitive processes of the mind 
(Loveland 2001, 17). In contrast to the ‘Top down’ theories of psychology equating 
symptomology with behaviour; neurobiological theories offer a ‘bottom up’ approach, 
suggesting that rather behavioural and sensory symptoms are a consequence of impaired 
brain structures (Loveland 2001, 18). A study into the electrical patterns of the brain of 
autistic individuals of varying symptomology versus neurotypical controls, and found that in 
two thirds of their sample the autistic individuals showed differential activity across the brain 
in comparison to controls, and a reduction in activity in the frontal lobe particularly (Tsanis et 
al 2001, 90).  
This correlates with similar studies which have drawn links between impaired executive 
function in autistic individuals and the temporal limbic and limbic frontal regions of the brain 
responsible for decision making, perception and behaviour (Frith 2003, 179; Tstsanis et al 
2001, 90; Loveland, 2001, 28). Frith reinforces a neurobiological theory of autism, proposing 
that considerable commonalities can be drawn between the behavioural effects following 
damage to the frontal areas of the brain, as in acquired brain injuries, and those commonly 
found in individuals with autism, for example emotional regulation and repetitive behaviours 
(2003, 179). In current research, neurobiological theories have gained significant traction and 
credibility in assuming an underlying causality for the development of autistic behaviours.  
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2.5e) Biological 
Biological models of autism have sought to locate the root of autistic behaviours within the 
body, medicalising autism as a condition with biological causality, and therefore, potentially, 
biological treatments. In the 1960’s, psychologist Bernard Rimland began to receive 
correspondence from parents of autistic children with alarmingly similar and curious 
gastrointestinal issues, ranging from diarrhea, constipation to vomiting. As a result, Rimland 
began research into elimination diets with complex regimes of high dose vitamins, which 
many claimed to have ameliorated their children’s more maladaptive behaviours. Such tests, 
however, were viewed with scepticism and failed to achieve FDA approval (Gabriels and Hill 
2002; 77).  
The potential link between GI symptoms and autism was to be revisited with some notoriety 
in the late 1990’s with a controversial study in the Lancet by UK Gastroenterologist Dr 
Andrew Wakefield, which linked ‘onset’ symptoms of autism with levels of mercury in the 
blood following receipt of the MMR vaccine (Wakefield et al 1999). This study has since 
been widely discredited, with Dr Wakefield having his licence to practice revoked for failing 
to obtain ethical review and for accepting payment in giving evidence in civil suits pertaining 
to MMR liability (Holton et al 2012, 691). Although this theory was swiftly and frankly 
refuted by the medical community, the impact of the study was manifold. Despite no credible 
scientific data linking autism to digestion or vitamin deficiency, the association between 
autism and potential gastrointestinal issues caught public attention, particularly amongst 
parents who were proactively seeking curative interventions for their children.   
In suggesting that autism was a biomedical condition which could be managed, the study 
revived credibility in many untested, costly, and arguably dangerous intervention therapies 
for children (such as induced vomiting and chelation) (Silberman 2015, 80). It also sparked 
widespread fear and ‘anti-vax’ movements surrounding the provision of the MMR to 
children, with many parents continuing even now to opt out of vaccinating their children for 
fear of ‘giving’ them autism. This potential link became a focus of fund raising and activism 
amongst certain parent groups, most notably ‘Autism Speaks’ 16 Whilst such movements 
which focus on curative interventions have arguably benefitted some families in providing 
 
16 Autism speaks define their organisation as being ‘...dedicated to funding global biomedical research into the 
causes, prevention, treatments and cure for autism’ (Autism Speaks (2012) cited in Waltz 2013, 138. 
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access to resources and perhaps a sense of community; they have also been widely 
condemned in pathologising and ‘othering’ autistic individuals by locating their condition 
within the body as something which has to be overcome and normalised (Waltz 2013, 162). 
2.6) A Gendered Condition?  
 
Autism has, traditionally, been considered a condition which predominantly impacts males. 
The ratio of boys with autism to girls is generally accepted to be 4:1, with high functioning 
autism (or Asperger’s syndrome) being even higher at 15:1 (Frith 2003, 64).  Asperger 
himself initially considered the condition which he observed to only affect boys, although 
later conceded its rarity amongst females (Frith 2003, 64). This perception has arguably 
endured over the last century, with girls being largely invisible from the autism narrative.  
So pervasive has this gendered assumption been that some researchers have suggested that is 
in fact a biologically gendered condition. Dr Simon Baron-Cohen, experimental psychologist 
and autism researcher, has claimed that autism is ‘an extreme form of the male brain’ (2002, 
248). The propensity towards analytical and systemising thought processes over those which 
are emotion driven, he argues, are indicative of a higher level of ‘male traits’, suggesting that 
autism is the consequence of increased levels of testosterone and other androgens prenatally 
(Baron-Cohen 2002, 248). Similar studies have suggested a link between testosterone levels 
in childhood in autism symptomology (Auyeung et al 2009, 20; Knickmeyer et al 2006, 830), 
however no large-scale medical research has been conducted into this potential association. It 
is also worth noting that prevalence of autism in girls has not been shown to correlate with 
stereotypical ‘male’ behaviours.   
In the context of this research, the sample presented by my participants shows a ratio of 2 
girls to 3 boys: notably, with one girl and boy being siblings. While this is a particularly 
small sample, and therefore cannot be generalised, the ratio does suggest that autism 
prevalence amongst girls is more common than is assumed. Emerging research (and accounts 
from autistic women themselves) have suggested that the diagnostic differential observed 
between boys and girls could be misleading, with girls potentially being more conscious of 
‘masking’ their maladaptive behaviours in order to fit in than their male counterparts. Thus, 
girls may display better compensatory learning than boys and may consequently be more 
difficult to diagnose (Frith 2003, 60). Some of the characteristics of autism, such as increased 
focus on a particular subject matter and emotional aloofness may be characteristics which, 
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particularly in education settings, are perceived as simply poise and concentration and are 
therefore behaviours which are praised in girls rather than stigmatised. While the reasons for 
the gender discrepancy is unclear, the suggestion above highlights that binaried and 
stereotyped ‘gender’ characteristics pervade much of the literature, arguably hampering a 
more nuanced understanding of the autistic experience. 
2.7) Contextualising the Conundrum: A summary 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how the historical context of autism has strongly influenced 
how it has been understood, both in the field of research and in society more broadly. 
Emerging from a period of social tumult, in a climate where research was heavily laden with 
political agendas, autism arguably had an inauspicious and rocky start in its definition as a 
diagnosis. These implications served not only to hinder the research process, meaning autism 
today is still frustratingly ambiguous for researchers and families; but also perpetuated 
conflicting narratives of what autism is and what it means for the person. In this chapter, we 
can see how considerably the damaging and harmful constructions of normalcy depicted in 
chapter one can be seen to impact the development of research and social care policies.   
Despite increasing multidisciplinary attention in the last 30 years, the cause of autism and its 
disciplinary home has still yet to be established. That there is no consensus as to the origins 
of autism has meant that some of more stigmatising psychoanalytical theories, particularly 
those rooting autism in family dynamics or mental illness, still have roots in the autism 
debate. Similarly, the indeterminate nature of the condition has left the field open for 
intervention therapies to focusing on curative treatments to continue to persist, medicalising 
autism as a condition which can be overcome. In the following chapter, I will turn to a 
discussion of how autism is currently understood in terms of symptomology and presentation. 
I will highlight that such symptomologies are varied and often incongruent with one another, 
making autism particularly difficult to diagnose. I will further highlight how this multiplicity 
and ambiguity in symptomology and their impact on everyday life create a particularly 
challenging and distinct parental experience, and one which mothers are disproportionately 
affected by.  
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 Chapter 3) Symptoms and Stigma: A distinct maternal challenge.  
 
Autism is a considerably complex and multi-valent condition in which individual outcomes 
are unpredictable and uncertain. It is also a condition which is inextricably and complexly 
rooted in various social, historical, and political sites of turbulence; what we know about 
autism has been informed by research shaped by dominant political ideologies which served 
particular interests. As I have charted in the preceding chapter, such ideologies can be seen to 
be shaped by wider attitudes to disabilities and have functioned in various ways to complicate 
and inhibit understanding and support for children and families with ASD. Although there 
can be seen to be some commonality in the symptomology displayed by individuals with 
autism, the ways in which these symptoms present and develop are so varied and 
multitudinous that attempting to describe common characteristics of autism is almost a 
contradiction in terms. Nonetheless, certain shared characteristics are generally seen to be 
present, and have informed the criteria currently used to provide a diagnosis of ASD.   
The World Health Organisation has separated these into three, arguably quite broad, sets of 
diagnostic criteria which is commonly known as ‘the triad of impairments.’ For a diagnosis to 
be made, behaviours from all three criteria have to be observed. In what follows, I will 
outline the behaviours which are currently considered to fall within these categories, with the 
aim of demonstrating the breadth, ambiguity, and conflicting nature of autism symptomology 
which makes diagnosis particularly challenging. I will reflect on the impact of these 
symptomologies on the everyday lives of both the individual with autism themselves and 
those who care for them, highlighting that the social attitudes of disability described in 
chapter one strongly influence how symptoms of autism are perceived, making it a 
particularly stigmatising lived experience. In concluding this chapter, I will propose that 
ambiguity in symptomology, difficulty in obtaining a diagnosis, and deeply stigmatising 
attitudes to autism coalesce to form a distinctly challenging experience for parents; and an 
experience which, as Kanner has situated, remains much more closely associated with 
mothers. 
3.1) ‘The Presence of Abnormal or Impaired development that is present before the age 
of three years.’  
 
Although autism continues to be a curiously unpredictable condition in its manifestation, it is 
now generally agreed that autism manifests very early in infancy and will present in what the 
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World Health organisation terms ‘abnormal development’. Childhood development is 
considered to follow a somewhat linear pattern, albeit there will be some fluidity and 
fluctuation to development. The attainment of verbal expression, independent mobility, 
reciprocal actions, and object recognition are generally reached by the age of three years in 
typically developing infants. A child may reach each of these milestones at different stages or 
at a different rate within this three-year window. For example, a child may begin their first 
attempts at speech at 9 months, yet not begin to walk until 16 months, and go on to develop 
perfectly typically.  
It is expected that initial concerns would be raised if children are ‘not babbling or gesturing 
by 12 months of age, have no single words by 16 months, have no two-word phrases by 24 
months of age, or if any loss of language or social skills is noted.’ (Schulman 2002, 29). My 
own son had begun to form words at 9 months and walked at 11 months. He could hold a 
crayon; he had a healthy appetite. His toilet training was frustrating, but typically so.  His 
delay in receiving a diagnosis was, in retrospect, in large part hindered by his developing too 
typically. That such variation can be seen even in typically developing children makes it 
extremely challenging to diagnose autism at this crucial early developmental stage.  
3.2) ‘Abnormal functioning in at least three areas of psychopathy: reciprocal social 
interaction, communication, and restricted, stereotyped, repetitive behaviour.’ 
 
3.2a) Communication and Reciprocal Social Action 
 
This second diagnostic category consists of perhaps the most easily definable and 
recognisable characteristics of ‘classic’ autism. It is in this section that the delay in speech 
acquisition is generally compounded by an apparent lack of interest or ability in responding 
to social communication, in addition to unusual speech patterns or inflection. Our desire to 
communicate with our children, to hear their thoughts and witness their personality develop 
through verbal actions is likely to cause parents to be especially vigilant to a lack of social 
interaction in their children, leading this to be a common early indicator of autistic 
characteristics.  
It is also these particular characteristics which inspired the term ‘autism.’ Coined by Swiss 
psychiatrist Eugene Blueler in 1912, the term conjoins the Greek word ‘Autos’, meaning ‘of 
the self’, with ‘ismos’, meaning action or state of being. Literally, it translates as ‘being of the 
self’ (Evans 2013, 4). Although originally used to describe a withdrawal from social 
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interaction and self-preoccupation observed in patients with schizophrenia, Kanner adopted 
this term to describe what he perceived to be a disinterest in the social world and desire for 
aloneness amongst his patients (Kanner 1943, 242). This representation of autistic individuals 
as choosing to avoid social contact or being indifferent to other’s emotions or attention has 
pervaded perceptions of autism for generations, leading to autistic individuals being 
considered cold, unfeeling or incapable of emotion (Swinton 2012, 275; Lawson, 2008, 47).  
This has been a very hurtful and damaging stereotype to the autistic community and has 
arguably contributed to the many barriers autistic individuals face in respect to social 
inclusion.  
However, with the increasing interest in autism in the last few decades, recent studies and 
indeed accounts from autistic individuals themselves (Grandin 1996; Shore, 2006), have 
suggested that the deficit in reciprocal social action present in autistic individuals is not a 
consequence of a desire for solitude, but rather an inherent difficulty in inferring meaning or 
context from social actions and understanding other’s facial and verbal expressions (Lawson 
2008, 103). Context is particularly important to individuals on the autism spectrum, as it is 
often relied upon to form ‘social rules’ or expected outcomes to particular situations so that 
one may anticipate the correct social response. Wendy Lawson, a psychologist who herself is 
on the autism spectrum, has described her difficulty in engaging in conversations with others 
which are outside of the context of her particular set of interests or range of experiences 
(2008, 59). It has also been observed that individuals with autism struggle with figurative 
language, in particular metaphoric language, and have a tendency to interpret speech literally 
(Kanner 1943, 244). Thus, the difficulty in understanding reciprocal social action could be 
arguably be seen to be one of the most problematic aspects of the autistic experience 
(Grandin 1996, 50).   
3.2b) Restricted, Stereotyped Behaviour 
 
Further to difficulty in social interaction, another symptom of autism is a preoccupation with 
routines, specific objects, movements, obsessive interests and ritualistic behaviour (Frith 
2003, 14). Temple Grandin describes her preoccupation with the repetitive action of spinning. 
Spinning, or ambulatory motions, are commonly described characteristics of autistic 
individuals and are generally described as self-stimulatory behaviours or ‘stimming’:  
Spinning was another favourite activity…self-stimulatory behaviour made me feel 
powerful, in control of things…I realise that non-autistic children enjoy twirling 
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around in a swing, too. The difference is the autistic child is obsessed with the act of 
spinning (Grandin 1996, 18) 
Like Temple, winding up a swing and allowing it to turn ferociously is one of my son’s most 
beloved past times. He has always delighted in any motion which propels him, and spinning 
is his particular favourite. Such repetitive behaviours may also include movements such 
rocking, hand-flapping, finger motions and other such gestures17. It is considered that these 
repetitive movements serve to please, calm, or even excite autistic individuals.  
Autistic behaviours are consequently often distinguished by their inexplicability to others, 
and their all-consuming nature to the autistic individual themselves. Indeed, it is the intensity 
with which autistic individuals adopt certain behaviours which seems to differentiate mere 
hobby from obsession. At times, this may take the form of a ‘special interest’ in a particular 
area. These will vary from individual to individual, although they are often comprised of a 
subject or object which is quantifiable, predictable, and easily systematised (Lawson 2008, 
83). While my son has had a few ‘special interests’ over the years, the most enduring has 
been dinosaurs. He has memorised the types, locations, and eras of any dinosaur you would 
care to mention, and in fact he would be quite delighted if you would. Their size, their diet, 
their habits have all been carefully catalogued in his brain and are ready to be whipped out at 
a moment’s notice, with the most tenuous, if any, connection to the conversation at hand. I 
know of another boy who is equally fascinated by trains: their engineering, their weight, 
speed, fuel. Still another is fascinated by sugar packets, and fervently collects packets he 
considers to be unique or interesting to him.  
Attention to a restrictive interest falls under the category of ‘repetitive behaviours’ as it often 
becomes ritualistic in its manifestation, for example collecting, cataloguing, or memorising 
information or objects pertaining to the subject (Kanner 1943, 245). Whilst the impetus 
towards this behaviour is unknown, a recent study into restricted interests in children with 
autism has suggested that such behaviour, like stimming, is perhaps a functional tool to 
inhibit anxiety, and can be seen to be used as both a means of distraction for autistic 
individuals and as a means of attempting to order or control one’s own environment (Spiker 
et al 2012, 314). Order, routine and an averseness to change is also a pervasive theme in 
autistic pathology. Leo Kanner’s early observations of autistic behaviour described his 
 
17 https://www.autism.org.uk/about/behaviour/obsessions-repetitive-routines.aspx 
 Accessed  18/03/19 10.06am 
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patients as having ‘limitation in the variety of spontaneous activity’ and an ‘anxiously 
obsessive desire for the maintenance of sameness’ (1943, 246).  
Lawson suggests that in fact every individual is reliant on routines. The problem, she 
considers, is that autistic routines may appear different or unusual to other people’s (2008, 
87). Whilst Kanner considered his patients routines to be almost arbitrary and insignificant, 
numerous studies since have stressed the importance of consistency and routine to the autistic 
individual in managing their sense of emotional stability (Gray 1997, 1100). Indeed, 
structured schedules, visual timetables and social rehearsal have been found to be incredibly 
useful for autistic individuals and are often used to underpin many parental and educational 
strategies for supporting children and young people on the autism spectrum (Howlin 1997, 
46; 172).  
3.3) ‘Non-Specific’ problems 
The third and final category of the autistic phenotype is the undoubtedly the most obtruse and 
problematic area to navigate, for both professionals involved in the diagnostic process and 
parents themselves. ‘Non-specific’ problems, while helpfully grouping an alarmingly wide 
myriad of characteristics under a single umbrella, also serves to muddy the waters of exactly 
what characteristics are, or are not, seen to be autistic. This ambiguity is particularly difficult 
for care givers, as it opens the realm of possibility that any or all behaviours could be 
arguably defined as ‘autistic.’ Due to the breadth of symptomology this category could 
encompass, it would be an unrealistic and fruitless endeavour to attempt to chart all the 
possible characteristics which could potentially fall within this area. Instead, I will look to 
discuss aspects of autism which have been seen to find commonality within the murky waters 
of ‘non-specific’ symptomology.  
3.3a) Personal Independence  
 
Whilst this is perhaps a rather broad and ambiguous heading, it is helpful in grouping 
together common characteristics which, whether present singly or collectively, may have a 
profound impact on the daily acts of personal independence which a neurotypical individual 
may take for granted. In early development, the ease with which a child acquires fine motor 
skills is often an indication of autistic characteristics. Autistic children have often been found 
to struggle with developing the fine motor skills or hand eye coordination required for tasks 
such as writing, tying shoes and fastening buttons. This may have a significant effect on a 
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child’s learning, self-esteem and in some cases may provoke considerable anxiety relating to 
dressing and other personal care (Howlin 1997, 174).  
It is commonly reported that individuals with autism may have continence issues, particularly 
in childhood. Other’s may struggle to form a sleep pattern or may require certain conditions 
be met before sleep can be achieved. Issues with diet and eating habits are also commonly 
reported amongst children with autism, with some individuals tolerating very restrictive 
interests in foods (Schaff et al 2011, 381). Whether or not these behaviours manifest in their 
own right as distinct symptoms, are symptomatic of stereotyped behaviours or are a 
consequence of underlying sensory issues is unclear. Certainly, they can be seen to have a 
profound impact on the personal independence and general physical health of the autistic 
individual, and consequently a profound impact on the demands of care givers.  
3.3b) Sensory Sensitivity  
 
A common theme in autism symptomology, whilst varying in severity and presentation, is 
sensory sensitivity (Grandin 1996, 12). In 2016, the National Autistic Society released a 
video entitled ‘TMI’, depicting a young boy with autism experiencing sensory overload 
during a shopping trip. Described as a virtual reality experience for neurotypical individuals 
to understand the challenges faced by those with autism, the short video immerses the viewer 
in an onslaught of competing noises which gradually increase in volume, along with the 
young boy’s clearly distressed breathing18. This video, it would seem, so accurately portrayed 
the experience that it prompted my son, who at such a time was unaware of his diagnosis, to 
ask, ‘Mum, do I have autism? That’s what I feel like!’   
What is interesting about auditory sensitivity among autistic individuals is that it has not been 
shown to correlate with any physical difference or impairment in hearing. Lorna Wing, 
author of ‘The Autistic Spectrum’, observes that some individuals may be unresponsive or 
appear deaf to some even loud noises, whilst other noises prove to be extremely agitating or 
distressing (1996, 50). The unpredictability of noise sensitivity is compounded by the fact 
that it is often unavoidable, as shown by the video’s decision to highlight the necessary and 
routine act of shopping as an almost insurmountable sensory challenge for someone with 
autism. Temple Grandin describes her own struggles with tactile sensitivity, which was at 
times overwhelmingly unbearable for her to manage. In ‘Emergence: Labelled Autistic’, she 
 
18 https://www.autism.org.uk/about/family-life.everyday-life/shopping-strategies.aspx  
Accessed 11/06/19 11.49pm 
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recalls one particular incident in which she causes her mother to crash their car over her 
inability to tolerate the sensation of a sun hat on her head:  
My ears felt as if they were being squashed together into one giant ear. The band of 
the hat pressed tightly into my head. I jerked the hat off and screamed. Screaming was 
my only way of telling Mother that I didn’t want to wear the hat. It hurt. (1996, 12).  
This example is particularly useful as it highlights that something seemingly innocuous and 
harmless to Temple’s mother, a simple sun hat, is utterly devastating to Temple. When a 
neurotypical individual chooses clothing, we typically will select our garments based on 
style, colour, or aesthetic. While we may have a preference of fabric, our decision to wear or 
not wear a particular item is rarely determined by whether or not our skin can tolerate the 
sensation of it. For someone with autism, the sensation of the wrong garment can be almost 
incapacitating. Such sensitivity to tactile sensations can also be seen to account for the 
reported reluctance of autistic individuals to engage in physical contact such as embraces or 
physical intimacy with others, rather than a perceived lack of affection or emotion. 
Conversely, similar to the sensory self-stimulation we have discussed, certain sensory inputs 
can also be shown to be soothing for individuals with autism; deep pressure techniques such 
as weighted blankets and vests are now widely recognised as beneficial for tempering sensory 
difficulties. 
For my son, sensory sensitivity scored particularly highly in his diagnosis. Competing 
background noises distressed him, and he could not tolerate anything loose or baggy on his 
person. To this end, his clothing had to be tight to the point of marking his tiny body, leaving 
grooves, indents and often bruises. Consumed with an irrational fear of laces coming undone 
or Velcro snapping causing him to trip (this had in fact never happened, but the possibility of 
it was enough), coupled with the need to have his clothing grip his body, Micah rejected 
every pair of shoes we attempted to put him in until eventually deciding on a pair of leather 
buckled sandals. This, in the beginning of spring, we considered a success. However, by the 
December, and on our 8th pair of what had to be the same brand and model of sandal (which 
had long been discontinued and which we now had to source by ever more creative means) 
this seemingly small victory had become the focus around which Micah orientated the 
success or failure of his, and consequently our, day. Now that he is older, he can reminisce 
with good humour about what has gone down in family infamy as ‘The Year of the Sandal.’ 
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The causation of sensory sensitivity amongst autistic individuals is also unknown. Whilst 
early theories suggested a compensatory model, proposing that individuals with autism 
favoured certain stimuli such as taste, touch and smell to the detriment of others; this was 
dispelled as increasing evidence observed sensory difficulties amongst all five senses, with 
no discernible trend or pattern (Frith 2003, 169).  Rather, Frith offers that rather there is 
difference in the way that autists process certain stimuli, rather than necessarily the stimuli 
themselves. She suggests a hypothesis of ‘stimulus over selectivity’, which posits that 
‘autistic children cannot attend well to simultaneously presented information and therefore 
select one narrow aspect of this information’ (2003, 170). It has also been suggested that 
external stimuli are often unpredictable and difficult to control, and therefore can be a source 
of anxiety for individuals with autism. Certainly, in a world in which we are confronted with 
unexpected and often competing stimuli, the experience of the autistic individual is one of 
constant external assault.  
3.3c) Temper/ Aggression  
 
Aggression, as a characteristic, is difficult to quantify or measure in terms of prevalence or 
severity. However, studies have shown that in relation to other developmental conditions, and 
indeed the general population, prevalence of aggressive, self-injurious or violent behaviour is 
considerably higher amongst individuals with autism (Stirling et al 2015, 115-116). A 2016 
study into behavioural and emotional problems associated with autism found that 68% of 
individuals with autism related conditions reported aggressive or violent behaviours, which 
was considerably higher than controls (Lecavalier 2006, 1110).  
In ‘Autistic Psychopathy in Childhood’, Hans Asperger offers a detailed description as to 
what he termed the ‘autistic acts of malice’ of his patients towards their caregivers, peers, and 
environment. ‘These acts,’ he muses, ‘typically appear to be calculated. With uncanny 
certainty, the children manage to do whatever is the most unpleasant or hurtful in a particular 
situation’ (1944, trans in Frith 1991, 77). This description is particularly jarring. It assumes 
not only an inherent cruelty in the autistic individuals observed but also an awareness of the 
cruelty of their acts. On their worst day, parents and caregivers of children with autism may 
sometimes feel the resonance of Asperger’s words and attribute intent to the autistic 
aggression they are experiencing. This can consequently have a profound and severely 
damaging impact to relationships and family life, with parents facing the additional stress of 
being at risk of being injured by their child, and also in preventing their child from harming 
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themselves. Such behaviours can also be deeply stigmatised and may result in social isolation 
for both the individual and the family (Gray, 1997; 1999).  
However, since Asperger’s bleak portrayal in 1944, research has increasingly refuted the 
association between aggression and malice described in individuals with Autism. Patricia 
Howlin, in her guide for parents and practitioners of children with autism, considers that there 
can be observed to be a perfect storm’ of environmental and developmental factors which 
coalesce to create aggressive outbursts in autistic individuals; difficulties in expressive 
language leading to communication difficulties and miscomprehension, sensory over 
stimulation, or even under stimulation leading to boredom and frustration are increasingly 
considered to be causes of anger and aggression in individuals with autism related conditions 
(1999, 211). As a means of de-stigmatising such behaviours, in recent years a distinction has 
been drawn between ‘tantrums’ and the outbursts of extreme emotion exhibited by 
individuals with autism now popularly termed a ‘meltdown.’ The National Autistic society 
describes a ‘meltdown’ as,  
…an intense response to overwhelming situations. It happens when someone becomes 
completely overwhelmed by their current situation and temporarily loses behavioural 
control. This loss of control can be expressed verbally (e.g. shouting, screaming, 
crying) physically (e.g. kicking, lashing out, biting) or in both ways. 19 
Whilst extremely upsetting for both the individual themselves and the people around them, it 
is generally considered that such outbursts become less frequent as children develop (Howlin 
1999, 211). Whilst it is uncertain whether children simply ‘grow out’ of such expressive 
outbursts, as typically developing children do with tantrums, it has been suggested that the 
acquisition of greater expressive language and increased awareness and avoidance of 
potential triggers, particularly environmental ones, can significantly reduce the frequency of 
meltdowns. 
3.4) Co-morbidities 
 
A challenging feature of autism is that it is often found to accompany other co-morbidities, 
which can lead to a frustrating and elusive ‘chicken or the egg’ search for answers. Is it that 
certain health conditions lead to autism, or does autism make one more susceptible to other 
 
1919 https://www.autism.org.uk/about.behaviour.meltdowns.aspx   Accessed 18/06/19 12.32pm.  
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health conditions? No one is quite sure, however there are certain conditions which show 
markedly more prevalence amongst individuals with autism.  
The relationship between autism and mental health has been an enduring one. Studies have 
shown that up to 70% of individuals with autism also have a co-occurring psychological 
condition (Simonoff et al 2008, 921). Particularly in school age children, ADHD is found to 
be three times more common amongst those with an autism diagnosis. Whilst many of the 
diagnostic criteria for autism and ADHD can be found to overlap, Mayes et al found in a 
study of 847 children with autism, over half displayed 30 or more symptoms of ADHD, in 
contrast to the control group of 158 children with a primary diagnosis of ADHD only (none 
of which displayed symptoms of autism) (2012, 278). Tourettes syndrome (or what is now 
commonly referred to as tic disorder) categorised by involuntary movements is also 
associated with autism; however as with the similarities in characteristics associated with 
ADHD, researchers are in disagreement as to whether such movements could instead be 
described as the ritualistic or repetitive behaviour (Baird et al 2006, 211). Similarly, epilepsy 
and seizure disorders are found to be present in 30% of individuals with autism (Silberman 
2015, 199), with rates of the general population falling in the region of between 4 and 10 per 
1000 people20.   
Whilst no large population studies have been completed to validate this hypotheses, 
researchers and practitioners as early as the 1970’s have also raised concerns over the 
increased susceptibility of autistic individuals to anxiety and depression (Rutter 1970, 441; 
Macaskill 2019, 130; Stewart et al 2006, 103). It is thought that increased sensory anxiety and 
difficulties in social communication may contribute to individuals suffering from increased 
levels of stress and social isolation, leading to depressive symptoms. However, this is 
difficult to quantify for a number of reasons. Firstly, issues in communicating and articulating 
feelings are common amongst individuals with autism, making it less likely for individuals to 
speak openly about depressive symptoms. Furthermore, many of the symptoms of depression, 
such as withdrawal from social contact, decline in personal care and sleep issues can also be 
seen to overlap with the symptoms of autism itself, making it hard to differentiate. To this 
end, there is no current diagnostic model for depression that is autism specific, and so the 
model used for the general population may not suitably reflect the subtle differences between 
depressive behaviour, and autistic behaviour (Stewart et al, 2006, 109).   
 
20 https://www.who.int.news-room/fact-sheets/detail/epilepsy   Accessed 18/06/19 14.08pm  
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3.5) Stigma  
 
As I have touched upon in the preceding chapter, the association of autism with 
psychological disturbance has left an indelible mark on how autism is perceived socially. In 
chapter one, I illustrated how constructions of ‘normal’ (and consequently ‘abnormal’) 
behaviour have functioned to position difference as inherently suspicious, deviant, or pitiable, 
particularly in relation to cognitive difference. More significantly, the influence of the 
eugenic beliefs examined in chapter two on social attitudes and policies towards difference 
made ‘normal’ a particularly dangerous category to be excluded from when autism was first 
identified. Whilst we have mercifully moved beyond the devastating reach of social eugenics, 
as I have examined in respect to autism and popular culture, attitudinal shifts are much slower 
to transform. 
Autism is, by nature, an invisible condition. In contrast to the differences which are often 
visually recognisable in the case of physical disabilities, intellectual or developmental 
conditions such as autism present by their difference in behaviour. Erving Goffman posited 
that stigmatising conditions which are ‘invisible’ (such as autism) allow for the phenomenon 
of ‘passing’ as ‘normal’ in social situations; therefore mitigating other’s awareness of their 
stigmatising characteristics and allowing for greater opportunities for social inclusion (1990, 
92). From this, we could infer that the ‘invisibility’ of autism leads it to be a much less 
stigmatising, and therefore less marginalised, lived experience.   
However, as Asperger’s attempts to shape his research to protect his ‘little professors’ has 
shown, the invisibility of autism far from translates into social acceptance. The behaviours 
associated with autism are often inexplicable and perplexing to others. Repetitive behaviours 
and restricted interests can appear ‘odd’ or peculiar’, often drawing unwanted or negative 
attention and marking persons with autism as distinctly different from their peers (Lawson 
2008, 31). Schaff et al noted that self-stimulatory behaviours in children with autism can also 
be particularly challenging for care givers and educators, as not only are they often 
stigmatised behaviours, but can also be potentially (if unintentionally) disruptive to particular 
social contexts such as family events or the classroom environment (2012, 374).  
David Gray observes in his paper on stigma perception in addition to the individual with 
autism themselves facing stigma, families also experience stigma as a consequence of their 
relationship to the stigmatised individual, in this case, their child (1997, 103). This research is 
consistent with what Goffman refers to as the phenomenon of ‘courtesy stigma’. ‘Stigma 
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perception’, or the intense awareness of other’s and their potentially negative opinions of 
both the child and the parent is considered to significantly impact not only maternal well-
being, but also the likelihood of participating in leisure activities outside the home, attending 
social situations, and seeking social support (Duerte et al 2009, 217). Gray also noted that 
parents of children with more aggressive characteristics (such as the temper and aggression 
detailed above) were considerably more likely to experience such stigma than children whose 
behaviours were ‘passive’ (2003, 2007). This may be a particularly relevant and interesting 
area of further study in relating to parenting as a unique experience of courtesy stigma, as 
parents arguably experience stigma both in terms of their relationship to the child, and also, 
as we have learned from Kanner, in terms of their perceived responsibility in the behaviours 
their child displays.  
3.6) A Distinct Challenge to Motherhood 
 
Despite it being commonly accepted that children with autism are considerably more likely to 
develop successfully the earlier diagnosis and potential intervention takes place (ideally prior 
to the child turning 3); it remains frustratingly difficult for parents to obtain a diagnosis for 
their children (Zelzazo 2001, 41). Research conducted by Howlin and Asgharian found that 
of the 770 parents they interviewed concerning the diagnostic process, 60% were not 
diagnosed until a third diagnostic consultation, with more than 25% being told ‘there was no 
problem’ or ‘not to worry’ at the first appointment (2007, 836). Sansosti et al noted that the 
majority of children in their study, despite their parents first noticing differences in their 
development between 9 and 12 months, were not officially diagnosed until they were of 
school age (2012, 86). This is alarmingly consistent with my own experience. Initial concerns 
regarding my son’s behaviour were raised in the last 18 months of his pre-school nursery 
placement, and a diagnosis was not formally obtained until June 2015, 14 months after 
beginning his assessment and 2-3 years after his development presented as atypical.   
There can be observed a tendency to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach to development so as 
not to misdiagnose and potentially mislabel a child before they have had the chance to 
‘outgrow’ particular behaviours (Sansoti et al 2002, 87). In this respect, the heterogeneity of 
autism may often function to inhibit its own disclosure, as a very young child may meet some 
yet not all of the diagnostic criteria at the point of assessment, or simply be too young to 
accurately assess in terms of language and cognitive ability, despite showing other indicators 
of early autism presentation. Schulman et al attribute several reasons to the prolonged 
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diagnostic period associated with autism, highlighting the significant impact such delays may 
have on families: 
The onset of autism is insidious, not usually marked by the appearance of abrupt or 
dramatic symptoms. Typically, families experience an awareness that a problem 
exists, adapting to their child’s difficulties without even being aware that they are 
changing their behaviour and expectations…The difficulties in diagnosing autism are 
manifold, as there are no clear or specific biological markers (Schulman 2002, 25). 
The diagnostic process can therefore be seen to be hindered two-fold. In one respect, the 
diagnostic process can be seen to be impeded by parents themselves, who may be reluctant to 
admit that their child is not developing in the same way as other children. In some cases, this 
may simply be due to lack of comparable experience. My own son is an only child, therefore 
I had no control measure of typical development to gauge him against. The characteristics 
associated with early indication of autism are often behavioural, and therefore often 
stigmatised as merely symptomatic of poor parenting.  Consequently, individuals of children 
presenting such behaviours may be reluctant to draw attention to them, for fear of being seen 
to be merely ‘bad parents’ of ‘bad children.’  
Over recent decades, a huge amount of research has investigated the impact to parenting of an 
autism diagnosis in comparison to neurotypical control groups, and, also, in comparison to 
other developmental disabilities in children; typically Downs Syndrome, Fragile X 
Syndrome, and Pervasive Developmental Delay (Dumas et all, 1991; Estes et al; 2009; 
Howlin et al, 1999; Sansoti et al, 2012; Zhang et al, 2015). While current research pertaining 
to autism care giving predominantly utilises the relatively gender-neutral term of ‘parenting,’ 
the literature itself paradoxically reflects that the experience of parenting even typically 
developing children remains strongly gendered. Marshall and Bonita suggest that research 
indicates the care giving demands of parenting a child on the spectrum are more consistently 
occupied by the mother in comparison to the father (2005, 105). 
Nicholas et al observe that throughout the literature, the stereotype of what makes a ‘good 
mother’ and the strict conditions under which one may adhere to this category remain a cause 
of significant stress amongst mothers of children on the autism spectrum (2016, 927). As I 
have touched upon in the preceding chapter, Kanner’s damning indictment of the ‘refrigerator 
mother’ arguably fuelled this assumed dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mothers, 
contributing to a damaging culture of maternal guilt. Whilst awareness and understanding of 
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autism has increased in recent decades, discrediting notions that autism is a psychological 
disturbance caused by mothers; the painful legacy of these paradigms can arguably continue 
to be seen in the way mothers experience the diagnostic process, access support, and are 
treated socially. 
Investigating fatigue and self-efficacy amongst mothers with children on the autism 
spectrum, Rebecca Giallo et al reported that further to maternal stress, their respondents 
experienced considerably higher levels of fatigue than mothers with typically developing 
children as a consequence of additional care demands (2011, 466). By this we can infer that 
the challenges faced by mothers of children with autism are not merely located in the social 
world but have very real implications on both physical health and emotional well-being. It 
has been suggested that in addition to heightened parental stress, mothers with children on the 
spectrum may experience lower perceived quality of life, or develop psychological conditions 
such as depression, anxiety and in severe instances PTSD (Zhang et al 2015, 29).  A recent 
study by Kocabiyik et al investigating the emotional impact to mothers of an autism diagnosis 
suggested that many mothers experienced an emotional journey similar to that experienced 
during the grieving process:  
At the first stage that they faced with the diagnosis; they might undergo shock, denial, 
grief or depression in most of the times. The reactions of families experienced in the 
second stage were anger, guilt and shame... Sometimes they might think that they are 
punished by the God. Sometimes they think that this has happened because they are 
not good parents (Kocabiyik et al 2018, 33). 
Examining the coping processes of mothers with children on the spectrum, Marshall and 
Bonita observed that the research suggests that in fact ‘few disorders in children pose a 
greater threat to the psychosocial well-being of parents than autism’ (2005, 105). Whilst this 
seems a bold, and perhaps controversial statement, the literature surrounding the family 
experience of autism overwhelmingly supports this assertion. Estes et al concluded that ‘no 
study to date has found a group of mothers with higher distress levels than mothers of 
children with ASDs’ (2009, 376). Mothers who are also care givers of children on the autism 
spectrum can be seen to be caught in a ‘perfect storm’ of mutually reinforcing difficulties; 
they are at once challenged by their child’s symptomology and the daily unpredictability of 
managing such a condition; yet also profoundly affected by policies and attitudes which 
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socially and materially disadvantage them. Thus, the experience of mothering a child with an 
ASD diagnosis can be a particularly obscured, lonely and challenging one. 
Despite the highly relational and experiential nature of this particular subject, much of the 
research to date has remained strongly quantitative; distilling participant responses on criteria 
such as mood and child symptomology into observable trends in experience (Estes et al, 
2009; Kissel et al, 2014; Tomeney, 2017; Adams et al, 2019). Whilst this is extremely useful 
in providing a concise overview of the commonalities experienced by parents, what is largely 
missing from the research is the voices of the parents themselves, articulating the lived 
experience of their parenting journey.  
3.7) Summary 
 
In this chapter I have sought to clarify some of the ambiguity in respect to autism by detailing 
symptomologies which are currently accepted to be diagnostic indicators. However, as I have 
demonstrated, the symptoms themselves are varied, unexpected, and often incongruent to one 
another; making autism a distinctly difficult condition to diagnose. I have problematised 
these symptoms as profoundly stigmatising for persons on the autism spectrum, with 
characteristics of autism variously impacting personal independence, social communication, 
and often defying socially accepted norms of behaviour. This presents a particularly 
challenging lived experience, not only for the individual with autism themselves, but by 
extension their families and caregivers. Whilst Kanner theorised that mothers were deeply 
implicated in the development of autism and, by extension, the mental health of the child; 
recent research suggests that conversely, autism is rather more significantly implicated in 
poorer mental health outcomes for mothers. Such research provokes insight into the 
relationality of autism as a condition whose impact extends beyond the individual.  
I have also argued that an over-reliance on quantitative approaches within this research 
context serves to dilute the authenticity of the experience it seeks to illuminate. Philosopher 
Ian Hacking has suggested that the ambiguity and complexity of autism makes it particularly 
resistant to quantitative methods, proposing that rather much of what we currently know 
about autism (even within medical contexts) comes directly from the lives of those 
experiencing it; often through life stories, biography, or creative fiction. He furthers that in 
fact how we choose to write about autism can deeply impact the lives and experiences of 
living with it (2009, 1467). With this in mind, in the following chapter I turn to a discussion 
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of methods, acknowledging the resistance of autism to quantitative inquiry and developing a 
qualitative approach sensitive to the complex, multivariant and occluded nature of autism as a 
lived experience.  
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Chapter 4) Research Methods and Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I will engage in a discussion of how practical theology responds to the 
complexity and ambiguity of lived experiences; exposing the disciplinary conflicts as to how 
we attribute theological significance to such experiences, and considering how practices of 
reflexivity respond to the challenge of authority in respect to knowledge production. I will 
then turn to a discussion of methods, identifying the methodologies I have used to underpin 
this research. These are shaped and informed by practical theology as a knowledge making 
system which seeks to locate the sacred, spiritual and the revelatory in the embodied ‘tragi-
passions’ of the everyday (Walton 2014, 86).  As I have sought to illuminate, the experience 
of autism, and of those mothers who love an autistic child, cannot be easily or neatly slotted 
into any single framework. While shaped by similar external forces, each experience of 
autism is different. It is in the complexity and ambiguity of these lived experiences which I 
propose will expose profound sources of knowledge.   
4.1) Practical theology as a knowledge making system 
 
Practical theology could be considered to occupy the space on the border between what is 
thought and what is known. It revels in the blurring of boundaries; in revealing the tensions 
between theory and practice, the sacred and secular, faith and praxis (Veling 2005, 5). 
Heather Walton considers that,  
… Perhaps our ragged ranks have always been assembled in a disputed territory on 
the borders of worlds and disciplines. It may be that our uneasy suspension between 
practice and theory lends us a different vantage point? We are the people whose 
vocation is to deal with the fact that in life is complicated, ambiguous, and impure – 
and our challenge is to respond to this in faith (Italics original) (2018, 224). 
Rather than a discipline whose knowledge making forms a linear path between theoretical 
work and practical application, Terry Veling considers practical theology an attempt to ‘heal 
the divisions’ between the apparent otherworldliness of theology, and the everydayness of the 
real world in which our experiences are located (2005, 6). However, in rejecting dualisms 
which seek to separate earth from heaven (Veling 2005, 5), practical theology has also 
occupied a space of tension within academic discourse. If it is neither theory nor practice, but 
somewhere in between; might it also be neither sufficiently academically authoritative, or 
even sufficiently theological to justify its position as a discipline?  
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Such frictions between objectivity and legitimacy have led some to suggest that it is often too 
easy for practical theologians, whether consciously or unconsciously, to default into accepted 
patterns of knowledge making in an attempt to re-assert the discipline’s credibility and 
validity as an academically credible theological discourse. Developing this critique, Courtney 
Goto argues that, 
…in a group of researchers, individuals implicitly research according to accepted, 
underlying patterns that presume and extend what is taken to be true. …I suggest that 
one can readily appreciate how privilege, epistemic violence, and historic communal 
injuries are insinuated in a community’s patterns of knowledge production (2018, 
221).  
As I demonstrated in chapters one and two, exactly who is conducting research, how, and to 
what end can have significant material consequences on the results generated and, indeed, the 
lives of the researched. Goto observes that it can be difficult for those who occupy a 
marginalised position, and particularly those who occupy multiple marginalised positions, to 
speak within practical theology without their voice being assimilated and adapted into taken 
for granted paradigms of knowledge (2018, 32). In the context of this research, the voices 
represented are ‘othered’ in many overlapping and conflicting ways. In the light of such 
criticisms we must be aware that while practical theology has been considered to offer a 
response to theological inquiry which lends itself well to diverse methodological approaches, 
it is increasingly being challenged to broaden its disciplinary boundaries to accommodate 
inter and intra-faith perspectives (Veling 2005, 4; Swinton and Trevett 2009, 4).  
4.2) The Challenge of Reflexivity 
 
In responding to this move within practical theology, Goto proposes that reflexivity is crucial 
to the self-interrogation required to begin to recognise, pay attention to, and develop new 
ways of practice around the dominant paradigms and assumptions from which our knowledge 
is formed (2018, 216). Reflexivity is described as the process of making explicit the reasons 
behind particular modes of engagement, the choices of methods, the reasons for looking at a 
given population, individual, or theological issue, and the impact of the researcher’s personal 
history and presuppositions on the issue being researched (Swinton and Mowat 2006, 61). 
Within the research process, reflexivity is a tool which can be employed to ensure that 
personal subjectivities and presuppositions are acknowledged, checked, and rechecked, 
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throughout the research process. In this respect, it is often described as the process of ‘writing 
oneself in to the text’ (Graham et al 2018, 22). Reflexivity, in this mode, can be considered a 
means of creative self-expression, of sharing life events in imaginative and engaging ways 
which contribute meaningfully to a subject.  
When first encountering this approach, it seemed almost too easy that I, as the writer, could 
become my own source of data, and that this data could be something academically credible. 
I now know all too well that there is nothing easy about self-reflection. Indeed, to conduct it 
well, one requires intense discipline, critical self-analysis, and a ‘thick skin’ as the process 
can render the writer particularly exposed. It also requires a lot of practice, as Walton further 
states; ‘it is assumed that theological reflection will develop organically from a life of faith 
and find its way unmediated onto the page. In my experience, this is never the case’ (2014, 
xi). Goto acknowledges that the practice of reflexivity is often at risk of being considered 
‘self-indulgent navel gazing;’ and is consequently practiced hesitantly, conservatively and all 
too inconsistently (2018, 216). Miller-McLemore cautions that within the field of practical 
theology, whilst reflexivity is perhaps more readily practiced than in other theological 
disciplines, we are still far from consciously interrogating our own deeply hidden 
subjectivities, and she laments, ‘We analyse hegemony and hierarchies of knowledge almost 
everywhere else but our backyard’ (2016, 204). 
My own academic ‘backyard’ is interdisciplinary. I am influenced by a sociological academic 
training and tradition which values critical analytical inquiry, a ‘value free’ position in which 
the researcher is a neutral observer of an external locus of concern; and yet I am also 
influenced by a theological tradition which extols the value of reflexive and reflective 
engagement with issues which are not so easily abstracted into neat conceptual frameworks. 
This research has been formed from the ‘epistemic advantage’21 of my lived, embodied 
experience of motherhood firstly, but also by being the mother of a child with autism. This 
distinction may perhaps seem insignificant, but the experience of mothering an ‘atypical’ 
child produces its own particularity of motherhood; one which is inherently shaped by 
distinct historical, social, and political sites of discourse. 
Whilst I may be considered to occupy many ‘minoritised’ positions; as a woman, as a single 
mother, and as a person whose life is closely intertwined with someone who is considered as 
 
21 In this context I use the term ‘epistemic advantage’ as defined by Courtney Goto as a ‘critical perspectival 
edge created by experiencing oppression personally or empathically, enabling a knower to stand in multiple 
places, discern what others might not, and to challenge ignorance or violence.’ (2018, 68). 
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a person with a disability, as someone outside of the Christian tradition of my field;  I am 
aware that I also occupy many positions of privilege. I am a white woman, who has been 
educated within a white, middle class, predominantly Christian academic setting. My 
research is being conducted in the West of Scotland, which is a similarly largely white, 
Christian demographic. Research which investigates the experience of autism in BAME22 
communities is limited, however a 2014 study by the National Autistic Society suggests that 
diagnosis and access to support may be significantly more difficult for individuals who are 
non-white: as a consequence of potential language difficulties, access to resources, or indeed 
biases from professionals themselves 23. Thus, I cannot neglect to acknowledge that my 
experiences may be significantly different and shaped by my own epistemic advantage. A 
reflexive awareness of these challenges recognises that my epistemic standpoint may 
influence, and potentially limit, the ways in which my ontology (or perceived ontology) 
shapes the research process. 
4.3) Methodology 
Reflexivity as defined above also affords us an awareness that our epistemological 
perspectives also strongly influence and inform our methodological decisions. By 
methodology, we typically refer to the ways in which research is conducted through the 
collation and representation of data, the research ‘tradition’ in which the researcher chooses 
to situate their analysis, and the significance of the researchers own ontology in shaping these 
choices. Often described as the ‘research paradigm’, the term methodology identifies the 
particular ‘stance’ through which the researcher will present their research. Swinton and 
Mowat define the term as ‘a family of methods that have in common a particular 
philosophical and epistemological assumptions’ (2006, 75). Such ‘epistemological 
assumptions’ are considered useful in situating research within particular conceptual 
frameworks which have commonly defined parameters. However, as I have illustrated above, 
there are inherent dangers in assuming research can be produced from unproblematic 
epistemological contexts.  
Problematising the very nature of terms such as ‘paradigms’ and ‘contexts;’ Courtney Goto 
shares her unease with practical theologies uncritical acceptance of dominant theoretical 
 
22 ‘BAME’ is an acronym used to refer to ‘Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic’ communities. It has become 
increasingly utilised in discussions relating to socio-political inequalities, however it is worth noting that its 
usage is contested, with some considering the amalgamation of these distinct communal identities arbitrary.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/uk-53194376. Accessed 17.07.20 20.20.   
23 https://www.autism.org.uk/about/BAME. Accessed 17.07.20 20.13  
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frameworks as established and unquestionable sources of knowledge. She proposes that what 
we consider to be ‘paradigms’ or ‘contexts’ are themselves constructed and therefore 
contested concepts, emerging from particular social and cultural milieus. Naming these 
milieus as ‘rhetorical spaces’, Goto furthers that ‘within rhetorical spaces, members of the 
guild decide the degree to which the work of individual scholars contributes meaningfully to 
the field, conferring legitimacy where they deem it to be deserved’ (2018, 47). As I have 
explored above, such ‘spaces’ are often colonialised, functioning to minoritize and 
marginalise voices which do not fit within the dominant paradigms established as legitimate 
knowledge (Althaus-Reid 2000, 119; Beaudoin 2016, 11; Goto 2018, 28-31). As someone 
who has similarly found themselves hovering on the borders of such established spaces, 
considerations of methodology can often feel like a litmus test of academic legitimacy.  
Bennet et al observe that ‘a methodological awareness reminds us that we do not come to the 
creation of knowledge as innocent inquirers. Our practice is creatively enabled and critically 
constrained by the methodologies employed’ (2018, 143). As I have demonstrated with the 
particular representations made by both Kanner and Asperger in the development of autism 
research; methodological decisions can be shown to actively contradict, misrepresent and 
hinder research towards particular aims or agendas. I have asserted that autism as a condition 
is ambiguous, complex, and significantly mis-understood, and can be shown to be located, 
shaped and constrained by multiple conflicting ‘paradigms.’ Thus, the lived experience I am 
seeking to present of mothers with children on the spectrum is similarly complicated and 
distinct. Indeed, my decision to research this particular issue is rooted in my assertion that it 
is not currently located within accepted theological discourses. It cannot be found to neatly fit 
within any single methodological context without privileging one facet of experience over 
another.  
Furthermore, as this research project is based upon life narratives and draws upon the 
emerging rubrics of autoethnography, my epistemology is inextricable from and deeply 
embedded within the subject I am seeking to explore. Consequently, whilst this section 
situates itself as a discussion of methodology, it does so with a recognition that the nature of 
this research necessitates that my methodology will not form a stable, determined location 
from which an objective researcher observes an external subject or object (De Certeau 1998, 
36); but rather is fluid, ambiguous and deeply interwoven in the processes and knowledge it 
seeks to produce. In what follows, I will thus consider my methodological choices in terms of 
‘perspectives’, acknowledging the spaces in which accepted paradigms of knowledge may 
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resonate with the experiences I am seeking to illuminate, whilst also recognising the unsettled 
nature of these lived realities as ambiguous, transformative, and resistant to being tamed 
(Walton 2014, 162). As this research centres around issues such as motherhood, the family, 
and disability, I will be drawing from feminist and phenomenological perspectives which 
support my consideration that mothering a child with autism spectrum disorder is a 
phenomenon which is gendered, embodied, experiential and occluded from current discourse.  
4.3a) A Feminist Perspective 
 
Utilisation of a feminist perspective in this research context will seek to bridge the gap of 
experience between the normative, essentialist, and androcentric paradigms of disability 
explored in chapter one, and instead highlight the more complex and multivalent realities of 
the lived experience of autism I am looking to observe. A feminist perspective offers a 
paradigm which enables us to consider the experience of the ‘other’ as something valuable 
and meaningful, demanding a ‘critical analysis of structures and ideologies that rank people 
as inferior or superior according to various traits of human nature, whether gender, sexual 
orientation, class, colour, age, physical ability and so forth’ (Miller-McLemore 1999, 79). 
This recognition of the voice of the other has been one of the overarching strengths of 
utilising a feminist methodology in representing the experiences not only of women, but of 
other similarly marginalised groups (Goto, 2018, 67). In its rejection of ‘otherness’, a 
feminist perspective lends itself well to disability studies as people with disabilities, much 
like women, have often found their voices disregarded as a consequence of their embodiment.  
Womanist and liberation theologians such as Ada Isa-Díaz, Nancy Eisland, and Althaus-Reid 
have utilised their distinct epistemic advantage as out with a white, heterosexual, or able 
bodied male experience to give voice to women of colour, individuals with disabilities, and 
those who are marginalised and oppressed by dominant social orders. Goto observes that in 
this way feminist theologies subvert our perceptions; de-familiarising what we assume we 
know to be familiar (e.g. the lives of mothers) whilst making familiar the lives of those who 
are perceived to be different from our own. She cautions, however, that ‘as feminist theology 
slowly transforms awareness, what once needed translation can become assimilated by the 
dominant discourse’ (2018, 67). In this sense, we must be wary that of the ‘conceptual trap of 
‘solidarity’’ in assuming a universal, hegemonic (and usually white) category of women 
whose experiences and struggles are easily transferrable with others. It can be all too easy ‘to 
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fall prey to this,’ and to neglect our own sites of privilege and power in representing the 
voices of other women (Althaus-Reid 2000, 90).  
Recognising the theoretical tensions as to exactly how we define the category of ‘women’, 
some also suggest that feminist theology has shifted too far away from the particularity of the 
body as a locus of experience. In contrast to perspectives such as Butler’s who rejects notions 
of bodily difference as essentialist (1990, 47); there is criticism from within feminist inquiry 
that such positions neglect the experience of women as one which can be powerfully 
embodied (Graham 1995, 170). Supporting a recognition of the value of embodied 
epistemology, Walton asserts that attention to embodiment does not imply that we consider 
women’s bodies as naturally imbuing them with an inherently ‘feminine’ theological 
perspective; but that rather our bodies are socially, culturally, and historically located, and it 
is this distinct location which offers a distinct voice (2018, 7).  
Feminist theologies have received further criticism, particularly from empirical theologies,24 
for their evocativeness; that they are too influenced by emotions, and consequently not 
sufficiently critically analytical to be a credible method of inquiry (Bennett et al, 2018). 
However, the disclosure of strong and conflicting emotions by female writers, which are 
often so carefully censored due to fear of judgment or criticism, are arguably what serves to 
give voice to the silenced experience of others. In sharing my own autoethnographic 
reflections throughout this thesis, and in sharing the often painful stories of others, I do not 
seek to merely create dramatic effect. Rather, I aim to reveal aspects of lived, everyday 
experiences which are often too difficult to share.  
4.3b) Phenomenology: Everyday Insights 
 
Whilst an awareness of the socially constructed nature of issues such as gender, the body, and 
impairment are essential in recognising the complex and competing forces in which our 
identities and perceptions are formed, we must also be careful not to neglect the lived, 
embodied experience of the social conditions in which we exist, and the meanings which we 
attach to these experiences. Michael de Certeau reminds us that ‘theoretical questioning, on 
the contrary, does not forget, cannot forget that…it is linked to the pollution of that which 
does not speak (does not yet speak) and which takes the shape (among others) of ordinary 
 
24 Empirical Theology, emerging from the Netherlands in the 1970’s is a form of theological reflection which 
proposes that there is a logical order and observable systemisation to human experience, beliefs, and practice 
which can be quantified, analysed, and evidenced to produce theological ‘results.’ (Van der Ven 1993, 2).  
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practices’(2011, 61).  In an attempt to circumvent this potential pitfall this research is also 
informed by a phenomenological perspective, in that I consider mothering with autism as 
rooted in the phenomena of everyday lived, embodied, and enacted moments and practices, 
and that these practices can also be considered sites of resistance against experiences of 
marginalisation.  
Phenomenology itself is something which is not easily defined and can be employed in many 
different ways in many different contexts. Clint Randles in his literature analysis of 
phenomenology describes the research paradigm as ‘a meaningful way to describe something 
which is not easily quantified’ (2012, 12). This aptly articulates that the difficulty in defining 
phenomenology is that the definition itself often raises more questions than it answers. Put 
simply, we can describe phenomenology as the ‘study or science of phenomena’ (Cerbone, 
2006, 1). Developed in the academic tradition of philosophy by writers such as Husserl, 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology rejects the principles of naturalism, empiricism 
and intellectualism which assert the position that objects, or phenomena, have a definable, 
static, observable or ‘true’ state of being, and instead looks to the phenomena of experience, 
perspective, and intentionality as fundamental components of our reality (Merleau-Ponty 
1962, xvi–xvii).  
Within the scope of this project, it can be described as the analysis of particular moments or 
experiences, and the meanings elicited from these particular sites of experiential knowledge.  
As my question is rooted in experience, this is a significant methodological tool as it 
positions experience as the generative source from which we create our meanings. David 
Cerbone, in his volume Understanding Phenomenology (2006), explains that the focus of 
attention in phenomenology is not the ‘what’ or the ‘who’ of the experience, but rather of the 
experience in its own right (2006, 3). De Certeau proposes that any analysis of experience is 
inherently and inextricably social and is rooted in daily practices. He argues that ‘many 
everyday practices (talking, reading, moving about, shopping, cooking etc) are tactical in 
character’, and that the wider social meanings to which we attach our experiences are rooted 
in the banalities of such seemingly unremarkable everyday tactics (2011, xix). Walton 
observes that, 
Recognition has grown that the ofttimes neglected sphere of daily living is where most 
people exercise agency and construct selfhood. It is the plane on which our most 
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meaningful life experiences unfold and also where the impact of economic and political 
forces are most keenly felt – and, in some cases, resisted (202025) 
Phenomenology asserts that perspective is central to experience- that experience is more than 
it appears to be. As I have problematised in the previous section, perspective cannot be 
extracted from the narratives of our experience. It is not the ‘thing’ we are experiencing; it is 
a merely a perspective of the subject, which may be different depending on the angle from 
which we are viewing it. However, Randles furthers that ‘researchers who use 
phenomenology as a research methodology do not shy away from some otherwise ‘messy’ 
subject matter, rather, the messiness intrigues them, informs them, and guides them to draw 
conclusions that are logical for them and quite possibly others as well’ (2012, 18). 
When describing the experience of mothers with autism and the complexity of the emotions 
which may emerge from this experience, no two mothers will have the exact same 
experience, at the same time, in the same way. Rather, they are presenting different 
perspectives of the same subject. Consequently, while I will develop common themes of 
experience in the following chapter, this thesis is underpinned by a methodological awareness 
that the issue at hand is experiential, subjective, and located within our own diverse and 
distinct personal histories. In exploring the maternal experience of autism, I do not seek to 
generalise or universalise, but rather reveal what has hitherto now been hidden within the 
everyday realities of mother’s lives, and theologically reflect on what insights or meanings 
these revelations may provoke. My choice of methods draws from these everyday lived 
experiences, affirming my position that the phenomena of the everyday can provide profound 
and generative sources of theological thinking. 
4.4) Research Methods 
 
In the previous chapter, I have described autism as unwieldy; defying our attempts to 
categorise its experience. I have problematised the fact that research into autism which relies 
on quantitative data is often tentative, speculative, and conflicting. I have sought to illustrate 
that the experience of autism is deeply enmeshed in conflicting sites of knowledge, and yet is 
also rooted in everyday living in ways which are ambiguous, indistinct, and complex. This 
research is, in essence, an autoethnographic project. However, this research journey is a 
process in which I am not only interrogating the meaning behind my own experiences but 
 
25 Unpublished paper.  
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also those of others; developing an ethnographic analysis into how such experiences are 
understood in the social context in which they occur. In what follows, I will outline my 
assertion that a utilisation of life stories as a research method offers the potential to reach the 
ambiguous, conflicting, and mutable nature of autism as a distinct facet of maternal lived 
experience in ways which would difficult to obtain through other means. 
4.4a) Life Stories  
 
Informed by a recognition of the significance of reflexivity in research practice, life writing 
has developed as a method of narrative based inquiry in which the researcher reveals 
elements of their own life in a narrative format in order to produce insight into particular 
lived contexts (Atkinson 1998, 9). While there is a wealth of genres which fall under the 
category of ‘life stories’ it is generally accepted that life stories (or ‘life writing’ as it is often 
referred to in research contexts) are accounts of lived experiences and the thoughts, feelings, 
and meanings we attach to such experiences (Wolfteich 2017, 19).  
Ruard Ganzevoort suggests that we all understand our lives in terms of stories, of which we 
are both the author and the protagonist. Describing this process as ‘enplotment’, Paul Ricoeur 
considers the construction of narrative as the way people are able to make sense of life’s 
intricacies which would otherwise be ‘chaotic, obscure and mute’ (1991, 115). As a form of 
narrative, life stories are thus necessarily fictive; they are plotted from our recollections of 
significant moments in our histories and understood within the context of what has been told 
before (Ganzevoort 2012, 216). Heather Walton reminds us however that ‘enplotment is not a 
creative act that takes place ex nihilo (2018, 2). Rather, all stories can be seen to have 
similarly ‘enduring elements…made up of beginnings, conflicts, and resolutions, with many 
repetitions of this pattern’ (Atkinson 1998, 3).  
Life stories have gained increasing traction as a research method able to reach experiences 
which are often deeply silenced and difficult to name (Walton 2014, 100). Walton considers 
that ‘although our use of life writing is still often cautious and circumscribed, there is also 
growing recognition of how fruitful an epistemic resource personal experience might 
become’ (2020). One of the strengths of life stories in this particular research context is that 
they afford a depth of understanding of the uniqueness of this situation which would be 
difficult to produce by other methods. With so many unknowns as to what autism actually is, 
what has become clear is that perhaps the richest and most reliable source of data in respect 
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to autism comes from an analysis of autistic lives. Consequently, much of what we currently 
understand about autism comes from the stories of those who have lived or are living with the 
condition (Hacking; 2009, Grandin; 1996, Claiborne-Park; 1997).  
In contrast to objectivist research paradigms which assume knowledge to be nomothetic, 
fixed, and generalisable (Swinton and Mowat 2006, 43); this thesis draws on methods which 
demonstrate that rather knowledge is subjective, contextual, and dialogical. Attentive to the 
limitations of the research explored in the previous chapter, I engage with life stories as a 
research method responsive to the enigmatic and vivid nature of the lived experience of 
autism. I will draw on three creative forms from within this genre namely:  
• Autoethnography 
• Memoir 
• Life story interviews 
These will be employed in order to generate insight into an issue which I have proposed is 
currently theologically occluded. In what follows, I will demonstrate how a ‘telling, reading 
and hearing’ of life stories can help to reveal the complex, embodied, dialogical and 
relational nature of lived experiences in ways that challenge our theological thinking.  
Autoethnography: Telling our own stories  
 
As a feminist practical theologian, mother to a child with autism, and friend to other women 
who share this lived experience; I am not only deeply implicated within the subject I am 
researching, but live and embody the experiences about which I am writing. I am not a 
neutral observer of an objective reality; rather, I am critically engaged in the process of 
researching my own experiences and their meanings through interpretive communication 
with others. Whilst the potential for bias from such an ‘insider position’ has been treated with 
methodological unease (Anderson 2006, 387; Sotirin 2010, 5), it is my conviction that my 
embeddedness within this subject instead offers the potential for a rich and authentic 
production of knowledge. Describing this process as ‘situated knowledge,’ Donna Haraway 
asserts that our epistemic location inevitably influences our epistemic making (1988, 581). 
Naming this epistemic advantage as ‘standpoint epistemology’, Sandra Harding has argued 
that our perspective, particularly when that perspective comes from a social location of 
marginalisation, affords us a privileged understanding which enables us to creatively engage 
with and share the insights of other marginalised voices (1992, 138).  
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Recognising the generative potential of personal experience in revealing deeper 
understandings of complex issues, I undertake an autoethnographic approach in this thesis 
which utilises my own lived experiences as both significant sources of data, and epistemic 
resource, in the production of this research. Often described as the process by which the 
researcher writes his or herself within the text (Graham et al 2018, 22), autoethnography 
draws upon the researcher’s particular social context and history in order to produce deep, 
vivid and meaningful descriptions which would be arguably unattainable from an outside 
perspective (Spry 2011, 54). My experiences will be utilised as something generative, 
something which can profoundly inform other’s understandings. However, this 
autoethnographic project is also a reciprocal process.  I approach this research with an 
awareness that the act of producing this project in dialogue with the voices of others may also 
challenge my own meanings and understandings. In dialogical engagement with the voices of 
others speaking from their own respective locations, Goto reminds us that our own 
‘situatedness’ is tested and re-tested, affording us the potential to see things which otherwise 
may have escaped our attention (2018, 69).  
Synthesising autobiography and ethnography, autoethnographic research has a long tradition 
within research as a method which draws on the researcher’s personal experience as an 
epistemically generative method of reflecting on social, cultural and political issues (Ellis and 
Bochner 2003, 213). Despite it often being perceived as mere ‘decorative flourish’ (Behar 
1996, 14) intended to evoke artificial emotional responses in the reader, autoethnography has 
its roots in the analytic research processes of fieldwork, note taking, and interviews utilised 
by notable social anthropologists such as Malinowski (1848), Levi-Strauss (1964) and 
Durkheim (1912) (Walton 2014, 3). Whilst we can identify elements of autoethnography in 
these methodological processes, what we now understand as autoethnography is a fairly 
recent development in research. Conflict remains as to whether autoethnography is a family 
of methods (Butz and Besio 2009, 1661), a singular research method, or merely an 
acknowledgement of researcher perspective (Smith and Sparkes 2008, 6). However, 
autoethnography’s defining characteristics are generally accepted to include; the visibility of 
the researcher within the text and a reflexive engagement with the subject (Anderson 2006, 
374), authentic, emotive, and vivid descriptions (Ellis and Bochner 2003, 212), and a 
challenge to epistemic norms (Denzin 2003a, 105).  
Autoethnography has become attractive, particularly within feminist, post-colonial, and 
liberation theologies, precisely because it allows for voices to be heard which may otherwise 
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be silent (Althaus-Reid 2000, 119). Walton observes that ‘as feminist scholarship has 
creatively reassessed the significance of gender difference, women practical theologians and 
practitioners are becoming increasingly confident about articulating insights from alternative 
positions’ (2018, 11). Norman Denzin in particular has advocated the liberatory potential of 
autoethnography in ‘unsettling’ and ‘criticising’ taken for granted socio-cultural and socio-
political scripts (2003a, 105). Stacey Holman-Jones considers that in this sense 
autoethnographic writing allows us to reveal ‘…a palpable emotional experience as it 
connects to, and separates from, other ways of knowing, being, and acting in/of the world’ 
(2005, 767).  
The intention for this particular autoethnographic project is that it will challenge commonly 
held beliefs about autism and what the experience of autism means to the family. My own 
autoethnographic texts have taken the form of life writing in which I have reflected on 
particularly strong memories which have emerged as shaping my lived experience of 
mothering, utilising these to precede and contextualise themes I later develop in each chapter. 
It is my intention that by offering an honest, sometimes painful, retelling of these moments, I 
will produce a meaningful and authentic engagement with an issue which is troubling silent 
in current discourse.  
However, that I am presenting my own story in this research is not without its own ethical 
considerations. Martin Tollich caution that ‘like an inked tattoo…the marking is permanent. 
There are no future skin grafts for autoethnographic PhDs (2011, 1605). Some of the 
challenges which I have chosen to write about were so all-consuming; emotionally and 
physically in being exhausted and overwhelmed by our life, that there have been points in this 
process in which they have simply been too raw and too painful to write about. Some of this 
research, consequently, has been written back to front, or from the middle out, during times 
when the more emotionally charged issues were simply too much to undertake. Tollich 
furthers that in autoethnographic work ‘The word auto is a misnomer. The self might be the 
focus of research, but the self is porous, leaking to the other without due ethical 
consideration. Topic choice can inadvertently harm the researcher’ (2011, 1608). 
How much to share, and to what extent the sharing will cause potential hurt or embarrassment 
to my child and our wider family is a deep concern. My son is 11 now but articulate beyond 
his years. I am aware that he could, and very well may, read this thesis in the not so distant 
future. Throughout this process, he has often sat beside me in the writing of it. He will at 
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times peer over my shoulder as I type or ask me what I am working on. It has been important 
to me to be honest with him about what I am writing, and why. I have been fortunate that he 
has a remarkably pragmatic understanding of the challenges his attempts to navigate his 
autism has created for others, particularly myself. As the researcher, I have had to make my 
own informed consent, and continually weigh the potential benefit of the information I am 
choosing to share against its potential harm to myself and my family. In undertaking this 
research project, I am making the decision that the potential benefit to others in sharing our 
story will outweigh the potential harm in telling it; encouraged by others who have made this 
same decision, and chosen to share their lives on the page.  
Using Memoir: Reading other’s stories 
 
The sharing of life stories is by no means a new phenomenon. From Augustine’s Confessions 
to Maya Angelou’s memoirs, the literary tradition of writing our lives has shaped what we 
know of each other, what we know of ourselves, and what we come to know about God. 
Autobiographical writing (or memoir) is often utilised as testimony, as confession, even as 
acts of resistance through the intentional practice of revealing significant elements of the 
author’s life to an audience. Leading practical theologian Clare Wolfteich asserts that, 
‘reading another person’s life is not merely an act of curiosity, however. Rather, it is a 
‘parallel process of transformation’; what the author reveals may resonate with, challenge, or 
inform the meanings we attach to our own experiences (2017, 23). In research contexts this 
reciprocity can afford a collaborative potential, whereby the researcher gains insight into a 
particular issue through the insider perspective shared by the author. In memoir, the author’s 
positionality is typically explicit; allowing them to share their observations, judgements and 
perceptions of the particular contexts in which they are writing in a way which highlights the 
inherent biases and subjectivities they bring.  
For the purposes of this research, I am utilising memoir both to situate the issue I am seeking 
to explore in its wider critical context, and as a form of data from which commonalities in 
experience can be identified and analysed thematically. In recent decades, emerging literature 
has critiqued the reluctance of academia to engage with autobiographical writing as a 
legitimate form of research, particularly in relation to experiential topics such as motherhood 
(Sotirin, 2010). However, within practical theology, the practice of autobiographical writing 
has already shone important light on the lived experience of motherhood as a potentially 
revelatory, challenging, and generative form of knowledge (Miller-McLemore 1995; Bons-
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Storm 1999; Moschella, 2016; Wolfteich, 2017). Nicholas et al note that in the context of 
mothers of children on the autism spectrum, ‘lived experience emerged as a form of 
mothering that was deemed unique to the extent that ‘You have to live it to understand it.’ 
(2016, 930).  
Given the paucity of research into autistic experience, memoir’s written by mothers of 
children with autism have become a significantly vital resource in furthering our knowledge 
and understanding of autism as a condition and offering insight into their often hidden lives. I 
have chosen to look specifically at narrative excerpts from two important memoirs: those of 
Clara Claiborne-Park (1995, 2001) and Jenny Lexhed (2008). Both are mothers to children on 
the autism spectrum, and their works are widely considered to have contributed significant 
insight into autism. By articulating their stories vividly and with candour, these authors name 
the often conflicting feelings and emotions associated with mothering a child with autism, 
affording us a glimpse into this particular lived experience of mothering which often remains 
hidden within research using other forms of data. Through their memoirs, Claiborne-Park and 
Lexhed reveal their private, and often painful stories, evocatively detailing their journeys 
both prior to diagnosis and their subsequent struggle to adapt as parents of an autistic child. 
In examining their experiences, I have been able to identify parallel processes which suggest 
that there is a particularity to mothering a child with autism which can be seen to be shared. 
While my own research has emerged from a particular geographical, temporal, and social 
location; a comparative analysis reveals that there can be seen to be a thread of shared 
maternal experience in respect to autism beyond these contextual boundaries, legitimising its 
significance as an area which requires deeper theological reflection. Attempting to categorise 
the experience of two women, whose only commonality is a child with a condition which I 
have already problematised as defined by its diversity, arguably seems risky. Further consider 
that these women are from completely different countries (The U.S and Sweden, 
respectively) with different health care and education symptoms, writing from different 
points in time, and the categorisation seems perhaps overly simplistic. However, despite these 
apparent limitations, I argue that their incongruence in circumstance in fact serves to 
highlight that there are resonances in the experience of mothering a child on the spectrum 
which traverse geographical, temporal, and political contexts. 
One of the inherent dangers in reading the stories of others, however, is that they are 
composed of memories. Memories, as we know, are not always linear, logical, or reliable. In 
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this particular context, the subject matter is particularly emotive, and thus the memories of 
the authors may be significantly influenced by their personal responses to the events they 
choose or object to share. Claiborne-Park in particular details her memories with an almost 
pragmatic detachment, and so while her emotional struggle is intimated, perhaps the depth of 
her emotion is such that it is unreachable to the reader.  
Problematising the use of biography as data, Wolfteich reminds us that life writing, like any 
other form of writing, editorial decisions have to made in which the author ‘both reveals and 
conceals’ what they wish others to know (2017, 22). In this sense, what the author chooses to 
leave out can often be shown to be just as revelatory as what they leave in. Heather Walton 
cautions that while life stories are an incredibly rich and generative epistemic source, ‘life 
narratives are unwieldy and difficult to tame to our own ends’ (2014, 14). In an attempt to 
bridge these silences, I have chosen to augment this research by turning to the voices of other 
mothers with children on the spectrum. Undertaking interviews with three women with 
children of differing genders and ages within my own local context, I seek to interrogate the 
gaps and silences of the literature through a hearing of other’s stories.  
Life Story Interviews: Hearing other’s stories 
 
The interview process has a long tradition in research, and is an established method of 
gathering, interpreting, and presenting the experiences of others to produce rich and valuable 
data (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 16). Interviews can be described as a dynamic process, 
allowing the participant an active and collaborative role in shaping the meanings and 
understandings brought to the research. As a contribution to ethnographic research, 
interviews are particularly useful in obtaining insight into the everyday lived contexts and 
practices of particular communities. With this in mind, how we define who or what is 
representative about the particular community we seek to research is an important 
methodological consideration in the interview process (Robinson 2014, 25). Given that I am 
seeking to offer insight into a particular and deeply personal maternal experience and not 
looking to validate a pre-conceived, generalisable hypothesis, I have chosen to adopt an 
idiographic approach to interview selection.  
Utilising a small sample of three participants, this approach allows for the authenticity and 
distinctness of individual voices to be heard, whilst affording sufficient scope to identify 
similarities between their accounts (Robinson 2014, 29). In order to define the parameters for 
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this small selection of participants, purposeful sampling was utilised to establish the inclusion 
criteria for interview participation26. The particular voices represented in this research were 
selected based on the following criteria; that they are all mothers of children with an autism 
diagnosis, sharing the particular social context of the West of Scotland, with children of 
similar ages, supported by the same local authority.27  
Naomi*, is a married mother of three, with a son diagnosed with Aspergers, ADHD, and 
Tourettes. Naomi was forced to give up work to accommodate the additional caring demands 
of her son’s condition while her husband works away to support the family. Scarlet*, 
divorced, has two children: a son, and a daughter with an ASD diagnosis. She also was 
unable to continue working due to the demands of being a single parent, frequent 
appointments, and her daughter’s disruption at school. Abigail*, married, also has two 
children, a daughter and a son both on the spectrum. Abigail was able to complete further 
education and continue her career, however she observed that this was a delicate balancing 
act with her husband’s career. Although their personal circumstances and histories were 
varied and diverse, their children were diagnosed, educated and supported by the same local 
authority. Given that I have highlighted the experience of autism as profoundly shaped by 
social, medical, and economic forces; their shared context offers insight into the potential 
impact particular social policies may have in producing experiences of struggle and 
marginalisation for mothers with children on the spectrum in Scotland.  
In beginning this research, I had intended to conduct semi-structured interviews, signposted 
with some basic ‘opening’ questions in terms of background context, for example age of 
diagnosis and duration of assessment. In considering a semi-structured format, I intended to 
avoid leading and limiting questions, mitigating the potential danger of influencing my 
participants towards a predetermined outcome, yet provide enough structure to focus the 
conversation on the issue at the heart of the research question. However, whilst I had entered 
into the interview process with predetermined questions, I found that we had little need of 
them once we begun. The desire to break the silence that they had experienced was palpable. 
What emerged, rather, was a spontaneous telling of life stories. These women all, 
unconsciously or otherwise, communicated their experiences as rich and vivid life story 
narratives.  
 
26 ‘Purposeful sampling’ can be defined as the process by which inclusion criteria is chosen prior to interview, 
based on what the researcher considers significant to the research outcomes (Swinton and Mowatt 2006, 69).   
27 Further detail on the selection process, the participants and the interview process can be found in appendix 1.  
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In exploring the history, life events and beliefs of these women, life stories emerged as an 
unanticipated but particularly useful tool in revealing their ‘situatedness’; offering a depth 
and context to their observations which perhaps would have been difficult to ascertain 
through other forms of interview. The detail afforded by this method has made life story 
interviews a particularly attractive tool in feminist and womanist theory. Susan Geiger asserts 
that the sharing of women’s life stories ‘must constitute our most critical and complex data’ 
about the social experience of women (1986, 335). Avowing that it is not enough to include 
women’s issues in ‘the scholarly agenda’, she stresses that women must be included in the 
production of such knowledge. Peter Atkinson observes that in contrast to other forms of 
interview, life story interviews enhance the agency the interviewee has in the production of 
knowledge (1998, 8). The central themes which emerge in life story interviews are thus not in 
response to a given set of questions but rather unfold in accordance with what the interviewee 
themselves consider to be significant to their own lives. Atkinson furthers, 
In a life story interview, the interviewee is a storyteller, the narrator of the story being 
told, whereas the interviewer is a guide…the two together are collaborators, 
composing and constructing a story the teller can be pleased with (1998, 9). 
Through our conversations, these mothers shared their separate and distinct experiences of 
the challenges and complexities of mothering children of varying ages and genders on the 
spectrum. Although we were each very different women with very different lives, many of 
our experiences echoed with each other’s, affirming my observation that despite the multi-
valency of characteristics associated with autism, there are many characteristics of the 
mothering experience which can be seen to be shared across temporal, social, and cultural 
contexts. The process of collating different voices and allowing different perspectives to 
shine through, Isasi-Díaz asserts, allows an organic and authentic revealing of connections, 
‘creating a tapestry in which one can see the similarity of experiences much more than 
dissimilar experiences’ (2004a, 142). 
American practical theologian Mary Moschella, considering the therapeutic potential of 
sharing life narratives, observes that ‘the opportunity to speak out loud, hearing one’s own 
voice and being asked for one’s own judgement, is an empowering experience’ (2018, 373).  
It soon became clear that choosing to take part in this research process was not merely an 
altruistic gesture by my participants to assist me in the production of research by sharing 
common experience; but rather was an active, resistive and liberatory process of engagement 
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with issues which strongly shaped their lived experiences in ways they had previously been 
unable to share. The liberatory potential of sharing narratives, however, is one which requires 
a critical and thoughtful theological response:  
If listening to narratives is to become ‘an act of resistance’ or an act of community 
and solidarity, practical theologians must do the difficult work of reflecting 
theologically upon others’ narratives without co-opting them, without writing over 
them, sanitizing and homogenizing them (Wolfteich 2017, 133). 
In an ethnographic research process, the researcher must resist the temptation to generalise or 
universalise participant experiences in the aim of demonstrating specificity (Isasi-Díaz 2004, 
84). Thus, the task of representing another’s worldview or experience brings with it an 
enormous amount of responsibility. Who has the authority to speak on behalf of someone 
else, and how this authority is used (or abused) is a potential minefield of ethical 
considerations. As this research is looking at potentially difficult and painful experiences of 
mothering, from women who share a relationship with a vulnerable group (children with 
autism), there were many significant ethical challenges which had to be addressed.  I was 
keenly aware that the sharing of personal, painful experiences may trigger negative emotions 
in my participants. There is an inherent stigma attached to sharing views of motherhood 
which do not conform to rose tinted stereotypes (Wolfteich 2017, 8); thus, how their 
narratives would be perceived by those close to my participants or the wider public, and the 
potential risk of distress or embarrassment to their children was a significant concern.  
In being mindful of these issues, I considered the nature of what my participants consented to 
share as something which was dialogical, ongoing and changeable throughout the research 
(Olassen 2005, 236). My participants’ consent was regarded as fluid and able to be 
withdrawn at any time throughout the research process (although no such withdrawals 
occurred). Given the sensitivity and relationality of this issue, an extensive ethical review 
process was undertaken to ensure that my writing process did not become one of 
colonisation, and that considerations of my participants well-being were situated as 
imperative to the research process. During this process, I established that:  
• assessments of my participants vulnerability had been made during the 
selection process. 
• my research aims, methods and intended presentation were made clear and 
transparent to my participants.  
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• pre-existing supports were identified and encouraged, and information for 
obtaining independent support was provided.  
• issues of confidentiality had been addressed by offering full anonymity for 
both participants and those they referenced in their interviews by way of 
pseudonyms. (See appendices 2-5) 
In undertaking this research, I sought to establish an interview process in which the stories of 
others emerged as organically as possible, and not in accordance with any pre-conceived 
agenda or intended research outcomes to mitigate my participants anxiety as to what was 
shared, and how. However, even the practice of ‘letting participants speak for themselves’ 
can have significant methodological limitations (Mazzei 2012, 745). Individuals bring with 
them their own interpretative frameworks through which they understand and make sense of 
their experiences. Whilst life story interviews are considered better placed to reveal these, the 
contexts of a person’s experience are not always easy to reach. Drawing on Spivak’s work on 
subaltern groups (1989), Kwok Pui Lan questions the role of researcher in ‘the constructing 
of subjectivity of subaltern women, the representation of their voices by intellectuals, and the 
social conditions which enable these voices to be heard’ (2011, 20). 
Critiquing the romanticising of ‘voice’ in qualitative inquiry as something which is presented 
as authentic, stable, fixed and true, Mazzei challenges the simplistic reduction of 
‘complicated and conflicting voices to analytical ‘chunks’ that can be interpreted free of 
context and circumstance’ (2012, 745). While we interrogate our own epistemological 
standpoint through reflexive engagement with the research process, we must also consider 
that our participants’ epistemology is similarly not singular or fixed but constructed around 
their own multiple axes of gender, class, and social location. Such an approach acknowledges 
the relationality and complexity of our experiences, and a recognition that we cannot 
interrogate our own sites of epistemic privilege without acknowledging their relationality to 
other’s epistemological standpoints (Goto 2018, 22). In this respect, I consider this research 
to be relational, dialogical, and transformative; recognising that the experiences of others may 
in fact challenge or subvert the meanings and understandings I attribute to my own 
experiences, and on the insights I expected to find.  
Indeed, our stories emerged as mutually resistant to the archetypal pattern of ‘beginning, 
muddle, and resolution’ previously described (Atkinson 1998, 9) (Walton 2018, 2). In a very 
real sense, the women I spoke to were ‘in the midst’ of their particular experience. As I have 
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highlighted in chapters two and three, autism is problematic precisely because it does not 
appear to have a ‘beginning’, nor can it be seen to have an ‘end’; but rather is surreptitious, 
unpredictable, and evolving. In contrast to memoir, life story interviews are accounts which 
can arguably be described as ‘unfinished;’ they offer reflection on issues which are current 
and ongoing. In the context of this research, life story interviews allowed real-time access 
into the ‘everydayness’ of this particular lived experience, yet also spoke to the unsettled and 
unresolved nature of autism as an ongoing and evolving condition. The unexpected evolution 
of the interview process also affirmed the fragmentary and disruptive power of life stories in 
challenging our theological thinking in unexpected ways (Walton 2014, 162). 
4.5) Summary 
 
In this chapter I have situated practical theology as a knowledge making system which is 
similarly relational and dialogical, identifying its creative ability to traverse the boundaries 
between theory and practice and engage in more fluid and diverse forms of knowing. I have 
considered the disciplinary challenges inherent in producing new forms of theological 
thinking which do not neatly fit within traditionally accepted paradigms of knowledge. 
Attentive to these conflicts, I have presented my methodology as informed by feminist 
phenomenological perspectives which recognise lived experience as embodied, experiential, 
and deeply revelatory.  
Drawing together three distinct forms of life stories (autoethnography, memoir, and life story 
interview), the following two chapters will examine the shared motifs which emerged from 
our life stories as particularly significant to the lived experience of mothering a child with 
autism, developing these thematically to offer insight into the everyday realities of this 
maternal experience. Through the sharing of our stories, I intend to highlight the revelatory 
potential of maternal experiences which are complex, ambiguous, and which have hither-to-
now been occluded from theological reflection.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Chapter 5) Reading Mother’s lives: Uncertainty, Diagnosis, and Stigma.  
Uncertainty 
 
I tried to remember a time before. It had not always been this way, had it? It was in his last 
year of nursery that it all began, wasn’t it? …Wasn’t it? I tried to retrace our steps, all the 
while painting over the sleepless nights, the furious tantrums, with the rosy tint of denial. Yet 
those little moments stubbornly refused to be painted over and began to take on new 
vividness, new meanings, under my now critical gaze.  
I remembered he had just turned one, and suddenly refused to wear the red dungarees I so 
loved him in. Every time I buckled the straps, he furiously tore them off, standing indignantly 
in his nappy shaking his head. At the time, I found his stubbornness amusing. He knew what 
he liked. I took pride in what I perceived to be his maturing personality; he was choosing his 
style. Looking back now, it was the beginning of a slow, insidious, and seemingly arbitrary 
rejection of anything he did not like the feel, colour, or fit of.  By the time he was two, he 
could tolerate only a handful of items of clothing; those which he would tolerate he could not 
bear to grow out of and would continue to wear even after they had long since stopped fitting.  
I remember one morning drinking coffee with his aunt, my childhood friend. She was my 
sister formed without blood, and she lived with us in his first few years. Micah was playing 
contentedly on the floor with his toy cars, lost in his own world. He was always content with 
him own company, he rarely demanded attention for the sake of attention. She was watching 
him, but her gaze had an intentness beyond the pride of a loving aunt. She quietly observed 
as he pulled his cars out of the box and lined them carefully and studiously up by colour in a 
row. He would put them all back, and then repeat the process again and again.  
‘He knows his colours,’ I said brightly, if a little uncertainly. Something was wrong. She was 
unreachable in that moment. I could sense that something had shifted in her perception, but I 
didn’t know what. ‘He doesn’t drive his cars,’ she said softly. It was true. He didn’t zoom his 
cars around the floor, simulating crashes or using the chairs as tunnels as her brother had 
done. The eldest of five siblings, she knew babies. Was he different from the babies she had 
nurtured before?  We have never spoken about it. Looking back, I wondered if in that 
moment, she knew. It was to be many years from that moment before any of us would have an 
answer.   
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As I have sought to articulate in chapters two and three, autism is a condition which is 
characterised by ambiguity and uncertainty. Consequently, it is not a condition which is 
apparent at birth, or presents itself overnight, but rather often appears as a series of little 
irregularities during early development. Sometimes these may be very slight, innocuous even. 
Different enough to notice, however not quite so different to cause panic. These 
inconsistencies build up, gradually, however, into a picture of difference which can no longer 
be ignored. For this reason, I have situated the pre-diagnosis experience of parents as often 
one which is marked by doubt, uncertainty, and fear.  
In ‘Love is not Enough; A Mother’s memoir of autism, madness, and hope’ Jenny Lexhed, a 
first-time mother, shared her nagging dread that her son was different from his peers: 
Increasingly, I understand that that Lucas is not like other children. He has always been 
different…but now the differences are beginning to be so big that they’re noticeable. 
Somewhere in the back of my mind: the word ‘autism’ is spinning … but I don’t want 
to believe it’s as serious, as terrible as autism (2008, 17).  
Lexhed’s account highlights the excruciating uncertainty of being at once aware that 
something is awry, and at the same time trapped in the uncertain limbo between concern, and 
diagnosis. For the women who have chosen to share their stories, myself included, our 
spectrum children were given to us as first-time mothers. Without a frame of reference or a 
context for appropriate development, the difficulty in reconciling gut feeling with action is a 
significant one. Despite subtle indications that development was not what it should be, the 
research examined in chapter three reflects that the doubt of having no comparison often 
outweighs the compulsion to seek external advice. Clara Claiborne-Park, writing of her 
journey with her autistic daughter ‘Elly’, describes the challenge of observing the differences 
presented by daughter in comparison to her other three ‘beautifully normal’ children. Her 
frame of reference would make each failed milestone all the more obvious, and all the more 
jarring in comparison to her siblings:  
So Elly grew, and though we look back and remember one incident or another, the 
onset of the condition was imperceptible. We perceived we had a child who, at 
twenty-two months, was not toilet trained- but neither were most of our neighbour’s 
children. She did not walk, but the little boy down the street had sat contentedly in his 
play pen until he was two…She spoke only a few words- but the onset of speech in 
children is notoriously variable, and every parent of a slow talker is aware that 
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Einstein didn’t talk until he was four. The various signs that now seem so clear then 
seemed easily attributable to individual differences (1995, 23). 
These attempts to reconcile her daughter’s difference reassured her, for a brief while at least, 
that her daughter too would ‘catch up’ despite all evidence to the contrary. She writes, 
poignantly, on her attempts to deceive herself that everything would be ‘just fine’; ‘She 
would grow and take her place in a family lovelier than anybody else’s…’ (1995, 29).  
However, as each milestone continued to pass without any indication that it was likely to be 
achieved, Claiborne-Park painfully admits to herself that her dreams of Elly catching up to 
her thriving siblings would not be realised:  
It is possible to learn humility…A year later, Elly would be examined again, in a 
bigger hospital with more refined techniques. And this time I would wait at night 
and hope and nearly pray that they would find a physical deficiency-something that 
could be controlled with a diet or a pill. And then my baby’s perfect health would be 
a heartbreak to me and no source of pride (Claiborne-Park 1995, 29).  
Despite the research indicating mothers are likely to experience an underlying anxiety, and to 
some extent dread, of receiving a diagnosis, our stories reflected that there is also significant 
anxiety that one will NOT be received and you will remain in the dark, unable to obtain 
answers for your child’s behaviour. At my own son’s diagnostic assessment, I remember 
vividly not knowing what outcome to pray for. Speaking with Naomi*, mother to an 11 year- 
old boy with ASD and other co-morbidities, she echoed Clairborne-Park’s fear of being 
undiagnosed, 
You start doubting yourself. Before he was diagnosed, I thought no, maybe there’s 
nothing wrong with him, there’s definitely nothing…and then you think why am I 
doubting myself, you know there’s something wrong. There’s so much back and 
forth… and then I thought no, there is there’s definitely something underlying. You 
always get that fear that they’ll turn around and say there’s nothing wrong and then 
you won’t know.  
I was equally afraid that we would have no explanation as I was of receiving a diagnosis; that 
the violence and rigidity and the tears we had grown accustomed to were nothing more than 
my son being inherently ‘a bad boy’. His behaviours were increasingly erratic, unpredictable, 
and challenging both at home and at school. Pre-diagnosis, my crippling fear that my son was 
bad at best, ‘crazy’ at worst, led autism to be something which was a much less frightening 
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alternative. Often, as my participants describe, the judgement and stigma experienced by 
parents attempting to unravel their children’s complex symptomology creates an unusual 
paradox in which a diagnosis is both a blow and a relief.  
Diagnosis: A Spectrum of emotions  
 
‘During the first term of this academic year Micah appeared quite settled; his behaviour was 
not as challenging as it was to become…’  
‘disruptive’  
‘shouting out, hitting and kicking others and spinning around’ 
‘extreme anxiety’ 
‘exhausted and overwhelmed’  
‘unable to be contained.’ 
These words were not unfamiliar to me. They were forever inked onto my thoughts in tears.  
The term ‘Challenging behaviour’ was a very clean and concise phrasing of a reality which 
was anything but. Our days were uncertain, unsettled, unexpected. There, on the page, was 
the reality that I was too afraid to speak out loud. If I didn’t name those things…If I didn’t 
speak them…it wasn’t really that bad, was it? He isn’t really bad, is he? 
Being confronted with those words, in black and white, was a jarring assault on my carefully 
constructed denial. The last two lines of this report, written by an outreach worker drafted in 
to untangle the complex knots of behaviour my son had been exhibiting, would pull me out of 
the deep depths of confusion and despair I had been submerged in, whilst simultaneously 
setting me on an unfamiliar road, in the dark, without so much as a map or a torch to guide 
me. 
‘Having observed Micah over a period of 4 weeks these behaviours appear to be 
consistent with those described as a ‘meltdown’ in children with an Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder.’ (Date of Report; April 2014). 
These last lines I read with an almost exuberant sense of relief. There was a reason, a 
tangible, medical reason for my son’s inexplicable behaviour. It was not my fault. Someone 
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would help us. They would know what to do. Of course, as is so often the case in the complex 
narratives of an autism diagnosis, it was not that simple.  
This remarkable woman, though insightful, was not a doctor. She was not qualified to make 
such a diagnosis. It was at once given, and at the same time swiftly taken away. I was firmly 
reminded that,  
‘There is a process to these things. He will need to be fully assessed by a team of 
multi-agency professionals to establish the veracity of this claim. This may take some 
time. Until such a point that a diagnosis can be given, we must continue as we are.’  
Continue as we are. So innocuous, those words. They evoke stability, sameness. Routine. The 
mundane. There was nothing mundane about our routine. Our routine had become a daily 
battle to even leave the house, it had become tears and anger and violence, daily phone calls 
from teaching staff who were as perplexed by his unpredictability as I was. How could we 
continue like this?  
It was to be 14 months after this well-meaning report, that we would finally receive a 
diagnosis. Naomi described her son’s diagnostic process as taking 18 months. The research 
explored in chapter three indicates that this is a far from uncommon experience. Amongst our 
accounts, and throughout the literature, it is clear that it is extremely common for parents to 
be referred from one professional to another, to still another, in the attempt to obtain a 
diagnosis. Sansoti et al noted that ‘such a circuitous, redundant undertaking likely is 
frustrating and may contribute to feelings of uncertainty about the information received and 
which direction to take’ (2012, 81). Whilst research consistently reports prolonged delays 
between reporting concerns and receiving a diagnosis, very little is said about the oscillation 
of emotions which occurs during this process. In sharing her own diagnostic journey, Naomi 
highlighted a peculiar bi-product of this prolonged waiting period; that the frustration and 
anxiety provoked by such delays may become internalised, leaving mothers questioning 
whether in fact it is they who have not done enough, or in time;    
Autism didn’t even cross my mind to be honest, we just thought he was behind.  I 
feel…not regret because the outcome wouldn’t have been any different, but I feel like 
I should have picked up on it and I should have picked it up sooner. 
She was not alone in struggling with the benefit of hindsight. Despite retrospectively being 
able to detail in surprising and nuanced detail the early indications of their children’s autism, 
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the women I spoke to all expressed regret to some extent that they were unable to identify or 
act on the signs earlier. Such feelings of regret could also be seen to run heavily through the 
biographical accounts of Lexhed and Clairborne-Park, who questioned their own 
effectiveness in advocating strongly enough for their child’s diagnosis.   
Lexhed writes candidly, and often painfully, about her emotional journey during the 
diagnostic process. She describes her sorrow for the loss of all the experiences she fears her 
son may never have, and the helplessness of being unable to understand or to guide him in his 
self-imposed isolation from the world. So severe was Lexhed’s emotional strain during this 
period that she was in fact placed under psychiatric restraint, hospitalised for several months 
before she was able to return to the challenges of caring for her son:  
Sometimes during the day, I can’t hold it back and my sorrow takes over. Like a 
hurricane, it blows the door wide open and blackest sorrow completely 
Rushes in  
Washes over me  
Drenches me. (Lexhed 2009, 37) 
Naomi similarly expressed an acute sense of grief and fear following her son’s diagnosis:  
I had set myself up for a diagnosis, but it didn’t make it any easier when it came…it 
really doesn’t. I felt like my whole world had collapsed. They say Aspergers, ADHD 
and Tourettes Syndrome…it was like a punch in the gut…I was scared…not 
scared…no, actually I was scared because I thought, how am I going to deal with this. 
It is life changing. I didn’t realise just how life changing it was. You fear for their 
future…their whole future flashes before you …The sense of grief when you get the 
diagnosis is huge because it impacts everyone, even his grandparents. 
I too, shared Naomi’s fear and sadness. I remember going home to an empty house after 
receiving my son’s diagnosis and being flooded with all the things I thought I knew about 
autism. Mutism, dependence, inability to form relationships…the worst-case scenarios of 
spectrum severity, none of which actually represented my son at 6 (nor do they now) flashed 
before me. I remember sitting on the stairs, unable to stop the tears, mourning the loss of all 
the things I thought that he would do, that we would do, that now seemed so impossible. He 
was what I was most proud of in my life: his intelligence, his sense of humour. But what 
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would become of him as an adult, if he was indeed autistic? Would he retain the qualities that 
I so cherished, or would they fade away under the weight of his condition? Naomi spoke of 
her sadness, not for herself, but for her son, in considering the reality that he may not be able 
to achieve ‘normal’ milestones in life like driving, marriage, children:  
And that’s okay if they don’t…it’s just they won’t experience life in the same way 
that we did. Life won’t be simple for them. You just feel like he should be 
independent and go on holiday with his pals and me not be worried sick about him. 
Not be able to go to mainstream…I feel so much guilt about that because he won’t be 
able to go with his friends who he’s so attached to. And that’s another hurdle we’re 
going to have to get over because it’s a major change again….and then you’ve got 
puberty…as a family how do we deal with that? 
Whilst current research into the emotional journey of parents assumes that ‘grief’ will be an 
expected but temporary outcome of diagnosis, Naomi’s reflection highlights that in fact 
feelings of grief can be seen to be cyclical, with ‘fresh griefs’ often recurring years after 
diagnosis. Naomi’s story strongly resonated with my own experience, reminding me of a 
sudden and unexpected recurrence of grief during a recent multi-agency review of my son’s 
progress. I had entered that particular meeting armed with discussion points and evidence of 
my son’s progress, which had been steadily improving. I held onto my belief that he would 
attend my former school, which I had experienced as a nurturing and supportive place. He 
would be fine. In sharing this belief with his review team, I was met with sympathetic, 
concerned faces. They gently reminded me that while he was indeed doing well, his progress 
was hard won, and a result of intensive one to one support that a mainstream high school 
would likely not be able to accommodate. While it was not set in stone, the possibility that he 
also may not be able to progress up to high school with his peers was a very real one.  
I was blindsided. I thought he was doing well…we were doing well. And he was. So well, in 
fact, that I had allowed myself, not to forget, but to place his autism on the margins of our 
lives, rather than the centre. I had been deceiving myself that the tenuous equilibrium we had 
worked so hard to achieve was evidence that the battle was over. Slowly, insidiously, images 
of my teenage son had been invading my dreams… of laughing with his friends at the bus 
stop, worrying about girls, receiving an award at assembly. And in one sentence, that had 
again been ripped away. Again, I walked out of that meeting, arguably more grief stricken 
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than I had been the very first time.  Hollow and devastated, that meeting was a reminder that 
things will perhaps never be how we had expected them to be.  
To date, parental grief, when considered, is explored primarily in relation to terminal illness 
in children, sudden loss of a child, or issues concerning infertility and miscarriage. Emerging 
research is beginning to identify complex grief present in parent- carers of non-terminal 
children with conditions such as epilepsy and schizophrenia, although this research is still in 
its infancy (Eakes 2009) (Whittingham et al. 2012) (Brown, 2016). In contrast to the 
literature which suggests feelings of grief are a response to diagnosis, our stories indicate that 
in fact grief is more strongly related to expected ‘milestones’, which are continual throughout 
a person’s life. In a study by Fernandez et al, it was observed that parents displayed an 
oscillation of coping mechanisms between ‘loss’ and ‘restoration’ following a diagnosis 
which were consistent with the ‘Dual Process’ model of grieving. They observed that parents 
were continuously adapting to the ‘losses’ associated with their child’s development, whilst 
actively concentrating on daily tasks of understanding how to best support their child (2013, 
319). In contrast to traditional staged process models of grieving which assume a linear path 
to a restorative outcome, Stroebe and Schutz make clear that in the context of their model:  
‘‘restoration’’ does not refer to an outcome variable, but to secondary sources of, and 
coping with, stress...this analysis is focusing on what needs to be dealt with (e.g., 
social loneliness) and how it is dealt with (e.g., by avoiding solitariness), and not with 
the result of this process (e.g., restored well-being and social reintegration) (1999, 
214). 
Research by Brown et al support this finding, proposing that what is unique to parental grief 
in respect to childhood disabilities is the continuousness of it. She observes that over time, 
there are recurrent reminders that life will, undoubtedly, be more difficult for your child than 
it was for you and that this is a constant process of adaptation and adjustment (2016, 119). 
Our accounts reinforce the cyclical, ever- shifting, and unresolved nature of autism, 
highlighting that our emotional journeys are also similarly circuitous, conflicting, and not so 
easily resolved. 
For Abigail, mother to both a son and daughter on the autism spectrum, the source of her 
grief was not her daughter’s Aspergers, nor the fear that she may not reach independence as 
an adult.  Rather, she experienced a very acute and anticipatory grief over her concerns that 
her daughter may not reach adulthood at all. In the chapter three, I touched briefly upon 
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violent and self-injurious behaviour being a symptom of autism, however the prevalence and 
significance of this for both individuals on the spectrum and their families is perhaps 
considerably underreported. My son, during his most challenging years, was particularly 
violent, most frequently towards me. I had been punched, slapped…bitten. At a particularly 
low moment, I admitted to a friend that it was almost like being in an abusive relationship 
that you could never leave. These periods were profoundly traumatic.  
However, they paled in comparison to the periods when such aggression was turned towards 
himself. I remember sitting in A&E with my son, at around age 8, who had begun to smash 
his head against the wall repeatedly following the death of my mother. After days of this, and 
days of him furiously sobbing that he no longer wanted to live, I didn’t know what else to do. 
He was thankfully unhurt, not concussed or bearing any physical damage. Due to his young 
age, the doctor, although well-meaning, dismissed the seriousness of my concern. I 
understood. What 8-year-old is serious about ending their life, one might ask? But yet, the 
nagging doubt that perhaps he might, was utterly, bone chillingly, terrifying. Abigail spoke of 
a particularly distressing encounter with her own daughter:  
There was one night I was bringing her home, I can’t remember after what or what 
happened, but whatever happened she wasn’t happy about what was said in the car 
and when we got home, she stormed up the stairs and said ‘I won’t be here in the 
morning,’ and shut the door. We had to bust the door in…Children on the spectrum 
struggle to vocalise their emotions at the best of times, so asking her if she’s going to 
be there in the morning…she’s sitting there saying, I don’t know. So we then had to 
take her to hospital, and we sat there till 4am to be told, well if we admit her it won’t 
have a good outcome so the best thing you can do is take her home and sleep with her 
until morning. And you really feel at a loss. You really do. You really feel at an 
absolute loss. It’s so hard. 
Naomi shared that she had to move from a flat to a house because her anxiety of her son’s 
suicidal threats was so acute:  
And I said something has to give because we were in a flat before, and he used to 
threaten to jump out the window. It was soul destroying. I couldn’t sleep in case I 
woke up and he was gone. 
Whilst the other women spoke of their efforts to keep their children safe, Naomi’s fears in 
relation to her son’s safety was so severe that it had actual, material consequences for the 
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family. To move home is a significant upheaval, and to do so in response to a perceived 
threat of safety to your child highlights the seriousness of the distress she experienced. 
Scarlet became particularly distressed when discussing her fears for her daughter’s future 
well-being, and her anxiety over potentially being unable to protect her from herself:  
For better or worse, I do remember being inside my head as a child, so I try to be the 
person I would have wanted. But it's depressing, frustrating…really seriously 
upsetting. And despite all of that, she still hurts herself. It's difficult seeing her go 
through it and not being able to help. Maybe I am helping, maybe it would have been 
worse, and she'd have gone through with her plans if I hadn't tried...you just want to 
be able to find a way to help her. And sometimes on a bad day, you feel like there just 
isn't. You feel helpless. 
Her choice of language is powerfully emotive (‘depressing’, ‘helpless’) and powerfully 
conveys how all-consuming and distressing this particular lived experience is for mothers. 
The thought of losing a child is unthinkable, but to have your own child threaten to take 
themselves away is a viscerally distressing experience. In contrast to anticipatory grief often 
researched in respect to palliative care, which, although not defined, has an expected end 
point; the anticipatory grief that mother’s experience in relation to their children’s self-harm 
is often continuous and unremitting. To my present knowledge, to date there is no study 
which explores the unique and complex relationship between self-harm and parental 
anticipatory grief, much less within the context of autism. For the mothers I spoke with, this 
issue emerged as a considerable source of grief and challenge in their mothering journey, and 
would warrant further, more in-depth study. 
Stigma 
 
He would not put his shoes on. He couldn’t tell me why, other than that they were ‘terrible.’ 
As were the boots, the sandshoes, and in desperation, the trainers I attempted to wrestle him 
into. He would not wear shoes, EVER, he told me. His anger was sudden and 
disproportionate. We sat on the stairs, at an impasse; him, furious, me utterly bewildered. 
Eventually, I steeled myself. ‘I am your mother, and you MUST go to school.’ 
He was only five. The shoe issue had arisen suddenly and unexpectedly. In those first days, I 
had spoken to him softly, reassuringly, attempting to distract him with tales of all the fun he 
would have at school once he arrived. When it became clear that my reassurances were 
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mistrusted, I tried games. Putting his shoes first on his teddies, then on our dog (this elicited 
a brief and bewildered repose from his rage), then, lastly, and unsuccessfully, on him. We 
had bought new shoes, with dinosaurs (his obsession) and flashing lights. While he 
appreciated these in the store, in abstract, he most certainly did not appreciate them in the 
context of his own feet. Day after day, he roared in fury. He threw things. He banged his head 
repeatedly on the floor. He sobbed, disconsolate. I tried everything. 
Eventually, arduously, I managed to wrangle him into a pair of shoes, sweating, exhausted by 
the effort. While he clung to the banister, howling in rage, I repeated this mantra to myself 
‘You MUST got to school.’ That’s what good mothers did. They got their children dressed 
and they took them to school. I gripped his tiny hand and forced us through the door. We 
were fortunate enough to live only a few minute’s walk from school. It’s only along the street. 
We were out of the house, that was always the hardest part. We would make it.  
Immediately, he flung himself to the ground, anchoring his tiny body to the spot, and 
screamed. In panic, painfully aware of the stream of other parents and children we would 
soon join, I scooped him up, his body contorting and twisting in anger. I staggered resolutely 
onwards, trying desperately to ignore the onslaught of blows as he writhed furiously in my 
arms. The bell had long since rung, and mercifully, only a handful of parents remained on the 
street, their chatting quietening to shocked silence at our approach. We pushed forward. He 
kicked, he punched. He twisted fistfuls of hair. He bit. He spat. And still, we were not yet 
there. Then one furious punch brought a turret of blood from my nose, the next tearing the 
flesh of my lip in two. I stopped, frozen. He froze, too, the sight of my blood jolting him out of 
his rage and dissolving him into complete devastation. 
I sat down on the ground, enveloping his now sobbing limbs in mine. I held him, and I rocked 
him, tears streaming silently down my face. ‘It’s ok’, I shushed. ‘I’m okay, you’re okay. 
We’re okay.’ Over and over. I rocked him. I don’t know how long we sat there like that, he 
and I. I lost all awareness of the silent stares of the other parents; at some point they had 
abandoned our spectacle and returned to their day. By the time his sobs had quietened, and 
his body stilled, the street was empty. I lifted him to his feet, clutching his hand and walked 
finally, brokenly, to the school office.  
The door opened and the secretary looked up from her desk. Her mouth fell open. She 
disappeared through a door. I looked up, staring at our reflection in the glass doors. My hair 
was a tangled nest, my face filthy and streaked with blood and tears. My son was ashen, 
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hollow eyed, exhausted. We stood there, broken, shattered by trauma. A minute later, she 
reappeared, teacher in tow. The teacher, though visibly alarmed, looked at us with a mixture 
of sympathy and concern. We stared back, unable to speak.  
‘Oh dear,’ she said. ‘I think mum needs a cup of tea.’ She turned to the secretary, ‘Can you 
take Micah to wash his face please?’  
His little hand tightened on mine, and my mouth opened to protest.  
‘He is okay. Right now, you’re the one who needs to be looked after. Come with me.’  
I nodded, still unable to speak. My stubborn attempts to conceal my private struggle had been 
laid bare. There was no hiding anymore.  
In chapter three I have identified that although autism does not have any outward physical 
markers, it is very difficult for individuals on the spectrum to ‘conceal’ their behaviour.  
Thus, we have individuals with ‘normal’ appearances who are behaving ‘abnormally’. This 
may be arguably more stigmatising for individuals on the spectrum, who may face doubt as to 
the validity of their condition by virtue of their appearance. The reflection I have articulated 
above was sadly not an isolated incident but was to become a routine part of our morning for 
many, many months. What also became routine were the gazes of others who witnessed our 
daily battle, gazes which were a spectrum of shock, pity, and judgement. As recently as a few 
weeks ago, a neighbour of mine remarking on how much my son has grown, commented; ‘I 
remember when you used to have to carry to him to school, you’ll not be doing that now… 
What a hard time he used to give you.’ 
It was well-intended, but this encounter reminded me that whilst mercifully it has been many 
years since I have had to carry him to school, other’s memories of that time, and their 
perceptions of us both, remain. Naomi described an encounter with another mother at the 
school gates:  
I even had one mum say to me I would love your life; you just swan about and do 
what you do and I’m like really? You have no idea that I haven’t slept for two days 
and he’s running out of school, sitting for two hours in the boot of a car trying to talk 
him into school.  
It’s the hiddenness of autism that’s difficult…the way he acts sometimes in public...I 
just let him get on with it, but you do feel people staring. 
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The characteristics associated with early indication of autism are often behavioural, and 
therefore often stigmatised as merely symptomatic of poor parenting. Consequently, 
individuals of children presenting such behaviours are very often considered to be ‘bad 
parents’ of ‘bad children.’ Scarlet felt strongly that the behaviours associated with her 
daughter were often inextricably linked by others to her own perceived failing’s as a mother; 
‘Bad parenting,’ she commented. ‘I still get ‘done’ with bad parenting.’ I expressed to Naomi 
my own reluctance to engage with other parents at the school gates or admit to staff that we 
were struggling, certain that what they had witnessed would be a cause for judgement. All of 
us were able to reflect on incidents in which we were ostracised or excluded from some form 
of social situation: birthday parties, school discos, after school clubs. Sometimes the stigma 
was covert, concealed by ‘forgotten invitations’, however it was sometimes also overt; being 
asked to ‘deal with’ our child, asked to leave, or being openly remarked upon were sadly not 
uncommon situations. 
I recently reflected in conversation with a family member about one particular Christmas, in 
which an extended family member attended with their new partner. I remember being anxious 
that the busyness and excitement of the holiday would overwhelm my son, and that he would 
not be able to cope. Christmas was always a challenging day for us, the over stimulation 
almost inevitably resulted in agitation, aggression, or exhaustion. To my surprise and delight, 
he was excited and eager to tell everyone about his presents. That year his special interest 
was geology, and so he received a collection of gem-stones and fossils that he was 
particularly keen to show off to his cousins. I was incredibly proud, and admittedly relieved, 
by the lovely memory he created for us all that day. I later learned that following our 
departure, the guest of my relative remarked ‘What a strange child. What kind of nine-year-
old wants a bunch of rocks for Christmas? He’s very weird, isn’t he?’ Upon being told of my 
son’s condition, she brusquely replied ‘Well, that explains it. I knew he wasn’t normal.’   
I had been used to stigma at the school gates, in the supermarket, at play parks. After so many 
years, I was steeled to the stares of strangers. This particular judgement, in a place where we 
felt safe and loved, came as an unexpected blow; in part because I had been so proud of his 
ability to have, at least what I perceived to be, a ‘normal’ Christmas day for the first time. I 
was at once furious and devastated that she had taken this achievement away from him…But 
yet there remained the nagging doubt, had I merely been lying to myself about how others see 
him? 
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Stigma perception associated with autism is a particularly challenging issue as autism is, by 
nature, an ‘invisible disability.’ Thus, the social recognition or empathy potentially evoked by 
a visible disability does not occur. In the case of our Christmas guest, she expected my son’s 
behaviour to match his appearance, a 9-year-old boy she presumed would be into cars or 
football. For both Clairborne-Park and Lexhed, the schism between ‘normal’ appearance and 
‘abnormal’ behaviour tainted both their own perceptions, and how they felt they would be 
perceived by others: 
For Carl and me, autism has a stigma. It feels abstract, scary, and awful. We didn’t 
know much about it, and we have preconceived notions—that autistics are mentally 
retarded people who cannot speak, and sit and rock in a corner, doomed to live in their 
own isolated world. That was what we envisioned when we first heard the word 
‘autism’ (Lexhed, 2008, 49).   
Clara-Claiborne Park admitted her own terror that others may look at her daughter with 
barely concealed horror as a consequence of her habit of mumbling: 
Because there can’t be mumbles. There mustn’t be. I remember the middle-aged 
woman I encountered in a bus station, mumbling under her breath to nobody at all — 
the frisson I felt, of pity but also fear. Jessy was still young; my imagination leapt 
ahead. Would she be like that, grown too old to be charming, still mumbling? If I felt 
fear, what could I expect from others? (2001, 60) 
Whilst the research examined in chapter three suggests stigma can be seen to correlate with 
more challenging behaviours; even ‘passive’ autistic characteristics, such as stimming, 
rocking, humming, or in my son’s case, unusual interests, can be shown to attract negative 
attention (Lawson, 2008). Abigail reflected that the even the resources and tools she 
employed to manage her children’s anxiety so that meltdowns were less frequent, for 
example ear defenders, Theraputty and other stimulatory toys, also attracted negative 
attention.   
For the most part, the mothers I spoke with reflected they dealt with stigma by developing a 
‘thick skin’ to the stares of others, steeling themselves to judgement. At other times, stigma 
was actively resisted by challenging negative attitudes, and attempting to educate others on 
our children’s condition. Shortly after my son’s diagnosis, I remember buying small cards 
which described autism so that I could provide those to people who showed strong reactions 
to his behaviour. Abigail observed that ‘sunflower’ lanyards were particularly helpful for her 
 
 
100 
 
children in subtly indicating to others that they had an invisible condition. Naomi commented 
that for her, providing others with the knowledge demanded greater sensitivity from them:  
I’m more vocal since his diagnosis…I have no shame in telling someone that he does 
have Aspergers or if he’s going somewhere he does need to have an adult because he 
does need one to one support. We don’t have to tell people why, but I think no, why 
should we pretend that he doesn’t. I’m a believer that if the children are aware of what 
he’s got and they understand, then if they put him in a situation where he has a 
meltdown, they’re complicit in that and they can’t get away with it. I don’t let people 
put him in that position easily. 
Scarlet and Abigail both noted however, that education does not always correlate to greater 
understanding. Both described engagements with health care professionals who, despite being 
assumed to ‘know better’, displayed the very attitudes they were expected to dispel. 
Describing her daughter’s diagnostic process, Abigail commented that one particular 
professional remarked:  
 ‘She’s just doing this to wind her mother up…If she has autism, I’ll eat my hat.’  
Scarlet reflected on a similar conversation with her daughter’s Educational Psychologist,  
She said, ‘I’m begging you please not to label her, if you push for a diagnosis she’ll 
be held back and stigmatised in school and she’s so clever…if you do this you’ll 
cause her to miss out.’  
And I thought you’re a professional! In my head I’m thinking I’ve worked with a lot 
of special needs children, and it really upsets me when people look at it as a stigma 
and a label. The only reason it could be is that people make it that way. 
These reflections suggest that an inherent difficulty for mothers is that they not only 
experience stigma socially, but also institutionally: which has significantly more far reaching 
consequences in respect to diagnosis and support. Scarlet raises a particularly intriguing 
issue; that stigma can often be a self-fulfilling prophecy. She questioned whether the 
professional in her daughter’s case was in fact perpetuating stigma by the mere fact of 
anticipating it. Burack et al raised similar queries in respect to the reciprocity which takes 
place in the context of autism. He suggests that by their very differences, persons with autism 
produce different social responses in others, thus inadvertently shaping their social 
experience: 
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…children with autism, therefore, experience a distinctly different social world than 
that experienced by other children from a very early age, as their unusual behaviour 
affords different sorts of interactions from those that other children usually 
experience. Not only do they experience or understand the world differently from 
other children, their world really is different from that of other children, simply 
because they are in it. (2001, 27) 
Summary 
 
In chapter three, it was anticipated that the delay in achieving diagnosis and the diagnosis 
itself would have a profound impact on the mental health of mothers. Whilst our accounts 
reflect these are indeed significantly challenging factors, it is clear that the diagnostic 
process, and the eventual diagnosis itself, are much more complex emotional processes than 
the literature suggests. Our accounts highlighted that the prolonged diagnostic period 
associated with autism generates a peculiar kind of medical authority on the lives of autistic 
individuals and their families; rather than a source of support, medical professionals often 
appeared as a gateway to obtaining social legitimacy for what is otherwise a considerably 
socially stigmatised experience. Rather than an advantageous ability to conceal, the 
invisibility of autism presents a particular challenge for traditional discourses of normativity. 
Individuals with autism appear ‘normal’, and yet their behaviours often present contradictions 
to normative expectations of the able-bodied. As our stories have reflected, this leaves both 
individuals with autism themselves, and us as mothers, open to particularly hurtful and 
stigmatising attitudes of others. 
 In contrast to research which anticipated ‘grief’ to be the primary reaction to diagnosis, our 
accounts reflected that in many ways a diagnosis came as a relief to the uncertainty, self-
doubt and judgement of pre-diagnosis. In reality, our experiences of grief, whilst significant, 
were fluctuating, periodic, and responsive to particular situational challenges. For mothers 
experiencing very real challenges to their children’s mortality as a consequence of autism-
related depression and anxiety, grief undoubtedly took on a very different and acute form. We 
lamented, were frustrated by, resisted against the lack of support, services, and understanding 
for our children, and for us. 
These conflicts between symptomology, social attitudes, and social policy make the 
experience of autism itself, and the experience of mothering a child on the autism spectrum, 
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distinctly challenging. Whilst the literature often frames this phenomena as ‘parental stress’, 
each of us described a much more complex emotional journey than a narrative of ‘stress’ 
could adequately encompass. Thus, whilst many of the themes which emerged were 
consistent with the research examined in chapter three, there were many more experiences 
which could not be seen to be located within current research into the maternal experience of 
autism. In the chapter which follows, I will explore the realities of what has emerged from 
between the gaps in the research; articulating a distinct experience of maternal struggle, and 
resistance, which is currently occluded.  
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Chapter 6) A Mother’s Struggle: Resistance or Resilience?  
Everyday Struggles 
 
The same room, a different year. A different Micah. This was our third multi-agency review, 
and perhaps the hardest one yet. In all of his previous meetings, referrals, and appointments, 
I had my mother by my side, his staunch defender; ‘the Micah whisperer’, I called her. She 
had left us 4 weeks earlier, finally succumbing to what had been a ferocious and determined 
battle with cancer. Before her passing, life with Micah had plateaued into a grinding, 
anxious, relentless struggle. All of the carefully negotiated strategies we had implemented at 
home, the stability of consistent routines, the ability to anticipate the next day’s challenges by 
making sure the RIGHT jumper was clean…all of those had been thrown into disarray by the 
emergent necessity of my mother’s palliative care. Gone were our Tuesday and Sunday night 
dinners, gone were his Friday sleepovers. Gone too was his mother, who was now shuffling 
hollowly through his days, struggling to maintain the façade that things were, or ever could 
be normal.  
The door opened and a stranger burst in, visibly harassed. I don’t remember much of the 
minutes before that, other than staring blankly at the table unable to meet the sympathy in the 
eyes sitting around me. This unexpected arrival cracked the defence of my numbness. ‘Duty 
Social work. Apologies for the delay, Micah hasn’t been re-allocated a social worker yet, so I 
was asked to attend at the last minute. Where are we at?’ The stranger was keen to get 
straight to the point and avoid being late for his next appointment. The chair cleared her 
throat. ‘Well, we didn’t know you were attending…but it’s very good of you to come. I’m not 
sure if you are aware but Eilidh has just experienced a significant bereavement, and a great 
loss of support to both her and Micah so it would be of benefit to them both to have some 
input from your department.’ He nodded at her, turning to me. ‘So, what can we do for you?’  
‘I....I don’t know. We’d only just met a social worker, and she took Micah out to soft play so 
that I could look after mum or just get a break, she brought her dog to visit him when he was 
sad…we were just getting to know each other when she left so we so hadn’t completed his 
needs assessment yet…’ I pause, aware that he is expecting me to provide something, 
concrete, tangible for him to respond to. ‘Our needs are… mornings are probably the 
hardest, he really struggles with dressing… and I’m missing a lot of work because he can’t 
always manage the school day, I’m always being called away because he needs me…We had 
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a night once a week that my mum would take him, so that we both got some space from one 
another, and I could work or get some rest… I don’t know what social work do…or can do 
but I just…we don’t really have any support now.’ 
 The stranger looked exasperated, abruptly shutting his notebook. ‘I’m very sorry for your 
loss Miss Campbell. But if you don’t actually know what you want, I’m really not sure how 
we can help you. It sounds to me, to be frank, like you need a babysitter. That’s not something 
the local authority can provide. You have our number if you’re really struggling but, in the 
mean time, perhaps it’s best for us to withdraw until your needs become clearer.’ With that, 
he excused himself, leaving a room of shocked expressions. It was to be 10 months before 
Micah was assigned another social worker. Months of desperately trying to soothe the grief 
of a child who doesn’t understand what grief is, just that he is angry, and sad, and I am not 
his nanny.   
Many of the issues which autistic individuals find challenging are often counterintuitive to 
the realities of social life, such as the need for routine and stability; along with other 
somewhat unpredictable challenges arising from sensory sensitivity to noise, busyness, strong 
smells. As such, the experience of predicting or pre-empting such challenges can be an all-
consuming and often overwhelming task for parents of children on the spectrum. For my son, 
these anxieties often centred around dressing. This I came to regard with a degree of irony – 
of all the triggers we could potentially avoid, putting clothes on was not one of them. My son 
would only wear certain clothes; finding the right ones was an arduous process of trial and 
error, and once found they had to be bought in bulk, in various sizes, because his need for 
sameness was all consuming to him. His favourite things must always, always be carried in 
twos – for if one were to break, the consequences would be unthinkable. As a lone parent 
with a small baby, I had relied upon routines because it simply made things easier; as an older 
child, these routines became less convenient and more crucial to his well-being. Plans could 
not be deviated from, promises made must be promises kept.  
In respect to impact to their personal lives, Both Claiborne-Park and Lexhed describe that the 
time demands of appointments, therapies and alternative education paths superseded their 
ability to maintain their careers. My son was unable to cope with organised childcare, or 
rather they were unable to cope with him, however I have been fortunate enough to largely be 
able to structure my job and studies around his schooling. That being said, every successful 
balance often comes as a consequence of sacrifice; my progression in both my academic and 
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working career has, in some respects, undoubtedly been impeded by my inability to commit 
to full time hours, attend conferences or be flexible in my schedule. Scarlet and Naomi both 
spoke of being unable to maintain their employment due to the frequency of appointments 
and high absences from school. Naomi reflected on the impact to her own life of her son’s 
caring demands, citing exhaustion as being one of the biggest challenges to daily life:  
The lack of sleep. He doesn’t sleep. That has a major impact, because it impacts 
school, it impacts my health because I don’t sleep because he’s not sleeping. He’s 
okay, because he seems to get enough that he needs. But I’m constantly exhausted. 
And I have two other children. And a house to run and meals to cook and the 
meetings and dog walking and the meetings…everything you can imagine. It affects 
so many different parts.  
It’s the same with taking his meds in the morning, he takes his meds with the same 
yoghurt every morning. But if someone else eats that yoghurt the whole day erupts. 
But it’s their home too, so I can’t tell the girls don’t eat his yoghurts. 
I used to be so social…I used to play the piano. I thought I’d be a qualified nurse by 
now, but it hasn’t worked out that way. But he comes first and that’s the way it is. My 
feelings as a mother have never changed. I’ve never thought I’m not doing this 
anymore. I would never every give up on them.  
Factors such as exhaustion and the additional demands of anticipatory planning emerged as 
significantly impacting our daily lives of mothers. Naomi gave the example of the seemingly 
unimportant number of yoghurts in the fridge. Whilst for many mothers, the matter of not 
having enough yoghurts could be considered a minor inconvenience, for mothers of children 
with autism, a simple yoghurt can be fraught with hidden meanings and far reaching 
implications that would seem impossible for anyone else to consider significant. Such 
narratives are often framed within the literature as ‘care-giving demands’ or ‘disruptions to 
daily living.’ Certainly, they are both. However what I consider significant about Naomi’s 
particular reflection, is that it highlights that one of the significant challenges of autism is that 
the ‘simple’ is very rarely ‘simple’, the mundane is often interwoven with the complex, and 
tiny changes can result in profound impacts on how the day will transpire. Put simply, what is 
easy for others, can be a monumental struggle for us.  
Nicholas et al found that among their respondents, parents described that, along with 
additional caring needs, they also had anticipatory caring requirements. Describing the 
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necessity of pre-empting potential triggers or difficulties with proactive and often ever- 
changing solutions, Nicholas et al note that autism was observed to be ‘pervasive’ in the 
thoughts, structures and routines of mothers:  
…unlike a job with delineated working hours and designated tasks, the roles of these 
mothers were described as broad-based and ‘all encompassing,’ and were thought to 
vastly exceed the demands associated with mothering a typically developing child. 
Participants described unending demands which required anticipatory planning for 
events in and out of the home, continual monitoring and adjustment, ongoing 
ingenuity and work in addressing the child’s immediate and anticipated needs, and 
responding to challenges in proactive ways (2016, 926). 
The pervasiveness of ‘anticipatory planning’ in my thoughts and routines is one which I have 
personally struggled with. I am not a natural planner. Organisation is something I 
enthusiastically attempt, only to abandon as everyday life gets in the way. In mothering a 
child with autism, you must not only be two steps ahead, but five. Once you learn to speak 
the complex language of all the anxieties your child may struggle with daily, which is in and 
of itself a long and often cyclical process, you then begin to pre-empt the myriad of potential 
triggers and situations which may derail their equilibrium. For my part, this was a 
considerable source of emotional disruption. Whilst some strategies could be relied upon to 
be consistent, I was regularly confounded by situations arising which circumvented my 
meticulous planning. When this occurred, it was often dispiriting and overwhelming, leaving 
me feeling like a failure for being unable to anticipate every eventuality. The ceaselessness of 
anticipating the possible multiple meanings everyday objects or activities may have for 
Micah was profoundly exhausting.   
I vividly remember during the challenging period articulated in my previous reflection 
watching other mothers at the school gates, wondering what they would consider a ‘bad 
morning’…what would it be like, I wondered, for my child to simply get dressed in the 
morning? Smile and wave at me at the school gates? Sometimes, I would be able to laugh at 
the absurdity of how traumatic the loss of a particular sock could be for us; at other times, I 
would weep with something akin to bitter injustice that such simple things were never simple 
for us. In admitting this to Naomi, she revealed that she had witnessed my daily battle of the 
school run and had shared much of it herself with her own son. Rather than the judging stares 
I had feared, she was in fact there, understanding of my struggle and comforted that she was 
 
 
107 
 
not alone in hers. Later in our conversation she confessed that she too felt burdened by daily 
life,  
Every day is a struggle. Mainly on me but Ryan* has the financial burden...nobody 
realises the financial burden. I genuinely think if he didn’t work away and earn a good 
wage I don’t know where we’d be...it’s so hard because it feels like a constant battle, 
you’re up and down to the school, you’re taking it home, and then my husband and I 
were just bickering as well…which didn’t help the situation at all.  Other people 
would always say how smiley I was, but people had no idea.  
I think I did have depression…at his worsts. I remember getting up battling with him 
to get to school, and just going back to my bed until three o’clock. And then feeling 
the shame and guilt of having not done anything all day, but I just lay and felt sorry 
for myself and cried…ate. And that’s how I dealt with it. But I was very personal 
about it, I didn’t talk to anyone about it. But I was really depressed for a long time. 
For Scarlet, while her daughter’s symptoms were in and of themselves a significant source of 
difficulty, her struggle was made harder by social attitudes and barriers to diagnosis which 
challenged and trivialised her experience:  
So they tested her and in their words…and this is something that has been a source of 
frustration with me for some years with my daughter…as far as the professionals are 
concerned, they tested her on all these various academic areas, maths, literacy etc and 
she tested at the highest range for all these areas so therefore, in their words, there 
couldn’t possibly be anything ‘wrong with her’.  
And I have an issue with that ‘Nothing wrong with them’…because either way there’s 
nothing ‘wrong’ with them, but just because someone excels academically doesn’t 
mean they’re not having these other issues, doesn’t mean they’re not crying 
themselves to sleep or having these other emotional issues… the doctors say there’s 
nothing wrong with her and again it was really, really frustrating for me… 
She was being excluded from school every other day, I was getting the phone call and 
having to come down, she’d be excluded for a week. I would have to work out the 
childcare because I was a working parent, as well I was also a single parent from 
when she was 5 years old. And I was banging my head against the wall trying to get 
somewhere. 
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Scarlet’s narrative reinforces some of the particular challenges autism presents for those 
advocating for support and understanding for their lived experience. As we have discussed in 
previous chapters, the invisibility of autism, coupled with the fact that it is a condition which 
arguably presents itself most acutely in daily experiences such as sleeping, dressing, eating 
and social interactions makes it all too easy for others to challenge the veracity of the 
struggles faced because they are often concealed within the private sphere of the home. In the 
opening reflection to this chapter, I have described how difficult it is for mothers to articulate 
the challenges and struggles we face, particularly when the sources of such struggles are 
often rooted in daily trials considered to be too mundane, too banal, too inconsequential to 
justify such a designation, much less support.  
Between the meeting I described, and our eventual re-allocation of a social worker, it was to 
be 10 months. During this time, I called, wrote, pleaded and ultimately berated our local 
authority to re-engage with us. Eventually, after the intervention of a local MSP, we received 
a re-allocation, a support worker, and a formal apology from the department. Whilst we 
eventually obtained the support that we so desperately needed, the balance of time spent 
advocating for my son, against time which could have been spent with him, weighed heavily 
on me. I was not alone in feeling that the attempts to advocate for support were often equally 
as stressful as the circumstances for which we needed support. Abigail discussed similar 
experiences of struggling against institutional barriers, facing many denials and refusals in 
the diagnostic process as a consequence of being dismissed as a mother merely overblowing 
the challenges of parenting:  
You doubt yourself. You do, you doubt yourself. To some extent I felt a failure. I’m 
letting her down. And to some extent I couldn’t cope because her behaviour as a 
teenager really did get excessive…And in the midst of it, you’ve got a psychiatrist 
saying she’s just doing it to wind her mother up. So as a mother you think what am I 
doing that’s causing her to want to wind me up this much? So it’s really, really hard. 
We’ve had a long fight…I’m probably not particularly well liked within the local 
authority because I had to push for my son to get into his school but I felt it was my 
duty to get him the outcome he deserved.   
Scarlet repeatedly echoed this imagery of ‘fighting’, often describing herself as ‘battling’, 
‘being up against a brick wall’ and ‘banging her head against the wall.’ The use of such 
metaphors illuminates that mothers of children with autism are often forced to undertake a 
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very different role to ‘care giver’; they are often required to fight and advocate for their 
child’s healthcare, education, and inclusion against a culture which does not take seriously 
their experience. We were just as, if not more, impacted by the responses to autism from 
employers, family members, schools and professionals as we were from our child’s 
symptomology. In reflecting upon both my own and my participants experiences of struggle, 
they were at once rooted in the frustratingly unremarkable activities and routines of our 
everyday lives and yet also waged at a much larger social and institutional level. 
Each of the women I spoke to discussed the strain of an ASD diagnosis on relationships, 
however for many it was rather family members or those in their wider social circle who 
struggled to come to terms with a positive diagnosis, often preferring to deny the reality of 
the situation to the detriment of their own relationship with the child. Scarlet discussed that 
not presenting as ‘autistic enough’ can often lead to other’s raising doubt over her daughter’s 
diagnosis, which can often feel like a lack of acceptance of who her daughter is and the 
struggles that they share:  
My siblings feel the same way, my ex-husband doesn't acknowledge that there's an 
issue. And people who have known her for her entire life...even other children on the 
autism spectrum can be the same. 
Whilst Scarlet has been able to maintain relationships with those in her life who reject her 
daughter’s diagnosis, this has often been the result of her developing a ‘thick skin’ to their 
opinions and abdicating her own right to turn to them for support. However, it is not always 
possible to maintain relationships in the face of such rejections. Abigail spoke about the 
painful reality of her parent’s refusal to accept her daughter’s Aspergers:  
It’s torn my family apart. It’s absolutely torn it apart. My son was somewhat easier to 
accept in some ways because so many of the signs were there so early. But my parents 
are quite old fashioned.  
So far as my daughter is concerned, my parents were absolutely determined she 
wasn’t on the spectrum, and if I even considered putting her forward for an 
assessment they wanted nothing to do with me. So, our whole family was torn apart 
last year, because I wanted my daughter assessed, my daughter agreed to it, and my 
parents forbade me from doing it. My parents also owned the house that I lived in, so 
we became homeless, because they decided that if I wasn’t going their way, I was 
 
 
110 
 
being cut off. That was the reality of it. They just can’t accept my children’s diagnosis 
at all. 
For Abigail, her parent’s denial was not merely a symptom of their processing of the new 
reality of their granddaughter’s condition, but had very real, material consequences for the 
whole family. At a practical level, important sources of support are withdrawn leading to 
further stress and isolation for the parents; at an emotional level, such a schism within the 
family can be devastating for all involved and is often difficult to repair once broken.  
Kearney et al observe that,  
Whilst sorrow seems self-evident, a great deal of pain derives from societal values 
and beliefs mirrored in the words and behaviours of friends, family and professionals. 
In a better world, this pain could be avoided. On the other hand, existential pain and 
grief (Stephenson & Murphy 1986) cannot be avoided, as it cannot be ameliorated by 
education and attitudinal change (2001, 588).  
Coping and Adaptation: Resistance or Resilience?   
 
We will of course, have him apologise to you. We do recognise the withdrawal of support has 
had an impact on Micah, which is deeply regrettable. You’ll be pleased to know we have 
considered a support package appropriate to Micah’s level of need.’ 
By this time, I was emboldened by our struggles. Furious and indignant. 
‘That is wonderful to hear. And I appreciate the offer of apology, which I will of course 
accept. However, what you fail to grasp is not only the affect it has on us in the present, but 
the impact it will have on the future. This ‘mistake’ has withdrawn support which could have 
significantly impacted his life. We have lost 10 months of progress. I also notice you state 
‘Micah’s need.’ I’m not sure what you consider Micah’s needs to be, however I assume from 
your choice of phrasing that my own do not factor?’  
‘Well…’she stuttered. ‘It is Micah’s support package. It’s all about supporting him to be 
independent. We considered a respite allocation, but it was agreed that it would be of no 
significant benefit to Micah in terms of socialisation or inclusion in the community.’  
‘Forgive me,’ I interject, ‘But the sign above the door says, ‘Family Support,’ not ‘Child 
support.’ Am I incorrect in assuming that you are duty bound to support families as a whole, 
and not just the child who is the subject of referral?’ 
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‘Well…I mean…yes, we are…however you must understand that we are at the mercy of the 
public purse. Funding decisions have to be made on a needs basis and in the best interests of 
the child. We always have to look first at what support family and friends can provide in our 
stead and perhaps this has been under-utilised…’ 
I did understand. I appreciated her predicament. Working within a charitable organisation, 
the support I would like to offer is often tempered by the financial realities of what I am able 
to offer. That notwithstanding, I am also painfully aware of robbing Peter to pay Paul; 
cutting costs in support in the short term creates bigger social problems in the long term. 
In the intervening 10 months, out of our struggles, I had learnt to be creative with Micah’s 
needs. Some of our old routines could be reinstated, others could be tweaked in such a way 
that it was still acceptable to him. Our tribe had rallied around us. My partner introduced 
him to the martial art of Muay Thai, finding an outlet for his anger, quelling his aggression 
and forging a bond out of shared interest. To our eternal gratitude, his school had worked 
hard to support his inclusion, gradually increasing his participation and channelling his 
interests into the learning outcomes he needed to achieve. I enrolled him in swimming 
lessons, art classes. As a result of significant hard work was, he was mercifully, eventually, 
coping. However, this delicate, intricate balance required constant thought, anticipation and 
effort. Every success was paid for with exhaustion.   
‘With respect. What YOU need to understand is that what you are offering Micah, I have 
already provided. His material needs are met, he is healthy. He is loved. He is included. He 
attends mainstream extra-curricular activities, independent of me. He has friends. I have 
done all that. WE have already done all of that. My son is without grandmothers, my father is 
83 years old. My friends are scattered across the city and work full time. My partner works 
full time and doesn’t live with us because Micah needs the consistency of our routine. They 
cannot, though they may want to, take on our day to day struggles. What we need from you is 
a recognition that while we mothers are killing ourselves to meet their needs, and killing 
ourselves to hide the fact that it is killing us, there is no one meeting OUR needs.’ 
In the preceding sections, I have highlighted the significant adjustments and adaptations that 
families must undergo in order to ameliorate an autistic child’s experience of the world. The 
importance of this stage, adaptation, is considered crucial to mother’s ability to cope with the 
demands and expectations of their reality. Parents are often required to be creative, 
resourceful, flexible and resilient to the ever-changing and often circuitous needs of the child. 
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Claiborne-Park writes extensively on the myriad of strategies, tools and adjustments her 
family employed both to mitigate her daughter’s anxiety, and also to attempt to glean tiny 
glimmers of progress in her development and independence. This she undertook, despite, as 
she writes above, steeling themselves against expectation:  
Minuscule, apparently empty victories nourished something in Elly and in us. In Elly, 
perhaps some frail sense of adequacy, in us the necessary hope that our daughter had 
some mind hidden away inside her speechless incomprehension. Not too much.  Hope 
was something against which we had to defend ourselves. Only enough to mount the 
next assault (Clairborne-Park 2001, 50).  
Echoing Claiborne-Park’s assertion that optimism must be tempered with a heavy dose of 
realism, Naomi observed that her husband’s response to their son’s diagnosis was one of 
pragmatism,  
In that wee space every thought goes through your mind…and then I thought don’t 
feel sorry for yourself. You don’t know what the future is going to bring. Every day is 
different with him. I remember phoning Ryan and he was like, well you know this a 
good thing because he’ll get the resources he needs at school and at home and he 
won’t have to struggle through life without support. And that’s a great way to look at 
it. 
Naomi’s reflection resonates with the theme of ‘loss and restoration’ examined in the 
previous chapter, highlighting that mothers can be seen to cope and adapt with the realities of 
autism caring despite their own emotional turbulence. In the preceding chapter, I 
demonstrated that mothers become adept in adjusting to the ever-changing needs of our 
children. Rather than approaching these as problems to be solved, I suggest that mothers are 
able to maintain this intense and immersive level of care by being realistic about which 
challenges can be met and overcome, and which simply require acceptance. During a time 
when my own attempts at adaptation seemed like a very unsuccessful process of trial and 
error, I was advised to ‘choose your battles.’ Whilst this may seem like an empty platitude, it 
has stuck with me in times of intense frustration and self-doubt. In three words, this sentence 
conveys that some difficulties may never be fully ameliorated; rather, we must pour what 
energy we do have into battles we know we can win. The theme of ‘battle’ emerged as 
recurrent through our stories and illustrated that what is often defined as ‘coping’ is in fact an 
active, resistive, and liberatory process for mothers navigating their children’s autism.  
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Nicholas et al observed that following diagnosis mothers often take on the role of ‘researcher, 
advocate, and coordinator of services’ for their children, immersing themselves in attempting 
to understand their child’s condition and petitioning for appropriate support (2016, 926). 
After the seemingly interminable limbo often experienced pre-diagnosis in which families are 
paralysed from taking steps to improve their child’s position, Scarlet felt liberated by the 
ability to take some control and responsibility for her children’s future outcomes:  
I was happy to get the diagnosis. It had been a fight to get it…people say nothing will 
change but things do change. You get a voice. You can talk till you’re blue in the face 
but without that piece of paper nothing gets put in place.  
Scarlet’s sense of empowerment from the agency afforded her by obtaining a diagnosis and 
undertaking her own research into how to best support her daughter was palpable: 
I fight in other ways. I fight on paper. I use my words. That fight...gives me 
something to focus on. I write a complaint and I follow it like a dog with a bone...I go 
on missions and if I run out of things to fight for for myself, I fight for other people if 
someone has an issue I'm like right, I'll sort this out! I keep myself busy, I never have 
a day where I don't have a dozen things to achieve and that's how I get through. I keep 
myself busy and I give myself fights to achieve and little things that I can win. And 
that gives me something to get away from the stress that's going on in my head. 
Nicholas et al further that for some of their participants, the challenges of their child’s autism 
became ‘purpose defining’ within their lives (2016, 929). Scarlet’s account above highlights 
how important this sense of purpose is, both in terms of maternal self-perception and in 
ensuring positive outcomes for our children. Abigail, reflecting on her experience of 
motherhood in the context of her wider life experiences suggested, 
I know you don’t get time, but when you do get time it’s good to think about yourself 
the way you were before you had children, and the way you’ve had to change yourself 
for their needs and you realise, actually I’m a better person for this…I absolutely 
know 100% that I am a better person for having those two children. I am a better 
person for having those two children with different needs that I need to think about 
and accommodate. I’m a much better person for it.  
Abigail felt very strongly that her experience as a mother had not only changed her 
personally but had shaped her vocation. As an educator, her experiences with her children 
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very much informed her practice, and positively so. In many ways, my participants 
considered themselves to have been made a ‘better person’ as a consequence of their child’s 
autism, in their awareness and understanding of others and in the compassion and patience 
they found themselves capable of possessing (2016, 929). In being able to overcome some of 
the challenges they faced, or, as Claiborne-Park articulates, discovering just how much one 
can bear, the mothers I spoke with reported a validation of their personal strength as a 
consequence of their experience.  
This led me to reflect on my own self-perception as a mother. Perhaps I am indeed a better 
person for being Micah’s mother, and have learned things about myself, relationships and 
faith that I would otherwise may not have. In heeding Abigail’s advice, and finding the time 
to reflect about these journeys, it is clear that my life has similarly changed direction 
following my son’s diagnosis.  I became a support worker for adults with additional support 
needs, and latterly, a mental health advisor for young children with emotional and 
developmental challenges. Without the experience I had with my son, I would arguably have 
been unqualified, and emotionally ill-equipped, to undertake these roles. I don’t deny that the 
feelings of sadness, and frustration, and loneliness can be overwhelming at times, but slowly 
and over time they can become peripheral to a sense of accomplishment and strength we may 
feel when, as Abigail suggests, we think about what used to be.  
Whilst the emotional journey associated with mothering a child on the spectrum can be acute, 
overwhelming and life impacting, research has shown, as have our stories, that mothers of 
children on the spectrum also demonstrate a remarkable level of resilience. Zhang et al found 
that the respondents of their study described having a ‘new appreciation of life’ and a ‘greater 
sense of spirituality and strength’ as a result of their experiences (2015, 30). King and 
Colleagues suggest that literature relating to parenting childhood disabilities has to date 
focused on a narrow model in which the child is seen to be the stressor, negating the 
possibility that parents may regard their experience as positive (2006, 1076). Critiquing the 
‘personal tragedy model’ of disability, Sarah Green found that parents of children with autism 
were much more significantly impacted by the objective realities of exhaustion and financial 
struggles associated with daily care giving (2007, 161). The mothers I spoke with were at 
pains to reinforce that their children were not sources of sadness for them, nor even 
necessarily their condition; but rather the complex, unexpected and ever-changing challenges 
and social barriers that their condition brought to their lives. 
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However, while I find the premise of Green’s article ‘We’re tired, not sad’ particularly useful 
in challenging the personal tragedy stereotype of ‘struggle’, I am wary that it may neglect the 
multi-valency of the challenges associated with autism parenting. In respect to autism, and, I 
would counter disabilities more generally, our subjective and objective realities are very often 
mutually reinforcing, not mutually negating entities. This frames the challenge of mothering 
on the spectrum as a ‘double burden’ which is particularly difficult for women.   
In reflecting on the shared experiences of these mothers, and on my own encounters with 
friends, family members, and professionals over the years, it became clear that what 
connected us, what emerged from the silence, was a shared experience of struggle. We were 
battle hardened, weary, exhausted from the relentlessness and pervasiveness of autism on the 
lives of our children, and of our own. We were tired, frustrated, lonely and embarrassed by 
the myriad of daily problems that the autism symptomologies of our children presented. 
However, we were also furious, indignant, and resolute in struggling for our children, 
fighting to obtain understanding, recognition, and access to appropriate health care and 
education. Our struggles were simultaneously small and domestic and huge and societal. 
We struggled. Everyday. Materially, as a result of loss of income and expense, physically, 
from exhaustion or as a consequence of melt-down induced violence; emotionally, from the 
constant unpredictability of our children’s emotions. We struggled in our relationships, in our 
attempts to gain vital support and services for our children, with the judgement of others. Yet 
this struggle has become so much a part of the fabric of our everyday lives, of our narratives, 
that my participants and I had often taken it for granted as simply life. I could only really see 
this clearly as distinctive to our lives, once it was on the page. Although ‘struggling’ is often 
conflated with ‘suffering’, implying a passive state of tolerance in the face of hardships; 
when considered within the stories presented in this chapter, ‘struggle’ can be seen to take on 
a much more active, responsive, and oppositional meaning. It is my hope that the agency and 
resilience demonstrated by the accounts presented in this section will perhaps help to 
challenge perceptions of mothers of children with disabilities as more than passive victims of 
a quirk of fate. 
However, I am cautious about falsely representing our stories as redemptive. The love that we 
as mothers expressed for our children is undeniable, and yet all of us at some point in our 
conversations wept openly in recounting our memories. Our stories were not quest narratives 
in which we had overcome great obstacles to reach a happy ending. While we have been able 
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to find happiness, joy and indeed meaning in our experiences, I would contend that it is naïve 
to consider that these positives completely sanitise the hardships we have experienced along 
the way. Nor, I would argue, that there can be seen to be an ‘ending’ to our story, happy or 
otherwise. The challenge of autism is precisely that- it is ongoing, fluctuating, sometimes 
joyful, often crushing.  
Summary  
 
In this chapter I have sought to articulate the ways in which our lived experiences can be 
shown to be complexly shaped by challenges such as fatigue, fear, and lack of social and 
institutional support. I have demonstrated that mothers with children on the spectrum are thus 
required to adopt creative and adaptive practices and attitudes in responding to these 
difficulties. In the following section, I will explore how theologies currently respond to the 
complexity of autism as a condition which is variously and simultaneously shaped by 
medical, social, and institutional discourses. I will consider whether traditional models of 
disability can be seen to effectively attend to the issues of normativity, stigma, and resistance 
raised by our shared accounts. By examining these issues within the context of disability 
theologies, I intend to explore whether the lived experience I am seeking to examine is most 
strongly shaped by its relationship to disability, or whether there is something in our lived 
experience which has emerged as more theologically complex. I propose that the particular 
experiences of mothering which have emerged from ‘between the lines’ of our stories pose a 
distinct challenge to our current theological thinking, and one which may prove generative 
for new models of theological response. 
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   Chapter 7) Theologies of Disability  
 
7.1) Theology and Disability 
 
Disability is so much more than a medically diagnosed impairment, a social stigma, or 
political activism engaged in the fight against manifest injustice: it is an existential 
struggle. Foregrounding this personal struggle is theologically important because most 
people do not find disability disturbing in this deeper and more personal way... I write 
then for those who have for some reason found themselves forced genuinely to 
wrestle with disability. (Brock 2016, xvii) 
In the preceding chapters, I have sought to articulate what this experience of ‘wrestling’ is 
like for those of us whose lives are touched by disability in such a deep and more personal 
way. I have situated autism as a condition which is strongly shaped by social and political 
attitudes and policies towards disability, and yet which simultaneously defies many 
commonly held beliefs about what it means to be disabled. It is both rooted in the everyday 
reality of autistic lives, and yet it is invisible to the lives of others until it disrupts and 
subverts our social expectations of what is considered ‘normal behaviour.’ I have also 
articulated how these complex and conflicting sites of discourse significantly impact the lives 
of mothers caring for a child with autism. I have proposed that this distinct maternal 
experience is a particularly significant and generative area for theological reflection, and one 
which is currently troublingly silent. In what follows, I will explore how current theologies of 
disability attend to the complexity of these competing issues.  
Firstly, I will turn to liberation theologies of disability which draw on the socio-political 
models explored in chapter one to articulate a theology which offers resistance to oppressive 
and exclusionary theological structures. I will consider how autistic lives and the related 
experience of mothers can be informed by liberation theological approaches which resist the 
marginalisation and stigmatisation of individuals who do not fit normative ideals of 
personhood. Secondly, I will look to communitarian theologies of solidarity in examining 
their potential significance in informing a theological response which engages with the 
relational and interdependent nature of this maternal experience. I will then turn to emerging 
theologies which, whilst drawing on these pre-existing communitarian paradigms, seek to 
develop a theological response which specifically attends to the experience of autism. I will 
examine whether ‘autism specific’ theologies can be seen to offer an opportunity to develop 
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more nuanced and insightful theological reflection on the lives of those on the spectrum and 
those who love them.  
Lastly, I will present theologies which seek to re-frame our conception of personhood as 
situated on a spectrum of vulnerability and human limits. Here I will propose that such 
models have the potential to move beyond paradigms of inclusion and hospitality which 
arguably still function to situate disability as ‘other’; instead asserting that we are all, as 
embodied persons, defined by difference. While these modes remained closely associated 
with the body as the locus of reflection, I will argue that they, perhaps more significantly, 
subvert the damaging deficit models of disability identified by liberation theologies and move 
towards a model which more fully attends to the diversity and breadth of occluded lived 
experiences.  
7.2) Liberation Theologies: Stigma, Accessibility and Inclusion.  
 
A synthesis of Christian theology and socio-economic inquiry, liberation theologies emerged 
into prominence in the second half of the twentieth century, predominantly within a Roman 
Catholic Latin American context (Streck 2012, 526). Influenced by Catholic social teaching’s 
‘preferential option for the poor’, theologians such as Gustavo Guiterrez (1971, 1973) and 
Leonardo Boff (1985, 1993) proposed a shift to liberation theologies in response to issues of 
poverty and social injustice (Streck, 2012, 527). They have since been enthusiastically 
embraced in increasingly wider contexts (such as feminism and post-colonialism) as a form 
of theological thinking which particularly speaks to issues of oppression and marginalisation. 
In doing so, they position themselves as sites of resistance against structures of inequality 
(Eisland 1994, 28). Strongly influenced by the social model movement, liberation theologies 
similarly situate disability as a socially constructed discourse shaped by political and 
economic dimensions (Eisland 1994, 13; Betcher 2007, 11).  
In upholding a social minority perspective of disability, liberation theologies of disability 
draw on the themes above to assert that theology has a problematic relationship with 
disability in a number of respects. The first, at a fundamentally practical level, is that 
religious institutions can be a particularly inaccessible place for individuals with disabilities, 
both physically and organisationally (Macaskill 2019, 41). The second is that disability has 
been pathologised, particularly within the Christian tradition. It is often represented through 
‘personal tragedy models of disability’ in which bodily difference is considered something 
which defines an individual as ‘lesser’, ‘other’ or not ‘whole’ in their personhood (Eisland 
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1994, 92). Thirdly, these factors often coalesce into stigmatising attitudinal barriers to 
inclusion which (consciously or unconsciously) treat persons with disabilities as inferior or 
incapable (Swinton 2012, 444). As a consequence, disabled experience is not represented, 
and disabled voices are often silenced within theological contexts. Naming the absence of 
attention to the spiritual dimensions of people’s lives within contemporary disability studies 
(Creamer 2006, 78), liberation theologies of disability traverse the disciplinary boundaries 
between disability studies and theology.  
Liberation theologies of disability are often developed from the standpoint of an ‘insider 
perspective’ by those who occupy a body which, in one respect or another, has been defined 
as a site of difference. Drawing upon key emphases in disability studies, central concerns 
include issues of social recognition, accessibility and inclusion.  In challenging the lack of 
representation of disabled experience, such perspectives have offered alternative theological 
symbols which speak to their own lived experience. We have been challenged to imagine a 
God with Down’s Syndrome (Winston; 2003), a God who is blind (Hull, 2001) and a God 
who is ‘crippled’ (Lewis; 1982, Eisland 1994). Such representations seek to oppose the 
particular inaccessibility of religious symbols for disabled bodies, asserting the position that 
if ‘If God is disabled, then exclusive and excluding practices cannot be tolerated’ (Swinton 
2012, 446). Providing a re-imagining of the symbolic tradition which she considers has been 
historically misappropriated to the detriment of disabled lives, Nancy Eisland proposes:  
…that a liberatory theology of disability must create new images of wholeness as well 
as new discourses. Furthermore, the bodily rituals of stigmatization and exclusion that 
are a significant form of oppression of people with disabilities must be supplanted by 
bodily practices of ordinary inclusion (1994, 92). 
Eiesland here can be seen to echo feminist disability theorist Liz Crow in asserting that a 
recognition of the impaired body does not diminish the socio-cultural dimensions of 
oppression imposed on it (1996, 3).  
Asserting the moral obligation of Christian communities to challenge the social oppression of 
individuals with disabilities, liberation theologies of disability are particularly concerned with 
issues of access, challenging the Church to make their structures and organisations more 
physically and intellectually inclusive spaces (Block 2002, 21). However, as I have 
demonstrated in chapter one, notions of accessibility are typically based upon physical 
definitions of disability, evoking images of ramps, lifts etc. This is inherently problematic 
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when considering the experience of autism. In the context of the Church, the busyness of the 
environment and competing voices (in differing tones and registers) coalesce to present a 
significant sensory challenge for individuals with autism. Speaking of his own experience as 
a member of the Church who is also on the autism spectrum, Grant Macaskill maintains that 
churches could introduce many simple adaptations to improve the experience for individuals 
who find them inhospitable. The fact that they are often slow to do so, he asserts, 
demonstrates that practical problems of accessibility and inclusion can arguably be seen to be 
secondary to the Church’s attitudes towards difference (2019, 41).  
Liberation theologies which focus on disability highlight that within the Christian tradition, 
disabled bodies are often constructed as ‘deficient’ or ‘less valuable’ than non-disabled 
bodies. In her introduction to Nancy Eiesland’s ‘Disabled God’, Rebecca Chopp observes 
that despite the ‘astounding fact…that Christians do not have an able-bodied God as their 
primal image,’ (1994, 11), there remains a tendency to treat persons with disabilities with a 
mixture of pity, suspicion and aversion. Such positions assert that Christian theology has all 
too readily adopted normative secular, medical models of the body which exalt bodily 
perfection, and position the wounded, disabled or suffering body as deviant.  
Disability theorists and liberation theologians have critiqued the influence of dominant 
capitalist ideologies in defining the ideal body as one which is economically valuable. Sharon 
Betcher, although herself rejecting the label of liberation theology, shares similar concerns to 
the issues raised above and offers a particularly strong post-structuralist perspective on issues 
of disability. Preferring to designate her analysis as post-structural and post-colonial, Betcher 
argues that post-colonial paradigms offer a ‘pragmatic immediacy’ in their ability to resist the 
‘socio-political stigmatization’ of lives deemed economically un-valuable (2007, 4, 9). 
Drawing on Lennard Davis’s description of disability as an ‘economically generated 
category’(2002, 3), Betcher develops this position to suggest that the Church’s idealism of 
the normative body betrays acquiescence to dominant capitalist ideologies, as critiqued by 
Marxian and Weberian perspectives (2007, 12).  
Developing Rosemary Garland Thomson’s critique of modernity examined in chapter one, 
Betcher argues that parallel to the construction of the ideal body as a healthy body; modernity 
has also constructed a damaging paradigm of suffering, emptying it of meaning and 
positioning it as something to be eradicated or cured. Highlighting the influence of political 
ideologies in shaping dangerously oppressive social policies towards disability, Betcher’s 
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critique supports the observations I have made in chapter two; naming the very real and 
dangerous potential of normalcy to function as a form of social violence (2007, 160). As I 
have problematised, paradigms of suffering which rely on restoration, rehabilitation, and 
eradication present particular challenges in respect to life-long developmental conditions such 
as autism. Furthermore, they imply that autism is a condition which ought to be cured; which, 
for many, is a deeply hurtful rejection of something which is arguably inextricable to their 
personhood. 
Rather than providing a response to disability which relies on elements of the theological 
tradition, Betcher asserts that rather it is the issue of disability which has the potential to 
fundamentally shift our theological perspectives. She considers that issues of inequality and 
marginalisation, such as disability, challenge our assumptions about God and the nature of 
human personhood and suffering. Asking us to consider if there is a different way to be 
human which accounts for imperfection, she proposes that ‘cripping our figural maps may be 
among the ways to imagine a love of life which can cope with suffering, which will find 
beauty- beyond idealism- in the midst of life’ (2007, 21). This resonates strongly with the 
reflections presented in chapter six. In contrast to ‘personal tragedy’ perspectives which 
situate disability as a ‘problem’ requiring ‘response’; our accounts reflected that experience 
of autism opened us up to confronting our own, and others, expectations and beliefs on what 
it means to be valued.  
Betcher’s work, together with the liberation theologies explored above, represent a shift away 
from individual difference being considered counter-normative, towards a recognition that 
there are many different embodied lived experiences which require theological recognition. 
Such perspectives challenge our theological thinking, asking us to interrogate our own 
constructions of personhood and how these inform our theological convictions. Furthermore, 
they are particularly useful in highlighting the intersectionality of oppressive social, political, 
and economic forces at work in the creation and continuation of marginalised and occluded 
identities. Liberation theologies can therefore arguably be seen to offer a valuable lens 
through which to reflect on the lived experiences of mothers whose lives are shaped and 
constrained by their relationship to disability, and the oppressive structures and attitudes 
which function to stigmatise their experiences.  
It is worth noting that many of the theological perspectives explored above are proposed by 
individuals who are not traditional members of the theological guild. Both Eisland and Block 
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share a sociological background in disability studies, with an interest in the religious lives of 
the disabled (Creamer 2006, 88). Their interdisciplinary status arguably reinforces the lack of 
attention given to disability from within theology itself. Whilst their ‘theological credibility’ 
may be challenged as a consequence of this; I propose that rather in occupying these 
‘insider’/ ‘outside’ positions, such perspectives are in fact well placed to generate theological 
thinking out with the constraints of dominant theoretical frameworks (Goto 2018, 32).  
Swinton however, whilst acknowledging the socio-political dimensions of disability, is 
uneasy about the way in which theology might become too comfortable in merely responding 
to social issues. In contrast to Betcher, he considers that,  
… very often the conversation between social analysis and theology tends to move 
only one way: from the experience of disability toward changes in theology… 
theology simply responds to the insights of sociology. There is no clear theological 
voice which can effectively challenge the sociological analysis. The premises are set 
before the conversation begins (2012, 445). 
This research, in articulating a social problem requiring a theological response, could be 
subjected to this critique. I also come from an interdisciplinary background, and while I 
respect Swinton’s conviction that theology should develop its own voice, I suggest that his 
perspective assumes a theological a-historicity which neglects the multi-valency of our 
situated lives. Neither our lives, nor indeed our theological thinking, develop in a social 
historical vacuum. Rather, as I have articulated in chapter four, our social histories 
profoundly affect our social presents. Furthermore, this critique neglects that the ‘social 
analysis’ of disabilities developed throughout such theological positions does not merely 
stem from a sociological interest; but from the real, lived experiences of individuals whose 
lives have been touched by the very issues they seek to challenge.  
However, despite my reservations, I do share another of Swinton’s concerns in respect to 
exactly who counts as disabled in such theologies of disability (2012, 175). While I 
acknowledge the utility of liberation theologies of disability in articulating the interplay 
between socio-political discourses and disabled lives I have sought to identify in chapters one 
and two; I do so with an awareness that such theologies are themselves often shaped by the 
same dominant assumptions they seek to challenge by relying too heavily on essentialist 
constructions of disability rooted in the body. The theologies of accessibility articulated 
above propose a model of inclusion which, while promoting an acceptance of bodily 
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difference, arguably assume a universality in respect to intellectual capacity which neglects 
cognitive developmental conditions, such as autism (Swinton 2012, 177).  
Given that autism is characterised by difficulties in engaging in the social world neurotypical 
people take for granted, as Shakespeare and Watson problematise in chapter one, I propose 
that it is perhaps naïve to consider that we may be able to make the social world accessible 
for people with autism in the same way that we can make buildings accessible. In moving -
beyond paradigms of accessibility, perspectives such as Betcher’s propose that genuine 
inclusion may only be attained by changing the way in which people are educated and 
socialised to value each other through a radical and universal transformation in attitudes. 
However, Brian Brock counters the assumption that macro social solutions can ever address 
the challenges that disability raises, asserting that ‘all the ramps and lifts in the world are a 
poor substitute for open hearts’ (2019, 2). He proposes that a truly inclusive theological 
response requires both personal and communal transformation. In what follows, I will explore 
how a communitarian model, as proposed by Brock, may look to address these tensions.  
7.3) Communitarianism and Solidarity.  
 
Communitarian theologies respond to Brock’s challenge for attitudinal change by positioning 
the Church as being at the heart of a community which is responsive to and responsible for a 
compassionate bearing with one another’s burdens. Influenced by the work of Karl Barth in 
responding to times of social crises and fragmentation, communitarian models advocate a 
return to scripture as means of providing coherence and constancy (Graham et al, 2018; 88). 
Informed by canonical narrative theologies which position the bible as a means of providing 
the scripts which guide our actions, such an approach both re-constructs and re-affirms a 
coherent Christian identity which is not only rooted in faith but lived and enacted in acts of 
praxis shaped by uniquely Christian values (Hauerwas 1990, 55).  
Bringing together elements of liberation theologies which propose a commitment to 
challenging social injustice and marginalisation, and principles of Catholic social teaching 
which engage in the practice of mutual solidarity and compassionate obligation to one 
another; communitarian disability theologies highlight the revelatory potential of disabled 
lives in unsettling and challenging our perceptions of what a community of genuine 
acceptance should look like (Brock 2019, 137; Swinton 2012, 184). A communitarian model 
of disability must therefore foster the level of inclusion and acceptance which would 
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significantly challenge the stigma, judgement, and exclusion that I have shown colours the 
lives of mothers of children on the spectrum.  
The work of influential theological ethicist Stanley Hauerwas is foundational to the 
communitarian model’s response to issues of disability. In contrast to the liberation 
theologies outlined above, Hauerwas was particularly concerned to explore how the 
experience of individuals with cognitive and intellectual disabilities might shine a spotlight 
onto our communal moral character - revealing how we value persons with difference (2005, 
54). John Swinton, who develops the communitarian approach of Hauerwas, is also 
particularly concerned with how theology responds to intellectual conditions such as Down’s 
Syndrome (2003), Autism (2009, 2012) and dementia (2012). He has been particularly vocal 
in critiquing theologies of accessibility as concealing the dynamics of power at play in 
excluding individuals with cognitive difference, which I have problematised in the preceding 
section.   
Critiquing a secularised and ahistorical distinction between faith and ethics, Hauerwas, much 
like Betcher, considered that theology has traditionally drawn on principals of modernity 
which equated disability with suffering. Life-long developmental conditions (such as we 
could describe autism) thus present as particularly problematic, as they do not fit with the 
expectation that suffering is temporal. It is quite one thing, Hauerwas asserts, to be present 
and sympathetic with someone who is suffering for a few days or a few weeks; it is quite 
another to ‘be compassionate year in and year out’ (2001, 550). Naming the potential to 
misconstrue ‘pity’ as ‘compassion’, Swinton asserts that merely identifying as Christian does 
not inherently imbue individuals with the ability to offer genuine solidarity in the face of such 
perceived suffering (2003, 11). Rather, he affirms the need for a Christian identity which is 
actively engaged in the faithful practice of Christian community (2012, 187). Swinton 
proposes that a genuinely hospitable Christian community begins with the recognition that 
God provides us a blue-print for relationships formed out of equality, acceptance, and love 
(2003, 69).  In such a way, he is seeking a much deeper understanding of inclusion incarnated 
in committed communal life: 
It is therefore essential that rather than striving simply to do things for the 
intellectually disabled, we begin to learn what it might mean to genuinely be with 
them… through God's accepting, incarnated love…intellectually disabled people can 
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begin to discover that they have value, that they are loved, and that they in themselves 
are essentially loveable (1997, 19).  
In advocating unconditional acceptance over notions of accessibility, communitarian models 
of disability assert the revelatory potential of engaging in a caring relationship with another 
person without sympathy or expectation of reward (Nouwen 1997, 43). However, by their 
association with the taken for granted ‘everydayness’ of the domestic sphere, the potential of 
caring relationships as revealing genuine models of community are often overlooked. In 
contrast to theologies of disability which are often taken from the position of the disabled 
adult, Hauerwas considered that parents of children with disabilities reveal a distinctly 
valuable and formative example of the kind of compassionate hospitality a Christian 
community is called to bestow. He proposes that the uncritical acceptance demonstrated by 
this parental model can offer a blueprint for the kind of patient, loving presence he believes to 
be critical in bearing with sufferings which are ongoing, and from which no purpose or 
meaning can be drawn. De-legitimising the notion that any children, much less children with 
additional support needs, are the sole responsibility of the parents; this position reminds the 
Church of the real material implications and obligations of the promise offered in baptism 
(Hauerwas 2005, 58). 
Certainly, we mothers have all, at one time or another, considered how much lovelier life 
could be if others could demonstrate the same uncritical acceptance that we have developed 
for our children. And in situating the parental experience of disability as distinctly generative 
of theological thinking, Hauerwas’s model of communitarianism has significant implications 
for this research. In the first instance, it recognises the argument put forward in chapter five 
that the knowledge of mothers is a potential collaborative resource for professionals in both 
expediting diagnosis and in developing successful support strategies for children. Second, 
this position highlights that while parents are the primary source of care, they should not be 
the only source of care. I have proposed that attitudes which present parents, and in 
particularly mothers, as solely responsible for the development and behaviour of children 
place an undue burden of responsibility function to inhibit our ability to ask for support.  
However, although Hauerwas was arguably revolutionary in recognising the potential value 
of parental knowledge in respect to how we consider childhood disabilities; he uses the 
gender-neutral term ‘parents’ to describe what I have argued is a particularly gendered 
experience. In concluding chapter three, I have identified that caring for the needs of others, 
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particularly in respect to children and even more so when a child has additional support 
needs, is frequently ‘a mother’s burden.’ I have argued that the work of caring labour is most 
often disproportionately situated on women, who shoulder a weighty responsibility in 
ensuring that their children’s complex needs are met. Furthermore, the occlusion of women 
through the use of an apparently gender-neutral term leads us to a wider critique of 
Hauerwas’s thinking.  
Developing a feminist liberation critique of Hauerwas’s theology of communitarianism, 
Gloria Albrecht suggests that his particular model of the family is premised upon traditional 
archetypes in which ‘doing the hard work of sticking out a marriage without reflecting much 
on whether one is fulfilled,’ has particularly problematic implications for women (1995, 56).  
She contends that communitarian theologies often neglect the inherent structural inequalities 
and hierarchies within the Christian community and assume a universality of experience and 
character which, as Althaus-Reid  (2000, 18) and Goto (2018, 221) have identified, is often 
the experience of the white, Christian male. Building on such critiques, Nicholas Healey 
argues that such issues of epistemic privilege raises significant concerns as to the issue of 
authority in representing the voices of others within theology, proposing that Hauerwas’s 
confessional rhetoric utilises a sermon like approach which disguises its deeply exclusionary 
aspects. 
Hauerwas situates himself as an outsider to the issue of disability, and so his interest in the 
subject, out with the context his background in medical ethics, is unclear. Echoing criticisms 
Swinton has levelled at liberation theologies (2012, 175), Healey suggests Hauerwas appears 
to be merely arbitrarily appropriating a social issue to further his particular agenda of 
demonstrating the uniqueness of the Church as a moral community (2014, 5). Healey also 
shares Albrecht’s concerns in respect to what he considers Hauerwas’s universalisation of 
‘the Church’. Denominations in differing social locations and in differing points in history 
vary so considerably that there is arguably no such thing as a universally accepted ‘Church’ 
or indeed the Christian formed in this ecclesial context. Healey contends that,   
…Formation is not simply a product of enacting a given set of practices. Persons are 
also formed by their reflections, discussions, and decisions about which practices to 
enact and how, as well as by their inevitable confusion over such matters. Our 
characters are constructed as the products of ongoing negotiations, whether explicitly 
or entirely un-reflected or somewhere in between (2014, 95).  
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In this sense, communitarian models which position the paradigm of a ‘hospitable 
community’ as one which is distinctly and uniquely Christian arguably present an uncritically 
constructed notion of both ‘community’ and the Christian person. It could be argued that 
there is there is nothing particularly or distinctly ‘Christian’ in the ‘Christian character’ 
Hauerwas describes; in fact, many non-Christian people live similar lives with very similar 
values. For someone who themselves is outside this conception of ‘Church’, but who holds 
themselves accountable to many of the values Hauerwas purports to be exclusively Christian, 
I find this issue particularly problematic. 
I am, nevertheless, moved by (albeit arguably utopian) visions of a community which 
responds to the suffering of others by simply seeing and bearing with them. For parents, and 
particularly mothers, who often feel isolated and stigmatised by other’s attitudes towards 
autism, and exhausted by its daily realities, the old adage that ‘it takes a village to raise a 
child’ holds particular significance. Whilst that village may not, in reality, resemble 
Hauerwas’s vision of Church, it offers an important reminder that we ought not to be alone in 
our particular struggles. In the course of this research, I was asked what such a ‘community 
of solidarity and inclusion’ might look like for parents with autism. This, admittedly, gave me 
considerable pause for thought. My answer was perhaps frustratingly pessimistic.  
Whilst it would be tempting to imagine a community in which our responsibilities and 
burdens were shared and supported equally, without judgement or expectation; in reality, this 
still would not be sufficient to resolve the challenges we face or to make life easier for our 
children. It is often unfeasible for others to provide the kind of practical support that mothers 
of children on the spectrum could genuinely benefit from. Compassion is a great thing. On 
days when we feel particularly burdened, the knowledge that another recognises your 
struggle can be profoundly comforting. Such comfort, however, is arguably often fleeting 
when there is little respite from the struggle itself. In chapter five, Both Abigail and Scarlet 
described challenges in obtaining acceptance and support for their children’s conditions from 
within their own families, highlighting that even when ties are perceived to be fundamental 
and unconditional, they cannot always be counted upon to be so. In this sense, I question how 
members of a community of solidarity might ameliorate the irresolvable, conflicting, and 
deeply complex struggles of a lived experience that they themselves do not, and cannot, fully 
share. 
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7.4) Autism Theologies: Thinking differently, loving difference  
In situating this research, I have proposed that the ambiguity and lack of understanding in 
relation to autism has led it to be an issue which is largely occluded theologically, and which 
has also left mothers theologically silent. Although still woefully few, theologies which 
attend to the specificity of autism as a lived experience which is generative for theological 
thinking are beginning to emerge. These perspectives can largely be seen to draw from the 
preceding theological models. Viewing autism from perspectives of accessibility (as in the 
liberation model) they are nevertheless more deeply informed by communitarian theologies. 
As I have shown these emphasise themes of inclusion and hospitality to dispel the assumption 
that autism must be socially isolating by highlighting the potential contribution individuals 
with autism can make to the church community. The models I will explore below focus upon 
three particular ‘communitarian’ themes: inclusion, acceptance, and love.  
Theologians such as John Gillibrand (2009), Tom Reynolds (2008) and Brian Brock (2019) 
have drawn on their own lived experiences to articulate the theological tension provoked by 
having a child with autism, challenging the Christian community to see their children through 
their eyes. Speaking of the stigmatisation he has experienced in parenting a son with both 
Down’s Syndrome and autism, Brian Brock admits that ‘at the deepest level, and behind 
these more mundane hopes, I can hope to enjoy Adam. I hope that others, too will… say with 
unfeigned sincerity: ‘I’m glad you’re here.’ (2019, 193). Proposing a response which 
attempts to bridge the experiential gap between the neurotypical and the neuro-diverse 
without attempting to normalise or paternalise autistic difference, Brock considers that 
greater understanding and empathy, rather than an attempt to ‘think autistically,’ make our 
communities a less hostile and judgemental place for families with autism (2019, 193).  
Echoing the views explored in the preceding section, this approach emphasises that an 
attention to how someone orientates their lives around the needs of another can provide a 
deep and challenging theological reminder of our responsibility to welcome one another with 
compassionate hospitality (Reynolds 2008, 42). Developing this position, Tom Reynolds 
considers that theologies which offer true inclusion must acknowledge that  rather than 
weakness, the vulnerability revealed by conditions such as autism highlights our mutual 
dependence, challenging us to find new ways of forming strong and loving connections with 
one another (2008, 118). Interestingly, the contributions to theologies of autism explored 
above have come from fathers who themselves have children on the autism spectrum. This 
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supports my assertion, and affirms Hauerwas’s position, that the lived experience of parents 
can afford significant potential in generating theological insights into disability generally, and 
autism specifically. 
Approaching this from a rare ‘insider perspective’ as a person with autism in the Church,  
Grant Macaskill supports Reynold’s theological model of vulnerability, appealing to a 
Pauline paradigm of human frailty which affirms the value of weakness and responds to it 
with love (2019, 186). Drawing together the threads of acceptance and hospitality identified 
above, he considers that true acceptance of difference might require neurotypical individuals 
to sometimes adapt to the person with autism’s way of being in and seeing the world, 
proposing a theology of ‘accommodative love’ (2019, 118). A commitment to remembering 
and anticipating the minutia of specific needs and wants a child with autism may have, 
whether that be, as I described, the right socks, or as Naomi shared, the correct yoghurt, 
demonstrates, I would argue, a praxis of loving attention which strongly resonates with 
Macaskill’s model of  ‘accommodative love.’ Arguably, it is this kind of adaptive love which 
enables mothers and care givers to continue in the daily and often seemingly insurmountable 
challenges they face. 
Reinforcing Macaskill’s position that loving acceptance requires a sincere and genuine 
willingness to consider and adapt to another’s ways of thinking, Swinton utilises Christine 
Guth’s Article ‘Horses live to run…’ to highlight that ‘accommodative love’ often requires a 
self-critical shift in perceptions. Articulating Christine’s experience of coming to the 
revelation that for her autistic and apparently ‘unloving’ husband, love was displayed in the 
seemingly inconsequential realities of daily routines, he observes that Christine was forced to 
confront her assumptions of what love actually is. He asserts that how we love one another 
can inform how we come to think of the love of God, 
To love God is to live a life that is routine and ordered. To love one another is to 
make sure that each night at exactly the same time you will sit down and have a 
conversation about the day; a wilful conversation that reflects a wilful form of love 
(it’s good that you exist; I’m glad that you are here) that is ordered and predictable 
and within which no offence is caused. Love is a form of action and a mode of routine 
(2014, 268). 
Problematising Christianity’s reliance upon Western cultural constructs of ‘romantic love’ as 
incompatible with images of individuals with autism as un-empathetic, undemonstrative and 
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unfeeling; Swinton draws on Christine’s narrative to challenge us to ‘think autistically’ by 
self-critically examining our own normative constructions of abstract concepts such as ‘love’ 
(2014, 269). 
However, whilst I support Swinton’s critique of commonly held assumptions in respect to 
autistic individual’s capacities for emotion, I find his own schemas of love to be similarly 
uncritically constructed. I would argue that Swinton not only generalises neurotypical love as 
being overly romantic and sentimentalised but also overgeneralises autistic love as being 
merely practical and un-intuitive. Swinton’s model of theological response to disability 
generally and autism specifically seems to over rely on the simplistic promise that ‘God is 
love.’ Irrespective of whether the subject is Down’s syndrome or autism, Swinton very often 
begins with insightful and nuanced criticisms of contemporary challenges to disability yet 
ends with very uncritical and essentialist proclamations of Christian love. I find that his 
conclusions also echo the rhetorical tone of Hauerwas’s work which Healey finds deeply 
troubling, in that it asserts a liturgical authority which theological academic research typically 
does not, nor should have (2016, 64).  
Although arguably making strides in bringing autism into theological conversation, I propose 
that current theologies which draw on autistic experience rely too heavily on pre-existing 
theologies of disability, thus replicating the same issues and limitations of these models. The 
theologies of autism examined here are similarly problematically constructed in ways which 
accentuate unhelpful constructions of difference.  In the following section, I will look to 
theologies of limits as proposing a paradigm of personhood which perhaps more closely 
attends to the reality of the experience I am seeking to reflect upon. 
7.5) Towards A theology of Limits; Vulnerability and Human Suffering.  
 
In previous chapters, I have charted how definitions of autism have been expanded in recent 
years towards a more inclusive and diverse ‘spectrum’ model of difference, which seek to 
move away from limited and medicalised paradigms of difference. Whilst the communitarian 
and liberation perspectives explored are similarly critical of medical paradigms of disability, I 
have suggested that they do, albeit tacitly, also rely on constructions of difference as a 
starting point from which to respond. In contrast, emerging theologies which propose a 
‘spectrum model’ of human experience are arguably more responsive to the issues of 
accessibility and inclusion. This theological turn positions that human beings, all human 
beings, are situated on a spectrum of ‘limits’ to their lived experience; with some limits, such 
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as the limits presented by impairment, more profound than others. Swinton observes that 
while ‘liberationist theologies focus on empowerment through political participation; this 
group of theologies focus on revelation through the recognition of shared weakness’ (2012, 
448).  
Critiquing liberation models as too narrowly concerned with definitions of disability which 
both rely on difference, theologies of limits affirm the position that disability is no one thing. 
Reinforcing the tenuousness of disability as a category of difference, Deborah Creamer 
argues that the likelihood is that we all, at some point in our lives, will experience limitations 
on our physical health (2008, 96).  Rather than a deficit, this perspective situates limits as a 
natural, neutral, and intrinsic part of our human nature. In contrast to constructions of 
disability as bodily difference, a theology of limits ‘emphasizes a characteristic of humanity-
one has limits…rather than being an array of unfortunate alternatives to omnipotence, (limits) 
are an unsurprising characteristic of human nature (2008, 94). This, Creamer suggests, offers 
us an understanding of human limits which allows us a more positive way of being, 
proposing that ‘our limits need not (and ought not) seen as negative…rather, they are an 
important part of being human’ (2008, 64).  
Developing Creamer’s position, Shelly Rambo proposes a theological recognition of 
embodiment in respect to human limits in attending to what she describes as ‘wounded 
bodies.’ Whilst the use of this term suggests a similarly physically orientated stance to the 
those already critiqued, Rambo instead utilises this term hermeneutically as a descriptive 
category for lived, embodied experience; encompassing psychological and emotional trauma 
and suffering as well as embodied experiences of illness and impairment. By reframing 
‘wounds’ in such a way that does not neatly fit within traditional paradigms of physicality or 
‘healing,’ she acknowledges the potential of ‘multiple traumas’; observing that struggles are 
often compounded by many different, sometimes competing, social forces and experiences 
(2010, 145). She proposes that theodicies which imply restoration or resolution from trauma 
neglect the cyclical, ongoing, and enduring nature of struggles which are ‘lived with’ and 
‘without end’ (2010, 15). Rambo’s work can be seen to offer potential release from the 
oppressive normative structures of tradition explored above which neglect the ‘ongoingness’ 
and ‘everydayness’ of suffering as simply part of our normal human lives. 
Acceptance of human limits as advocated by Creamer and Rambo thus challenges the 
enduring and damaging theological schemas which consider suffering as some form of divine 
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punishment. We are all arguably guilty of attempting to find theodical justifications for our 
experiences. I found myself profoundly moved when Abigail reflected on one particularly 
difficult moment, in which her son questioned why God made him autistic. This reminded me 
of a tearful conversation in which I asked my mother a similar question. ‘Is he being 
punished because of me? Am I being punished? Why us?’ My mother, who knew such 
things, replied, ‘My darling, God knows what we can handle. And he knew that you are the 
only person in the world who could handle him.’ Abigail responded to her son with similarly 
tender pragmatism, ‘Because son, God has put you with a family that he knows can support 
you. Somebody in this world has got to have autism, sweetheart, it might as well be someone 
who can be supported and loved through it.’ These insightful women unwittingly affirmed 
Rambo and Creamer’s position that while there is no answer to the question of suffering, we 
can address this within a perspective that takes cognisance of human, and also divine, 
potentialities and limits. In acknowledging the limits of both our personhood and of the 
divine, such a perspective opens up the potential for more fluid and diverse modes of 
theological reflection:   
Rather than thinking of limits solely in a negative sense (what we, or what God, 
cannot do), this perspective offers alternatives for thinking about boundaries and 
possibilities. In an age of war, terrorism, economic injustice, and environmental risk, 
a recognition and theological affirmation of limits seems more responsible than 
apathy or omnipotent control and offers a perspective that can lead to hopeful 
possibilities of perseverance, strength, creativity, and honest engagement with the self 
and the other (Creamer 2008, 113). 
Theologies which acknowledge our human limits, and the often theologically irreconcilable 
nature of struggle and suffering as part of our human experience, arguably offer a more 
holistic and realistic model of inclusion than the paradigms of disability explored previously. 
Furthermore, they are particularly useful in generating new theological thinking which 
helpfully re-frames our relationship to God in a way which ‘not only offers corrective 
guidelines to established theologies but also itself raises new theological possibilities’ 
(Creamer 2008, 78). I am thus drawn towards a theology which offers a recognition that 
autism ‘is what it is’ and not some divine form of punishment or moral challenge to learn 
through difficulty.  In the preceding chapter, I have articulated that such pragmatic 
acceptance is crucial to a mother’s ability to cope with and respond to the challenges of their 
lived experience. Instead of looking to faith to provide explanations or solutions such an 
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approach suggests that perhaps God rather gifts us with the theological wisdom we need to 
deal with the suffering and unresolvedness that comes from being human. 
7.6) Summary  
 
In this chapter, I have considered the utility of disability theologies in responding to the 
challenges mothers face in navigating their children’s autism. I have demonstrated the 
usefulness of liberation theologies of disability in highlighting the stigmatising impact of 
discourses of normalcy on the lives of those who do not fit within these parameters. I have 
considered the work of Shelley Rambo, Deborah Creamer and, with some reservations, 
Stanley Hauerwas as useful in articulating lived experiences of struggle which do not neatly 
fit within the confines of physical impairment. In contrast to other theological models of 
disability, theologies of limits arguably resonate more strongly with autism as an invisible 
condition, situated on a spectrum of difference.  
I have highlighted the utility of theological contributions which attend to issues of inclusion 
by advocating loving acceptance, recognising the particular potential of theologies which 
acknowledge the significance of familial care giving as a profoundly generative means of 
theological reflection. However, I suggest that these models continue to exclude mothers 
from the theological conversation. I contend that mothers show remarkable and distinctly 
resilient forms of loving beyond the communitarian models examined in this chapter, which 
can arguably be considered revelatory and liberatory in praxis. In the following chapter, I will 
situate the theological challenge revealed within this research as being a distinct form of 
maternal experience rooted in everyday struggle, and consider this within current theologies 
which attend to the maternal and the everyday as generative sources of epistemic value. 
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Chapter 8) Mothers ‘in the struggle’ 
 
What has emerged from this research is a distinct and complex lived experience which 
presents an equally complex and distinct theological challenge. In sharing our stories, it was 
revealed that mothers are facing unusual and particular struggles in their experience of 
mothering children on the autism spectrum, shaped by complex and often conflicting social 
and political discourses on disability. The sources of the maternal struggle I have illuminated 
throughout this thesis are inter-relational, woven on both the personal and the societal level.  
Individuals with autism and their families are undoubtedly disadvantaged socially, 
economically and suffer from intense stigma and marginalisation. Viewed against the 
backdrop of material inequality and social policies which fail to respond to our pressing need 
for services, it would have been tempting to situate this thesis within a liberationist 
theological reflection. Liberation theologies, as I have explored, offer a particular resistance 
to oppression. 
My participants, and I suppose, myself, in writing this thesis, actively participate in acts of 
resistive and liberatory praxis every day. These women are advocates, researchers, 
campaigners, educators. They are arguably making more strides in liberatory praxis in the 
everyday realities of negotiating their children’s curriculum and access to activities, clubs and 
churches within their community than my academic exercise in presenting their stories could 
ever hope to achieve. At the same time, these efforts are approached with a heavy measure of 
pragmatism. We are winning small battles for own children, sharing battle tactics and 
knowledge so that other children may benefit. However, the macro-structures which shape 
and contribute to our struggles are so complex and over-arching at a societal level that it 
would be naïve and idealistic to believe that we are likely to see considerable, meaningful 
change within the fleetingly short span of our children’s childhoods. Thus, our experiences 
cannot not simply be reduced to that of socio-political marginalisation. These social forces 
undoubtedly shaped our experience of struggle; yet we were also profoundly affected by our 
daily realities of mothering, in the unrelenting ‘little stuff’ which we know will re-start, 
cyclically and ceaselessly, day after day.   
While the theologies of disability explored in the preceding chapter could be seen to attend to 
some of these issues; I found that such theologies did not attend to everyday lived experience, 
nor to the intersectionality of the competing social discourses which affected our everyday 
lives. Mothers, I have argued, are most typically the primary care givers of children 
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generally, and atypical children particularly. Thus, I consider the absence of attention to 
maternal experience within disability theology to be peculiar at best and at worst, a missed 
theological opportunity. I propose that the distinct experience of mothers of children on the 
spectrum is one which is even more significantly occluded from research, yet one which has 
the potential to provoke a particularly new and insightful form of theological thinking. The 
question then arises, what is distinct about the particular experience of maternal struggle 
which I have revealed, and how do we respond to it theologically? This has proven to be 
more challenging than the question I initially expected to answer.  
While considering this issue my son asked me, with learned thoughtfulness, ‘What bit are you 
working on now, Mama?’ ‘Struggle,’ I sighed, contemplatively. ‘How are you getting on?’ he 
asked. I laughed. ‘I’m struggling.’ He paused for a moment. This pause invariably means one 
of two things from an eleven-year old boy- he is considering whether or not this is interesting 
enough to him to pursue the conversation, or he is choosing an appropriate social response to 
bring me some measure of comfort in my admission. Eventually he also sighed. ‘Well. You 
see the irony here.’ Who says autists do not understand abstract concepts?  
In the course of our lives, I would anticipate that we have all, at one point or another, 
considered ourselves ‘Pues, ahi, en la lucha’ , or ‘in the struggle’ when asked how we are 
doing (Isasi-Díaz 2004a, 229). The mothers in this thesis have all, at one point or another, 
been told ‘I don’t know how you do it,’ upon our answer. This is problematic in a number of 
ways. It is a closed question- or rather, it is a statement, rather than a question. It leaves little 
opportunity to respond. It asserts, I know nothing of your struggle, but also shuts down the 
invitation to share it with me. It is, I assume, intended to convey a recognition of our struggle 
but also our resilience. However, this presents a simplistic kind of sympathy, which is, 
oftentimes, experienced more as pity than empathy. And so, in response to those who 
exclaim; I don’t know how you do it! this thesis has sought to find a way to tell you. 
As mothers of children on the autism spectrum, in the course of sharing our lived experiences 
with one another, we all laughed and cried with one another when considering this question; 
we could all agree that we were, quite simply, struggling. It also became alarmingly clear that 
while at a surface level literature alluded to autism as presenting ‘unique challenges’ to daily 
living, these challenges were often listed arbitrarily, with very little critical examination of 
how such challenges are really lived and experienced for mothers. In what follows, I will 
explore this lived experience within the context of feminist theologies which acknowledge 
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the significance of motherhood as a profound source of epistemic value, before considering 
the contribution of theologies which attend to the complexity of struggles which are rooted in 
the seemingly mundane practice of everyday living. In shifting away from theologies of 
disability, towards theologies which attend to women’s lived experience, I will examine 
whether such theologies may be better placed to offer a more nuanced response to the 
particularity of the lived experiences which have emerged within this thesis as a distinct form 
of maternal struggle.   
Maternal Thinking: A neglected source of knowledge 
 
Feminist theory, in the fields of psychology, sociology, and theology have contributed 
extensively in highlighting that mothers experience struggle in way that is distinctive to 
women, and often as a consequence of their simply being women (Miller-McLemore; 1994, 
Butler; 1999, Althaus-Reid; 2000, Rich; 1976). Dominant discourses which romanticise the 
experience of motherhood as something biological, natural and altruistic have caused the 
conflicts of mothering to be silenced, hidden, and neglected from any real critical inquiry. 
Perhaps more significantly, mothers struggle against an insidiously dominant discourse which 
suggests that women who experience struggle in their motherhood are somehow ‘anti-
woman’, unnatural, and uncredible. We are unreliable witnesses to our own testimony (Bons-
Storm 1996, 18).  
In the preceding pages, I have articulated an experience of mothers which is similarly and 
dangerously silenced.  We were all too often as mothers conflicted by the traditional 
narratives of what motherhood is assumed to be, in contrast to the reality of motherhood as 
we truly live it. I have caught glimpses of myself and others on the pages of Adrienne Rich 
(1976), Riet Bons Storm (1996) and Bonnie Miller-McLemore (1994) as they bravely 
revealed the unthinkable, much less nameable- that mothers are not always brimming with 
love and patience and utterly fulfilled by their children; but rather are often conflicted, 
exhausted, and drained from the ceaseless demands and expectations of motherhood. I have 
admitted my own complicity in this silence by being reluctant to share how overwhelmed and 
exhausted I have often felt in my role as a mother. Adrienne Rich, writing candidly on the 
physical and emotional toll of motherhood asks us,  
What woman, in the solitary confinement of a life at home enclosed with young 
children, or in the struggle to mother them while providing for them single-handedly, 
 
 
137 
 
or in the conflict of weighing her own personhood against the dogma that says she is a 
mother, first, last, and always—what woman has not dreamed of going over the edge, 
of simply letting go, relinquishing what is termed her sanity so that she can be taken 
care of for once, or can simply find a way to take care of herself?  (1977, 279) 
This evocative account can be seen to resonate strongly with the issues raised in chapter six; 
for mothers of children with autism, caring demands are exhaustive, unrelenting, and leave 
little time for considerations of mother’s own well-being. Echoing the incongruity Nicholas 
et al note between motherhood and a ‘job with delineated hours’ (2016, 926), Clare Wolfteich 
rejects the popular assumption that maternal conflicts lie in the ‘balance’ between work and 
motherhood. Drawing on Patricia Hill Collins’ term ‘motherwork’, she asserts that only when 
we acknowledge ‘mothering as work and to mothering in relationship to other spheres of 
women’s labour’ will we begin to see that women’s roles are interconnected and often 
indivisible (2017, 6). Whilst Wolfteich contends that Rich ‘speaks over women who may 
interpret mothering in terms of sacrality, vocation, or empowerment’, she notes that 
‘mothering can be a site of oppression and/or freedom, suffering and/or fulfilment,’ and that 
these conflicts are currently occluded theologically (2017, 141; 145).  
Where such conflicts are attended to, Bonnie Miller-McLemore suggests that they often draw 
from unhelpful theologies of ‘agape’ or ‘altruistic love,’ which harmfully reinforce unrealistic 
representations and expectations of maternal experience (1994, 102).  Such theologies of 
motherhood portray women as adopting their child-rearing responsibilities with a self-
sacrificing commitment and seemingly limitless love for their children; however, in reality, 
this is by no means a natural state and by no means a constant state of being. In chapter 
seven, I shared my unease at academic attempts to ‘theologise’ love, particularly when such 
attempts may provoke universalised and unhelpful stereotypes of loving. Mothers, like 
anyone else, lose patience. We become tired, at times we may even feel overwhelmed and 
resentful of the demands of our children. Presenting mothers as endless and virtuously giving, 
Bons-Storm asserts, creates a dangerous expectation on mother’s abilities to continue to give 
beyond their means,  
Most women are rightly convinced that many persons around them are in need of 
kindness and loving care. So they give it. Only there is no limit to the giving. To stop 
or to limit the caring and giving would mean to stop playing a role that is seen as their 
destiny as women (1990, 61).  
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In the preceding chapters, I have highlighted that in respect to autism, such damaging and 
unhelpful stereotypes of mothers as virtuously giving have simultaneously functioned to 
inhibit research into autism itself by laying blame with unaffectionate mothers, and also 
significantly impacted mother’s ability to voice the struggles and challenges of their 
experiences in fear of being considered ‘not loving enough.’ Miller McLemore proposes that 
such theologies also support the perception that self-sacrificing love is what is necessarily 
distinct about mothers and their abilities (1994, 104). In the preceding reflection, I have 
described an encounter with a support agency which could arguably be seen to be shaped by 
this very misconception. The belief that mothers can, not least should, be able to manage 
whatever challenges their children present stoically and without complaint can in very real 
terms be seen to continue to shape provision of support at an institutional level for mothers of 
children with autism.  
I have articulated that the women I spoke with felt very strongly that their thoughts and value 
as mothers were respectively ignored, neglected, or discounted by the professionals tasked 
with supporting them.  Despite mothers’ intimate knowledge of and creative engagement 
with our children’s needs arguably being the best source of ‘raw data’  practitioners could 
utilise during diagnostic and intervention processes and would arguably function to expedite 
and simplify processes which are currently arduous, complex and protracted; sadly Kanner’s 
legacy lives on, and there often remains a distinct disconnect between the contribution of the 
parent, and the perceived authority of professionals in assessing diagnosis and providing 
support (Claiborne-Park 2000, 179). These insights also have the potential to reshape social 
visions.  
Mothers, by virtue of their conflicting demands, have had to develop ways of thinking and 
acting which are anticipatory and creative, immediately balancing the needs of the now with 
the consequences for the future. In ‘Maternal Thinking: Towards a politics of peace,’ Sarah 
Ruddick contends that in fact what is distinct about mothers is that they possess a unique and 
generative way of thinking that has the potential to offer very real profound insight on socio-
political issues (Ruddick 1994, 20). The variously creative and pre-emptive tactics which 
mothers of children with autism can be seen to employ our efforts to maintain our children’s 
well-being arguably demonstrate precisely the kind of anticipatory and adaptive thinking that 
Ruddick exemplifies. These tactics, whilst every day in practice and nature, are often also 
tacitly employed in provoking ‘resistance’ to standardised models of learning and support 
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provision which do not accommodate our children’s various, and varying, needs. Heather 
Walton reminds us that,  
While a romance still exists as to the nature of maternal care it will be impossible to 
address the dilemmas women face…To recognise that these uneasy, painful relations 
are ones in which powerful emotional force is located is to begin to understand that 
they are possible sites from which to engage in the project of political transformation 
(2001, 9).  
Motherhood is not a role which one can easily abdicate. I would suggest that even when 
women do, they are nonetheless irrevocably changed by having been a mother. I have sought 
to demonstrate that mothers, much like is assumed of those on the spectrum, think differently. 
As Nicholas et al highlighted in chapter four, the needs of our children pervasively and 
unrelentingly shape our thinking. However, in contrast to personal tragedy models of 
disability, I propose that whilst the distinct forms of maternal practice outlined above can 
arguably be described as forms of ‘struggle’ in a woman’s daily life and thoughts; mothers 
can also be shown to draw significant strength from and uniquely respond to these struggles 
in a way which is distinctly generative and meaning making. As Miller-McLemore asserts, 
‘we are most alive when passionately engaged in life’s struggle, not when reflectively 
detached… The academy does not usually understand this creative generative tension. A 
mother might’ (1994, 142). 
The Everyday: a site of struggle and resistance.  
 
Being ‘passionately engaged in life’s struggle’ is very often most strongly enacted in the 
‘everydayness’ of life as we live it. The experiences of myself and the other women who 
have shared their stories have highlighted that our struggles are most often fought day to day. 
Whilst we are acutely aware of the ‘bigger picture’ in respect to school placements, 
continuing access to resources, and the impending reality of ‘aging’ out of support 
provision28; these larger issues are often forced to be peripheral to the intricacy and 
immediacy of the daily planning required to be responsive to our children’s needs. I have 
demonstrated that for mothers of children on the spectrum, even seemingly inconsequential 
everyday acts such as dressing, or remembering to buy the right yoghurt, can have profound 
significance and meaning for our children, and by extension, ourselves. I have described the 
 
28 Children’s support services are typically withdrawn once an individual reaches the age of 18.  
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myriad of ways in which autism symptomology plays out in the taken for granted spheres of 
‘normal’ daily living; from eating and sleeping to speaking and hearing. It is invisible, yet 
tangibly pervasive in the ways in which it manifests in everyday life, and distinctly 
problematic when considered in respect to theologies of inclusion and adaptation.  
In ‘Mujerista Theology’, Ada María Isasi-Díaz reflects on a seemingly inconsequential 
moment at a bus stop with a young mother. Díaz observed that the woman’s son was smartly 
dressed and appeared clean, healthy and well cared for. In contrast, the mother was visibly 
exhausted, dishevelled, holding a take-away coffee and a doughnut that was likely her 
breakfast. Whilst many would have merely glanced at the duo and moved on, Díaz was struck 
by the many conflicting decisions that woman likely had to make that morning (2011, 52). 
Was she drinking take away coffee because her income did not allow for the luxury of buying 
enough groceries for her to eat breakfast at home? Had they only enough water to wash her 
son and his clothes? Is she exhausted from the competing demands of working to support 
him, and being present enough to meet his needs?  
Isasi-Díaz’s observation echoes the difficult and unseen challenges shared by Naomi and I. 
Our mornings were dictated by a myriad of seemingly tiny decisions and battles which had to 
be waged to simply get our children to school. The ‘dailiness’ of our lives were significant 
sources of struggle that were peculiar to our particular context. In this sense, we were keenly 
aware of the reality that Isasi-Díaz goes on to admit; that she, much like the other mothers at 
the school gate, occupied a position of privilege in which mornings were easy, and tough 
decisions simply didn’t have to be made (2011, 55). Isasi-Díaz affirms that while we can 
often be seen to struggle from the effects of forces from above, the reality of such struggles 
cannot be detached from the seemingly unremarkable practices of everyday life. The ‘big 
stuff’, she contends, affects the ‘little stuff’, but it is the ‘little stuff’ which can often feel the 
biggest struggle.  
Yet the everyday is not simply a site of struggle, it is also a site of resistance. The liberatory 
potential of the everyday has been developed by feminist theologians who critique traditional 
theologies neglection of ‘the personal sphere’ for its potential to shape and transform social, 
political, and theological praxis (Isasi Díaz, 2004, 67; Walton 2014, 9; Miller-McLemore, 
1994, 142). Describing such everyday acts as ‘tactics’, De Certeau furthers that even when 
we are engaged in practices which are seemingly routine and unconscious, we are often 
actively engaged in small but profoundly significant acts of resistance against dominant 
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socio-political discourses (1988, xvii). De Certeau proposes that whilst seemingly 
unremarkable or habitual practices such as walking or the creation of a meal have been 
discarded as trivial by analytic enquiry, they can in fact be shown to be poetic forms of 
making which demonstrate creativity and agency in the ‘everyday struggles and pleasures’ of 
our daily living (1988, xx). Attention to the everyday, particularly the everyday lived 
maternal experience of a condition such as autism which so significantly and profoundly 
affects daily living demands a recognition that life is messy. It is complex. It is shaped by 
social, political, and theological discourses which are interwoven into knots impossible to 
detangle. Theologies which attend to the liberatory potential of the ‘everydayness’ of struggle 
offer an important insight into the complexity of such lived experiences. 
Developing this from a post-colonial feminist perspective, Ada Isasi-Díaz affirms the 
liberatory potential of lived experiences of everyday struggle as vital theological source 
(2004; 2011). Critiquing dominant theological paradigms which position struggle as a form 
of suffering, Isasi-Díaz develops a theological response which re-envisions struggle as an 
active, resistive way of living which she describes as ‘en la lucha’ (being in the struggle) 
(2004a, 229). In this sense, ‘en la lucha’ rather ‘represents a statement about survival, a 
comment on economic and social circumstances, a comment on coping and perseverance, and 
contains seeds of a commitment to be engaged, to be in struggle’ (Schussler-Fiorenza 1996, 
339). Central to Isasi-Díaz’s theology of struggle is the concept of ‘Lo cotidiano’. While she 
utilises this in various contexts to convey different meanings, ‘Lo cotidiano’ broadly 
describes a process of active, ongoing participation in the choices, tactics, and conversations 
(Latina) women engage in an everyday politics of resistance. It refers to the ‘stuff’ of 
Hispanic women’s daily lives; their shared but not common choices, practices, and 
understandings; complex, transitory, and formed in the struggles of everyday life (Isasi-Díaz, 
2004, 67).  
As I have raised in chapter four, parallels can be drawn from Isasi-Díaz’s notion of ‘shared 
but not common’ experience and the lived experience of the mothers in this thesis (2004a, 
142) Whilst the struggles which emerged can be seen to be shared, they are experienced and 
resisted in different ways. This holds particular resonance for the lives of mothers who are 
waging daily battles to obtain social support, fair healthcare outcomes, and inclusive 
education for their autistic children; and yet also battling the inconsistency and relentlessness 
of a daily life shaped by sensory overloads and disrupted sleep patterns. In chapters five and 
six, I have noted that whilst the unusual challenges of our children’s daily routines and habits 
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can be a significance source of struggle, mothers of children on the spectrum often develop 
creative ways of engaging with this this struggle which resist the potential for overwhelment.  
It must be noted, however that Isasi-Díaz’s theology of lo cotidiano was developed in 
response to the particularities of the struggles of Hispanic women. Kwok Pui Lan questions 
whether by affirming this specificity, Isasi-Díaz’s insights can really be translated to other 
contexts (2011, 35). Thus, I am cautious of the potential dangers of co-opting or colonising 
the experiences of others to suit a methodological ends (Goto 2018, 28) Kwok raises an 
important observation. Although Isasi-Díaz, as a Cuban-American woman, situates herself 
within her own particular research context, her reflection above highlights that even within a 
perceived ‘community’ the experiences of those within that community may be more unequal 
than equal. In my methodology chapter, I have problematised the issue of authority in being 
able to speak to experiences which are like our own, yet also not our own. In responding to 
Isasi-Díaz Kwok asks, how can we, as academics, authentically speak to the experiences of 
others, particularly when the voices of those others resist our theological scripts? (2011, 35).  
As researcher, much like Isasi-Díaz, I am within the community of women I am seeking to 
research. While I came to this research with an understanding of many of the issues which 
might emerge, my knowledge of these issues could not assume exactly what they might 
reveal for my research. My participants were similar to me in many ways, speaking of 
struggles I knew all too well. However, their experiences were distinct from my own in many 
ways too. One such way was that they all had more than one child. This does not, in of itself, 
appear very significant. Nor did it to me. However, in considering my own experience, and 
questioning what might be different about the voices I am seeking to represent, it became 
particularly meaningful. 
In reflecting on their shared stories, it was evident that certain aspects of their motherhood 
experience differed considerably between their children. The differences were often subtle; 
however, it was clear that mothering a child with autism involved considerably more time 
demands, thought, physical effort, and financial consequences. What has been revelatory to 
me is that I myself had until recently (and admittedly naively) considered the daily struggles I 
experienced as rooted in the experience of mothering generally, rather than mothering with 
autism, specifically. In reflecting on these subtle, yet significant differences, I suggest that 
while mothering with autism embodies many aspects of maternal struggle I have explored in 
this chapter, these challenges are magnified by their relationship to autism. This positions the 
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experience of mothering a child on the autism spectrum as a distinctly amplified and intense 
form of maternal struggle, and one which is not attended to within current theologies of 
motherhood.  
Summary 
 
In this chapter I have critiqued the reluctance of theology to fully engage with mothers as an 
important and generative source of theological reflection, articulating an experience of 
motherhood which defies incorporation into the dominant ideological paradigms of 
‘traditional motherhood.’ I have considered how theologies which attend to issues of struggle 
in everyday contexts can speak to the experience of mothers whose lives are shaped by 
struggles which are disregarded as seemingly mundane and unremarkable, yet which 
significantly inform their choices, practices, and experiences of living. What is particular 
about the lived experiences which have emerged in this research is that they are doubly 
constrained by both dominant discourses of disability and dominant discourses of 
motherhood, and yet do not fit neatly within either. In the same way that I have considered 
theologies of disability neglected the experience of mothers, so too have theologies of 
motherhood and struggle not fully attended to the added complexity of motherhood in 
relation to disability.  
Our lived experiences are thus revealed to be theologically problematic, as they cannot be 
adequately reconciled within any one theological discourse. A theological response which 
attends to the particularity and distinctness of such experiences must be similarly particular 
and distinct; resisting the temptation to neatly round the edges of what is revealed to fit 
within the boundaries of what has already been written. In the following concluding chapter, I 
will draw together theological elements which hint at this particular experience, from these 
proposing a theological response which attends to the complexity and ongoingness of lived 
experiences which are simultaneously ambiguous and mundane, resisted yet unresolved.  
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Chapter 9) Pragmatic Unresolvement: Towards a new theology of struggle 
 
Practical theology wants to keep our relationship with the world so that we are never 
quite ‘done’ with things; rather, always undoing and redoing them, so that we can 
keep the ‘doing’ happening- passionate-, keen, expectant—never satisfied, never quite 
finished (Veling 2005, 7).  
This research has sought to develop an understanding of autism as a deeply ambiguous, 
misunderstood condition, resistant to disciplinary categorisation. I have demonstrated that 
autism occupies a position of incongruence in that it can be seen to be strongly shaped by 
dominant discourses of disability, and yet is ‘invisible’ and ‘dis-embodied’ in ways which 
disability theory largely neglects. Autism is thus ‘unresolved’ in many ways. Its cause is 
unclear; individual’s symptoms can be seen to change, improve, or regress in unpredictable 
ways. Thus, what we know and understand about autism is continually evolving. What has 
emerged from the sharing of our stories is that mothering a child on the spectrum is an 
experience which is similarly complex, distinct, and currently theologically occluded. Our 
children’s needs are varied and conflicting, often hidden within the seemingly unremarkable 
events of daily life. Facing these challenges in silence, we have had little opportunity to speak 
to our experiences. 
While I entered this thesis with an awareness that what I may find might ‘render my world 
stranger’ (Bennett et al 2018, 143), I perhaps naively anticipated that our accounts would, 
nonetheless, echo much of what has been written and find their theological home. However, 
as Goto and Kwok have reminded us, lived experiences, even when assumed to be common, 
are subjectively intersectional, and therefore inherently resistant to generalisation (2016, 29; 
2011,). In the preceding chapter, I have asked how practical theology may respond to such 
hidden voices which ‘unsettle our theological assumptions’. Goto suggests that our very 
compulsion to answer to this question, to generalise or categorise experiences to fit an 
expected outcome, is at the root of a fundamental problem in the way practical theology 
constructs knowledge (2016, 222). 
In attempting to reconcile our findings within traditional ‘conceptual frameworks’, Goto 
proposes that we inhibit our own ability to generate new knowledge, instead preserving what 
is already assumed to be known. What is ‘already known’ in practical theology, Tom 
Beaudoin suggests, is shaped by an unconscious and unquestioned white, male 
‘christianicity’ which forms the theological blueprint for our practices, knowledge and 
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interpretations (2016, 18). In his de-construction of the ‘practices’ of practical theology, 
Beaudoin reveals formulaic processes at work which he suggests unconsciously shape what 
we consider to be ‘theological;’  
…an intervention is normally framed in a theologically naturalized or essentialised 
fashion, such as claims about God-material showing itself in, through, or in relation to 
practice, along these familiar lines; God cares about X, Jesus is concerned with Y, the 
Spirit is known through Z (2016, 16).  
This formula suggests a coherence and orderliness in which practice and theory are 
unproblematically reconciled. The reality however, as we know, is much more complex.  
Approaching these tensions from a feminist, post-colonial perspective, Marcella Althaus-
Reid has been particularly vocal in her critique that practical theology has been constructed 
within occlusive discursive regimes which determine exactly whose experiences count as 
theologically significant (2000, 18). As a female practical theologian who is ‘outside’ of a 
faith tradition, I have all too often felt the seductive pressure to situate my writing in relation 
to what has gone before, to speak in a ‘Christian’ voice that is not necessarily my own in 
order to legitimise what I am saying. My participants themselves all had distinctly different 
attitudes to faith and relationships with the divine. Some, indeed, had none. If I had attempted 
to reconcile their voices within normative epistemological boundaries, would this have 
precluded them from even entering the discussion?  
Heather Walton considers that these issues raise fundamental questions as to ‘whether 
practical theologians possess the capability to engage with voices that resist incorporation 
into conventional frames of academic credibility and coherence’ (2018, 10). As someone 
whose voice resists such conventional frames, the question ‘but am I really a theologian?’ has 
plagued me throughout this research. Frustrated by the gaps and silences I encountered when 
attempting to locate our experience theologically, the gnawing doubt crept in ‘If theology 
does not speak to this experience, is it even really theological?’  
Drawing on Beaudoin’s work in Conundrums in Practical Theology (2016), Walton suggests 
that it is indeed right that we should question what is ‘theological’ about our work. However, 
she proposes that perhaps the gnawing anxiety this question provokes stems not from our 
own academic insecurities, but rather from a deeply hidden awareness that how we measure 
what is ‘theological’ is itself what is arguably problematic (2018, 226). Walton suggests that 
perhaps the answer is, ‘We have never been theologians’ (2018, 224). This provocative 
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declaration is not intended as a sweeping rejection of the work of theology, but rather an 
invitation to challenge our deeply held beliefs over what our task as theologians really is. 
Increasingly, practical theology is being challenged to adopt more diverse, interdisciplinary 
models of theological reflection. In a pluralistic globalised society, Walton proposes that 
instead of lingering within the nostalgic comfort of tradition, we ought to re-consider how 
practical theology can creatively respond to the ambivalence and ambiguity of our post-
secular world (2018, 226).  Developing this from a feminist phenomenological perspective, 
Elaine Graham has offered nuanced and sophisticated contributions on the challenges of post-
secularism and post-humanism within practical theology; urging us to find creative and 
engaging ways of moving between the ‘rocks and hard places’ of what we think we know, 
and what is really in front of us (2013, 60). Challenging us to become more comfortable with 
blurred boundaries and theological ambiguities, she reminds us that ‘difference serves as 
disclosive, in that a deeper and larger truth is revealed as resting in diversity and pluriformity’ 
(2002, 200).  
Beaudoin affirms that practical theology must therefore ‘hold open pre-Christian, Christian, 
post-Christian, and non-Christian meanings all at once, and let those meanings be non-
exclusive to each other’ (2016, 28). Considering what this may mean for the discipline, he 
asks ‘is practical theology left with empty hands? No-or rather, Yes: practical theology is left 
with hands that become theological by how they give away what was never the property of 
Christianity to begin with’ (2016, 28).  This is not to suggest that practical theology ought to 
‘throw the baby Jesus out with the bath water.’ Tradition is important. Rather, what the work 
of Beaudoin, Walton and Graham highlight is that practical theologians should now take the 
opportunity to critically examine our own epistemological preconceptions, defamiliarizing 
what we presume to be theology and pushing us towards new and diverse ways of knowing.  
In the preceding chapters, I have explored many different theological responses in 
considering how I may come to locate and draw meaning from this particular maternal 
experience. These theologies are all distinct, however I would argue that they largely share a 
common thread in that what we are offered are theological reconciliations, whether their aims 
are at the personal level of accepting love (Swinton, 2012; Mackaskill, 2019; Reynolds, 
2008) or at the social level of affecting change (Eisland, 1994; Block, 2002; Isasi-Díaz, 
2014). In the theologies explored, what can arguably be demonstrated is a thread of 
‘overcoming.’ Yet, as I have sought to highlight, our stories defied the archetypal narrative 
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pattern of ‘beginning, conflict, and resolution’ (Atkinson 1998, 3; Walton, 2018, 2). The 
concept of ‘overcoming’ thus offers little value to an experience of motherhood which is 
rooted in the ongoing daily realities of struggle, challenge, grief and joy from which there is 
no overcoming. I argue that in fact the suggestion of overcoming is potentially harmful, as it 
implies an end point to struggle which for some never comes.  
 In considering my participants struggle, I too fell into the trap of attempting to locate the 
‘how’ in their survival. How did they cope, how did they make sense of the struggle, how did 
they find meaning in their experiences? I myself have been asked this question many times. I 
have often been left wordless in response, at other times frustrated by its naiveté. The simple 
answer to this was, we just did. My subjects and I are all distinct. Some of us acknowledge 
relationships with the divine, others do not. Yes, we spoke about our experiences having 
made us better people, and they have doubtless provided a different perspective on life. Yet 
the ways in which we considered this transformation or the meanings we attached to it were 
all very different. While some possessed a belief in the revelatory power of their experience, 
others were merely trying to get through the day. This was our life, there was little choice. As 
our shared accounts have highlighted, there is often little opportunity for respite. 
While I have sought to demonstrate that whilst this particular maternal experience has been 
shown to be strongly shaped by socio political policies from above, the daily challenges of 
everyday living are also so all-encompassing that we must carefully ‘choose our battles’ in 
deciding exactly which struggle takes precedence. In being faced with such a choice, one or 
more battles are necessarily and inevitably lost. Our stories have reflected an active, ongoing 
resistance against institutional barriers to our children’s well-being; yet also admitted a 
weariness in acknowledging that our potential to ever fully overcome these is limited.  Thus, 
our ‘tactics of resistance’ are enacted with an acceptance that they are unlikely to solve all of 
our challenges, rather, they may ameliorate them just enough to fortify us for the next battle 
to be waged. 
Drawing from Bonnie Miller-McLemore (1994, 142) and Sarah Ruddick (1994, 20), I have 
situated this pragmatic adaptability as a distinctly active, anticipatory, and resilient form of 
‘maternal thinking’ which has significant generative potential for engaging with alternative 
stories of motherhood. Challenging the relegation of motherhood and its praxis to the 
‘domestic sphere’, I have proposed that the everyday tactics of attentive mothering I have 
described are instead creative sites of resistance against the absence of institutional support. 
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In attending to the conflict of struggles from both ‘above’ and ‘below’, I have considered the 
work of Isasi-Díaz (2002; 2014) and De Certeau (1989; 2002) as particularly constructive in 
illuminating the tension between the political and the personal on our daily lives. Walton, 
drawing from De Certeau, proposes that attention to the everyday reveals the unnameable and 
unknowable in our encounter with the other, in a way that opens us up to the disruptive 
possibility of transformation (Walton 2014, 184).  In reminding us that the ‘everyday’ is not a 
site of passive acceptance or mundane banality, but rather that some of our deepest 
theological challenges can be found within the mundane, messy, complexity of everyday 
moments; these theologies acknowledge the liberatory potential of the everyday as a site of 
struggle and resistance.  
I have expressed my deeply held reluctance, however, to disingenuously represent our 
experiences within a context of ‘liberation.’ Liberation implies a release from the sources of 
struggle, which, in this particular lived experience, is not only unrealistic, but is in many 
ways impossible. Autism is a life-long developmental condition. Many of the struggles we as 
mothers face have been shown to be directly related to autism symptomologies: which, as I 
have highlighted, may improve, but will never disappear. In a similar way, while the 
organisational and attitudinal sources of struggle we experienced may be resisted; they are so 
overarching that we often simply do not have the time, resources, or energy to overcome 
them.  
Describing her work on trauma as ‘suffering which does not go away,’ Shelly Rambo invites 
us to find ‘resonance in the unknowing’, resisting the urge to find theological justifications 
for experiences which are uncomfortable, unsettling, and unspeakable (2010, 15). Echoing 
Rambo’s reflection of the ongoing and everydayness of living with multiple traumas, recent 
work by Nicola Slee has highlighted the potential to become over-burdened by everyday 
‘multiple overwhelmings’ which are complex, overlapping and multi-faceted, yet also an 
inescapable part of life (2017, 21). Drawing from Deborah Creamer’s theology of limits as a 
natural, unremarkable part of living, Slee considers a theological re-framing of overwhelment 
and struggle as normative, rather than counter-intuitive, to our daily lives (2017; 26). 
Acknowledgement of our ‘limits’ not only speaks to the practical acceptance of what we 
cannot change but also defies the dominant theological imperative to seek resolutions. It does 
not assume that all struggles can be easily be made sense of, nor should they be, but rather 
invites us to endure; creatively, actively, pragmatically, in the midst of and in spite of our 
struggle. 
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Attending to the particularity of the experience developed throughout this thesis as an 
ongoing and distinctly difficult form of maternal struggle, I propose an interdisciplinary 
theological response which recognises that experiences are not a-historical, singular or 
unrelated, but rooted in the overlapping and complex forces of daily life which do not easily 
make sense within any singular framework. I propose that what is currently absent, and what 
is needed, is a theology which attends to life as it is and does not attempt to silence 
experiences it cannot neatly explain within the accepted discourses available to it. In 
response, I offer a new theological thinking, drawing from the theological approaches which 
have almost touched, but not quite reached, the lived experience I have revealed in this thesis. 
I invite you to consider a theological response which acknowledges that life is often 
unsettled, unresolved, and that not all challenges can be quite so neatly tucked away.  
Responding to the ambiguity and restlessness of lived experiences whose edges are blurred 
and permeable, I propose a theology of ‘pragmatic unresolvement.’ In drawing together the 
threads of active, every day maternal praxis revealed in this thesis, this theological response 
is pragmatic in proposing an acceptance of the cyclical, conflicting, and irresolvable forms of 
struggle which are out with our ability to conquer. Attentive to the irresolution and ambiguity 
of lived experience, this theological response is also unresolved, in that it recognises the 
ongoing, cyclical, and compounded nature of struggles which do not have a definitive end 
point, nor the potential for overcoming. Theologies which attend to the unsettled, the 
unknowable and the ambiguous may offer significant revelatory potential in challenging our 
deeply held assumptions about both our tasks as theologians, and our relationship to the 
divine. They may give space to reflect on experiences which are not temporal, immediately 
visible, or easily understood.  
Presenting us with the theological challenge to see and bear with the ongoingness and 
unsettledness of daily living, a theology of pragmatic unresolvement seeks to blur the 
boundaries between immanence and transcendence in a way which is fluid, adaptive and 
‘never quite done’ (Veling 2005, 7). In an age of ever increasing uncertainty, of economic 
instability, political tensions, and global health inequalities; it is ever more important that we 
move beyond dichotomous theological scripts of the Christian/ non-Christian, of divine 
omnipotence or secular abandonment, and ‘consider this more risky, immanent and 
vulnerable image of a God who permits Godself to be caught up within the overwhelming’ 
(Slee 2017, 31). Reminding us that our tasks as theologians is to risk transformation, Walton 
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revels in the complexity, ambiguity, chaos and wonder of life as it is, not as we expect to find 
it,    
I know I am most alive in the messy, compelling, tragi-passions of everyday life. I do 
not seek deliverance from them but rather revelations within them. In fact the thing I 
probably most fear is the resolution of contraries in a peaceable whole. The stark 
irresolutions we encounter (they make both beauty and tragedy) are what make us 
human, and for me these are also the key to understanding God in the light of 
incarnation (2014, 86).  
Conclusion  
 
In beginning this thesis, I considered that its theological contribution would be to highlight a 
lived experience which was occluded, obscured, and difficult to name. I anticipated, however, 
that the stories presented would find their theological home within the words and pages of 
others who had chosen to share their lives. Instead, what has emerged is a theological 
response to the gaps and silences in those narratives, to the tensions and conflicts between 
what is considered known in practical theology and lived experiences which defy to be 
known.  
In proposing a theology of pragmatic unresolvement, I do not presume to have offered a new, 
cohesive and complete methodological approach. Rather, in drawing from theologies of 
limits, I acknowledge that this theology too is limited. In undertaking research which looks to 
the particularity of mothers, I have admittedly excluded the voices of fathers, and indeed 
individuals with autism themselves. As I have touched upon in chapter four, this thesis also 
reflects a predominantly white lived experience, and thus does not investigate the ways in 
which racial inequalities may significantly impact this experience. This theological reflection 
has not been intended to be an exhaustive analysis of these many different perspectives; 
rather it is but one perspective of a complex issue.  
In highlighting the experience of mothers, I hope to have afforded insight into the experience 
of autism itself, opening a conversation into how we may reflect more authentically on 
autism. This is merely the beginning of a conversation. Its emergence was unanticipated but 
instinctive, responsive to the theological silences it encountered.  Thus, it is the beginning of 
something which is not yet done. It is a call to invite others to consider wading into the 
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murky waters of a theological engagement with life as unknowable, unsettled, and thoroughly 
untameable.   
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Epilogue 
 
Unprecedented   
Uncertain 
Socially Distant 
These are the watchwords which are defining our ‘new normal’, as it has come to be called. 
There is nothing normal about it, which, in a strange way for us, is almost comforting. We 
are used to making ‘new normals.’  
In the final weeks of my writing, our world was rendered stranger than even we were used to. 
We had heard rumblings, murmurs, a foreshadowing of what was to come. Yet when it came, 
it felt sudden, abrupt, like jumping into cold water you expected to be warm. On the day of 
the announcement, Micah had a mere twelve weeks left of Primary School. We had submitted 
a placing request to our high school of choice, and he was anxiously trying to stem back the 
flow of time until he would have to say goodbye to the faces, rooms, and routines he once 
knew. As it would turn out, goodbyes were to come a lot sooner than expected. We were in 
‘lockdown’. In response to the catastrophic damage COVID 19 was wreaking across the 
globe, we were plunged into a state of suspended animation, urged to ‘stay home, to save 
lives.’  
On that last school day, I waited at the same spot I had every day for seven years, but it was 
different now. He was different now. No longer did I stand in dread, anxious of the day he 
had had. Our days have slowly, gradually, become, for all intents and purposes, something 
close to ‘normal’. That last day was not to be one of those days. That last day, he came out of 
the main door. Flanked by his teachers, they formed a guard of honor, clapping as his class 
tearfully left school for what was likely to be the last time. At one time, his participation in 
this would have been unthinkable. That day I watched as he walked out shoulder to shoulder 
with his peers, fighting back tears, but a part of it all. We didn’t know if they would be able to 
return. We knew simply that we had to mark this moment for them, to pre-empt a conclusion 
that was yet to be drawn.  
It has since been 10 weeks since that day. There have now been over 400, 000 deaths 
worldwide. Our ‘new normal’ is composed of oxymorons; ‘self-isolation’, ‘socially distant’, 
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‘working from home.’ All of our carefully calibrated equilibriums have been thrown into 
disarray. Our routines, disordered.  Our social supports, severed.  
With all the unknown, and in the absence of the comforting and reliable structure school 
provided, many of the issues we had thought were things of the past have re-surfaced. The 
‘tics’ which we had believed to have disappeared years ago, are now a regular occurrence. 
Micah’s anxieties are manifesting in the ‘little things’ he may exert control over; once again, 
shoes are his nemesis. My days are spent anxiously trying to pre-empt these challenges, 
trying (often futilely) to create some sense of order to his little world. In between these 
attempts, I am working from home, writing, teaching…washing, cooking, comforting… 
mothering. On some days, I have been able to balance these commitments; on others, I have 
been left hollow, exhausted from the effort.  
And yet, there is a curious sense of calm in our imposed isolation. I have been able to re-
learn who Micah is, to see him through my own eyes, and not the stares of others. We have 
very recently learned that, despite our fears, he will in fact be able to attend the school we 
had hoped for. I am acutely aware, however, that many of the carefully choreographed 
mechanisms which have sustained his ability to manage will not follow him there. Right now, 
we don’t know what High school will look like when it comes. Will he continue to learn from 
home? Will I be able to return to work? We don’t know what the world will look like. I don’t 
know how he will cope with all the change, the uncertainty, the unknown. All I can hope for is 
that others will learn to enjoy Micah, and say, with ‘unfeigned sincerity, I am glad you are 
here.’  
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Post-Script: Micah’s own words.  
 
Having autism doesn’t necessarily mean that you are extremely hard to take care of or will 
always have trouble managing things. But I feel as though being diagnosed with autism is 
challenging, it’s a strange thought being different than other people. I also have Tourettes 
Syndrome, which can be challenging because I have had multiple ticks. ADHD is also a 
challenge. I take pills to limit my extra energy. It is sometimes difficult to take a pill every 
morning and night. Sometimes I forget to take it, but most of the time I remember.  
I think I have grown so much from when I was younger. I went from being an aggressive kid 
with anger issues to one of the most relaxed people I know. I think that when I was younger it 
was probably very challenging for my mum, and it still probably is. But I think we have 
bonded so much throughout my life it’s extraordinary. I hope she thinks so too. 
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Appendix 1: Participants and Interview Process 
Interview Process 
In beginning this research, I approached a local non-profit autism organisation and the staff 
team at my son’s primary school to facilitate a call for participants to contribute to this 
research. They kindly agreed to notify their respective communities about this research and 
invite mothers willing to share their experiences of parenting a child on the autism spectrum 
to participate.  
From the responses received, I selected three participants. These participants were selected on 
the basis that they did not possess any potential vulnerabilities (as defined by the University’s 
guidelines on vulnerable groups), that their child had a completed diagnostic assessment of 
autism, and that they had demonstrated awareness of and access to support if required.  
The interviews were conducted between June 25th 2019 and September 25th 2019. My son’s 
primary school offered the use of a confidential meeting room to ensure participant and 
researcher safety, and anonymity. Initially, I had anticipated to require between one and three 
interviews with each participant in order to establish a position of trust and to obtain 
sufficient depth of data.  
Each taking around two hours, my participants spoke candidly and openly about their 
diagnostic journey, their feelings during and after diagnosis, and the challenges they faced as 
a consequence of their child (or children’s) condition. The depth of detail in each interview 
was abundant enough that no follow up interviews were required, although this was left open 
as a possibility should my participants want to revise, add, or redact anything shared in the 
initial meeting.   
Participants 
The first participant, Naomi, is a mother at my son’s school whose son’s diagnosis mirrored 
my own (Aspergers, ADHD & Tourettes).  Naomi is married and had two other neurotypical 
children to accommodate in addition to her son. This was revealed to add a particularly 
distinct facet to her experience, in which she faced additional challenges as a result of the 
competing needs of her family. Naomi reflected that her identity had been somewhat taken 
over by her son’s diagnosis, in that she was unable to maintain her career, hobbies, and social 
life.  
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Scarlet is a local mother of a son and a daughter. Her older daughter has a diagnosis of ASD, 
while her son does not. Scarlet is divorced and lives alone with her two children. She 
described having a supportive partner, although they do not live together. Scarlet also 
described many challenges of lone parenting which resonated with my own experiences, 
particularly the enhanced stigmatisation we felt as a consequence of being single mothers. As 
a mother of two, Scarlet echoed Naomi’s conflict around balancing the needs of one child 
against the other. Scarlet felt very strongly that children with an autism diagnosis and their 
families were not adequately supported within the local authority, reflecting that many of the 
professionals she encountered displayed outdated or prejudiced attitudes towards autism 
which delayed her daughters diagnosis, and access to support.  
Abigail is a married mother of two children: a daughter and a son, both on the spectrum. She 
was able to compare the diagnostic process for each, noting that it was significantly longer, 
and more challenging, for her daughter than for her son. She felt similarly strongly that her 
family had been let down by inconsistent diagnostic processes and education policies which 
were slow to respond to additional support needs. Whilst her daughter is able to maintain a 
mainstream school placement (due to extensive strategies put in place by Abigail herself); 
Abigail’s son could not, with Abigail successfully advocating for an additional support needs 
placement for him.  
Themes  
Whilst each participant had distinctly different social histories and contexts, central themes 
emerged from their interviews which informed the results of this thesis. These included:  
• Difficulty in obtaining a diagnosis 
• Stigmatising and occlusive attitudes of others (particularly within professional 
contexts) 
• Conflicting emotions of relief, anxiety, fear and loss in relation to their child’s 
diagnosis 
• ‘Battling’, ‘Fighting’ and ‘Advocating’ for understanding and support for their 
children.  
Whilst each participant brought their own unique context to the interview, it became clear 
that each of us were navigating the challenges of our distinct maternal roles against much 
wider social and structural inequalities. This indicates that while the experience of mothering 
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a child on the autism spectrum can be demonstrated to be more challenging than typical 
mothering, some of these challenges could be ameliorated by more inclusive and supportive 
social policies.  
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Appendix 2: Sample Interview Questions 
 
• How old is your child?  
 
• At what age did your child receive a diagnosis?  
 
• How long did the diagnostic process take?  
 
• Do you feel the support available to you throughout the assessment process (if any) 
impacted your response to the diagnosis?  
 
• How do you feel the diagnosis has impacted your family? 
 
• How do you feel the diagnosis has impacted the relationship with your child?  
 
• Could you share some of your experiences or challenges of parenting, before or after 
diagnosis, which you feel may be relevant to the project? 
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Appendix 3: Consent Form 
 
 
 
College of Arts 
Theology and Religious Studies  
 
 
 
 
CONSENT TO THE USE OF DATA 
 
I understand that Eilidh Campbell is collecting data in the form of unstructured/ semi-structured 
interview, life writing, journal writing, or creative methods requested by participants for use in 
an academic research project at the University of Glasgow.  
 
This project will be researching the emotional impact of parenting a child on the Autism 
Spectrum and looking to establish parallels between some of the emotions experienced 
following a diagnosis of autism, and what are considered to be ‘grief emotions’ commonly 
experienced following a bereavement.  
 
This project will be using contemporary literature in the fields of theology, gender, grief and 
disability studies, along with excerpts of personal life stories from participants in their chosen 
method of communicating. For example, life writing, journal entries, or interviews. This 
research will be used to form the basis of the researcher’s thesis for submission in Doctorate 
of Practical Theology.  
 
I give my consent to the use of data for this purpose on the understanding that: 
1. I have discussed the project with the researcher and am aware that it deals with sensitive 
and potentially difficult issues. I have considered the potential risks associated with this and 
am willing to participate. I understand that I can withdraw from the project if I find 
participation uncomfortable or distressing.  
2. I have the choice to leave any question unanswered.  
3. Interviews: Interviews will be transcribed, and the recordings deleted. 
4. All data and materials will be anonymised, meaning my name and all identifying 
information will be removed or redacted.  
5. Project materials in both physical and electronic form will be treated as confidential and 
kept in secure storage (locked physical storage; appropriately encrypted, password-
protected devices and University user accounts) at all times. 
6. I may withdraw from the project at any point up until the anonymisation of materials is 
completed (October 1st 2019). If I choose to do so, all materials I have provided will be 
destroyed immediately.  
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7. I understand that once the materials are rendered anonymous, then in accordance with 
current legislation (General Data Protection Regulation) I will no longer have rights relating 
to the use of the data unless I have legitimate grounds for concern that I remain directly 
identifiable from it. 
8. Project materials will be destroyed on completion of the thesis.  
9. The thesis resulting from this research will be available in the public domain via the 
University Library website.  
10. The anonymised material may be cited and discussed in future publications derived from 
the thesis, both print and online. 
 
 
 
Name of Participant:  ___________________________ Date: _________  
  
 
 
Signature:  ____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
• Researcher’s name and email contact:  Eilidh Campbell 
e.campbell.3@research.gla.ac.uk 
• Supervisor’s name and email contact: Heather Walton  heather.walton@gla.ac.uk 
• Department address: No 4. The Square, University of Glasgow, G12 8QQ 
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Appendix 4: Participant Information Sheet 
 
The aim of this research is to gain a deeper understanding into the experiences and challenges 
faced by parents of children on the Autism Spectrum, in order for parents experiencing 
struggle to be better supported theologically and pastorally following a diagnosis. In 
particular, I will be looking to identify parallels between the emotions experienced following 
a diagnosis of autism and the emotions most commonly associated with the grieving process. 
I will be looking for personal accounts of experiences prior to, during, or following diagnosis; 
reflections on the emotions experienced during this process, or any thoughts on your 
experience of parenting with autism generally that you wish to share. As a mother of a child 
with Autism, I will also be a participant as well as researcher to this process. 
This project is intended for submission in April 2020.  
Q&A 
What is the research for? 
You will be participating in a research project for the purposes of a thesis submission for the 
completion of the researcher’s PhD at the University of Glasgow.  
Who is the researcher? 
The research is being undertaken by Eilidh Campbell, doctoral student in Practical Theology 
at the University of Glasgow who is also a mother to 10 year-old boy with Autism. The 
researcher has a full and current PVG, and has a background in social care.  
How long will the research take? 
The participant based involvement for this project will be during the final year of the research 
process, May 2019- April 2020, however your active participation in the project will consist 
of no longer than the initial 6 months of this duration.  The completion of your participation 
will be October 1st 2019. The frequency or duration of your involvement is optional, as your 
participation is voluntary. Your participation is anticipated to consist of 1-3 meetings, either 
by telephone or face to face in a meeting room facilitated by the local authority (Goldenhill 
Primary School).   
How will I be contacted? 
The methods of communication will be participant led, which means I will be requesting 
information in whatever format you feel most comfortable with.  I intend to conduct between 
1-3 semi structured interviews, either by telephone or face to face in a meeting room 
facilitated by Goldenhill Primary School.  However, should you prefer, you may choose to 
submit a creative contribution. This may take the form of life writing (i.e writing about a 
particular moment or experience from memory, and reflecting on that experience),  
unstructured interview (an open discussion in which you are free to tell me what you wish 
either in person or over telephone), journal entries should you wish to use a journal 
throughout the process, or any other creative methods which feel comfortable to you.  
How will my information be used? 
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Your responses will be used as independent case examples, highlighting aspects of 
experiences or emotions associated with parenting a child on the autism spectrum which will 
be explored in the thesis.  
Your responses will be presented as accurately to your own words as possible, and in the case 
of any edits, will be provided to you for your approval or amendment. You may review, 
amend, or withdraw any response given throughout the research process until the date 
provided for final completion of anonymised data (October 1st 2019). Your withdrawal may 
be given verbally, or in writing at which point any and all information provided by you will 
be destroyed.  
Will this be confidential?  
The research process is confidential. Any personal information collected will be minimal, and 
only what is necessary and fit for purpose in accordance with GDPR regulations.  Your data 
will be anonymised for presentation in the thesis, to ensure your confidentiality. Any 
information relating to you or provided by you will be stored securely and confidentially on a 
secure University storage drive and any unnecessary data will be destroyed. The research data 
collected will be destroyed following submission of the thesis.  
What do I do if I have questions, concerns or complaints during the process?  
As researcher I will be available throughout the process to answer any questions or concerns, 
however if you feel more comfortable raising any issues with an independent party, a 
University of Glasgow Doctoral supervisor will be available as point of contact.  
Contact details for researcher: Eilidh Campbell    email: e.campbell.3@research.gla.ac.uk 
Contact details for supervisor: Heather Walton email: heather.walton@gla.ac.uk 
Where can I find support during the research process? 
As researcher I aim to support you throughout the research process. However, prior to 
undertaking your involvement, we will rehearse the potentiality of any triggers or emotional 
distress, and discuss the resources and support currently accessed by you as your point of 
contact should you experience any stress or emotional disruption relating to discussing your 
child’s diagnosis. Further to your existing support networks, there are several external 
support agencies available to parents of children on the Autism Spectrum (See below).  
 
National Autistic Society Helpline: 0808 8004104   
NAS Parent to Parent Helpline: 0808 8004106 
Vale of Leven Autism and Aspergers Forum: 01389 750384 
West Dunbartonshire Social Work, Children and Families: 0141 562 8800. 
CAMHS (Children and Adolescent Mental Health Services): 01389 817324 
Adult Mental Health Service: 0141 941 4400. 
www.autismlinks.co.uk 
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Appendix 5: Risk Assessment 
 
1.1 Physical Risk 
Identified Risks 
Likeliho
od 
High/ 
Medium/ 
Low 
Potential 
Impact 
Who might 
be harmed 
and how 
Risk Management Mitigating Factors 
Low risks identified 
due to face to face 
interviewing process.  
  Low 
Physical risk 
to researcher 
Vulnerabilit
y of 
participant 
depending 
on location 
of meeting. 
The option of telephone 
interviews will be offered 
where appropriate. 
Meetings will take place in 
a private meeting room 
facilitated by the local 
primary school to my 
participants. This will 
function both to preserve 
privacy and anonymity, 
and as a safe space within a 
public building to ensure 
neither participant or 
researcher will be alone or 
vulnerable.  
The building itself has it’s own 
security, with secure door entry, 
security cameras and fire safety 
procedures in place.  
 
1.2 Psychological Risk 
Identified Risks 
Likeliho
od 
High/ 
Medium/ 
Low 
Potential 
Impact 
Who might 
be harmed 
and how 
Risk Management Mitigating Factors 
Discussion of a 
sensitive topic may 
produce strong 
emotions/ distress in 
participants. 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants 
may find it 
difficult or 
upsetting to 
share their 
stories, 
particularly 
if this is the 
first time.  
There will be a clear and 
open dialogue with 
participants before 
consenting to the research 
project on the potential 
emotional impact. During 
the initial conversation, 
researcher and participant 
will rehearse the 
potentiality of emotional 
As the research is also personal 
to myself as researcher, there is 
also the risk of emotional 
distress in my own undertaking 
of the project.  
This will be managed through 
supervision and the external 
support resources of the 
participants.  
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Vulnerability of 
participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the 
participants 
will be 
adults not 
perceived to 
be of a 
‘vulnerable’ 
group, 
however, 
they are 
caring for a 
vulnerable 
group and 
the sensitive 
nature of the 
topic may 
evoke 
emotional 
responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
distress and confirm the 
pre-existing resources and 
support accessed by the 
participant which they may 
reach out to in such an 
event. The intended 
participants all have 
existing support networks 
ranging from the local 
CHALMS team, social 
work, school counsellor 
and local autism groups.  
 
 
 
 
The researcher has a 
current full PVG for both 
adults and children, and a 
background in social care 
working with vulnerable 
adults with complex 
support needs. Through 
this role, protection of 
vulnerable adults course 
has been completed.  
Regular informal check ins 
will be had with 
participants to ensure their 
well-being. Participants 
will be reminded that this 
research may bring up 
emotional subjects and that 
they may partially or fully 
withdraw from the process 
at any point should they 
experience distress or be 
affected by external life 
stressors which may be 
compounded by the 
research process. 
Participants will be 
encouraged to make use of 
their preexisting supports, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes in circumstances will be 
monitored, as dramatic life 
events may potentially increase a 
participants vulnerability 
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Potential Disruption to 
family life 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Being known to the 
researcher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants 
may find 
sharing 
challenging 
experiences 
may bring 
up tension in 
the family 
unit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants 
may feel 
anxiety 
about being 
known to the 
researcher in 
terms of 
confidentiali
ty or 
potential 
judgement.  
however information will 
be provided as to external 
support agencies available 
to participants should they 
be experiencing emotional 
distress.  
 
 Regular check ins will be 
undertaken with the 
participants involved to 
ensure their emotional 
needs are being met and 
that their circumstances 
have not changed 
(impacting their potential 
vulnerability). Participants 
will be encouraged to 
access their existing 
support agencies should 
difficulties arise, and will 
be provided with 
information as to 
alternative support 
agencies should they 
prefer.   
 
The participants will be 
voluntary and already 
known to the researcher, so 
a relationship of trust has 
been established. They will 
only be requested to 
provide information which 
they feel comfortable 
sharing, and may withdraw 
this permission at any time.  
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